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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION:  
SPAIN, POLAND AND TURKEY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 
by 
Engin Ibrahim Erdem 
Florida International University, 2011 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Tatiana Kostadinova, Major Professor 
 The study explored when, under what conditions, and to what extent did European 
integration, particularly the European Union’s requirement for democratic conditionality, 
contribute to democratic consolidation in Spain, Poland, and Turkey? On the basis of a 
four-part definition, the dissertation examined the democratizing impact of European 
integration process on each of the following four components of consolidation: (i) 
holding of fair, free and competitive elections, (ii) protection of fundamental rights, 
including human and minority rights, (iii) high prospects of regime survival and civilian 
control of the military, and (iv) legitimacy, elite consensus, and stateness. To assess the 
relative significance of EU’s democratizing leverage, the thesis also examined domestic 
and non-EU international dynamics of democratic consolidation in the three countries.  
 By employing two qualitative methods (case study and process-tracing), the study 
focused on three specific time frames: 1977-1986 for Spain, 1994-2004 for Poland, and 
1999-present for Turkey. In addition to official documents, newspapers, and secondary 
sources, face-to-face interviews made with politicians, academics, experts, bureaucrats, 
and journalists in the three countries were utilized. 
 vii 
 
 The thesis generated several conclusions. First of all, the EU’s democratizing 
impact is not uniform across different components of democratic consolidation. 
Moreover, the EU’s democratizing leverage in Spain, Poland, and Turkey involved 
variations over time for three major reasons: (i) the changing nature of EU’s democratic 
conditionality over time (ii) varying levels of the EU’s credible commitment to the 
candidate country’s prospect for membership, and (iii) domestic dynamics in the 
candidate countries. Furthermore, the European integration process favors democratic 
consolidation but its magnitude is shaped by the candidate country’s prospect for EU 
membership and domestic factors in the candidate country. Finally, the study involves a 
major policy implication for the European Union: unless the EU provides a clear prospect 
for membership, its democratizing leverage will be limited in the candidate countries.  
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
   
Do international organizations matter for democratic consolidation? In recent 
years, increasing numbers of studies have argued that international organizations have 
made substantial contributions to democratic consolidation processes in many countries.1 
Within this body of scholarly works, the democratizing impact of the European Union 
(EU) has attracted a great amount of attention. Particularly important, the EU’s 
democratic conditionality for membership has been considered as a powerful mechanism 
leading to institutional and normative changes in the EU candidate countries.2 These 
changes have been related to a wide range of issues such as fundamental rights and 
freedoms, civil-military relations, human and minority rights, corruption, and judicial 
reforms. Yet, the EU’s democratizing impact has not been uniform among the candidate 
countries as the impact has involved variations across different countries during the EU 
accession process. Then, one should deal with the central question: when and under what 
conditions the European Union plays a democratizing role for the candidate countries? 
Identifying these conditions will help us understand why the EU’s impact varies across 
countries and over time. It will also illuminate the relative salience of the EU’s 
                                                          
1 For example; Pevehouse 2005, Ziolanka 2001, Kelley 2004 and Magen et al 2008 
 
2 For instance; Linden 2002, Pridham 2001, Vachudova 2005, Kubicek 2003, Dimitrova 2004, Grabbe 
2006, Pop-Eleches 2007, Schimmelfennig et al 2005, Williams 1999, Haughton 2007, Schimmelfenning 
2007, Pridham 2002, and Rechel 2008.  While the EU driven institutional changes may involve the 
adoption of laws conforming to the EU’s requirement for democratic conditionality, the normative changes 
can refer to the spread of democratic norms among political elite and people in the candidate countries. 
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democratizing role vis-à-vis the domestic dynamics of democratic consolidation in these 
countries. 
The dissertation will attempt to explain these conditions through a comparative 
study of Spain, Poland and Turkey. Choosing one country from each of three different 
waves of European enlargement offers an opportunity to assess to what extent the EU’s 
democratizing role varies over time.3 Moreover, a detailed analysis of the three cases 
would enable an assessment of the extent to which domestic political dynamics contribute 
to and/or limit the EU’s democratizing impact. The existing literature in this area has 
discussed a variety of intervening variables that work with or against the EU’s 
democratic conditionality.4 Through a careful examination of domestic politics in Spain, 
Poland and Turkey during the EU accession process, the dissertation is expected to 
identify significant domestic factors that shaped the EU’s democratizing influence. For 
this purpose, the study will employ process-tracing method to explore the connections 
among the EU’s democratic conditionality, domestic intervening variables, and 
democratic consolidation. The analysis of sequences of events - process tracing-, will 
enable us to identify the degree to which the three countries have implemented 
democratization reforms in line with the EU’s conditionality principle. In the end, the 
study will help to build a thorough understanding of when, how and under what 
                                                          
3 For example, the EU’s 1993 Copenhagen Criteria, which set the democratic conditionality for the Central 
and Eastern European candidates, include the areas relating to human and minority rights. These areas were 
not part of the democratic conditionality during the Southern enlargement (1975-86).      
 
4 For example; the EU’s credibility for the membership goal, the degree to which government in the 
candidate country has a commitment to the prospect of EU membership, the elections, party composition of 
the national parliaments, the level of elite and mass support for the EU membership (Pridham 2001, 
Vachudova 2005, Grabbe 2006, Kelley 2004). 
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conditions European integration matters for the democratic consolidation of the three 
countries. 
The study has significance for both theoretical and policy-related reasons. On the 
theoretical side, it will contribute to three major bodies of literature: (i) international 
dynamics of democratization (ii) the domestic-international linkages, and (iii) European 
enlargement. With cross-country and within-country comparisons, the dissertation will go 
beyond the simple question of whether domestic or international dynamics of 
democratization matter most; it will offer a more nuanced analysis that respects spatial 
and temporal variations. In addition, the study will contribute to recent debates on how 
domestic and international politics are linked to each other.5 Finally, the comparative 
study of three EU candidate countries will contribute to the literature on European 
enlargement. Overall, the dissertation is expected to enhance our knowledge in the 
specified fields of international relations, comparative politics and European studies. 
The study is also significant for the policy world. Comparative study of Spain, 
Poland and Turkey has a potential to generate policy recommendations for both the EU 
and the candidate (current and future) countries. For example, the Spanish and Polish 
experiences might provide lessons for the ongoing process of Turkey-EU accession 
negotiations, and help in assessing the EU’s contribution to the Turkish democracy. 
Finally, the analysis of the EU’s democracy promotion could generate policy conclusions 
for regional organizations in other parts of the world.  
 
                                                          
5 For example; Gourevitch 1978, Katzenstein 1978, Gourevitch 1986, Putnam 1988, Evans et al 1993, 
Keohane and Milner 1996, and Sikkink 2005. 
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Literature Review 
The dissertation inquiry is situated at the intersection of three bodies of research. 
First, it is related to the democratization literature in comparative politics, particularly to 
the arguments emphasizing international dynamics of regime change. Second, the 
literature on domestic-international linkages in international relations provides a key 
theoretical framework for the research project. Third, the Europeanization and EUization 
(of the member and candidate countries) literature in the area of European studies, 
including works on the EU’s democratic conditionality, is another major point of 
departure for the dissertation work. In what follows, a brief review of the three bodies of 
research will take place. 
 
(i) International Dynamics of Democratization 
The democratization studies have constituted an important component of the 
discipline of political science in the past half-century. Cultural and structural arguments 
were the dominant mode of thinking in the 1950 and 1960s. While Almond and Verba’s 
The Civic Culture (1963) linked democratic stability to civic attitudes, Barrington 
Moore’s Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (1966) brought a power-
centered, class coalitional analysis of regime change. Modernization theories of 
democratization argued for a causal relationship between economic development and 
democracy. Lipset’s seminal article, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy” (1959) was 
a pioneer of these studies.  
Later, the literature witnessed the rise of critics of liberal modernization theories. 
The bureaucratic-authoritarian model of authoritarianism, driven by the Marxist 
 5 
 
dependency theory, asserted that dependent capitalist development resulted in 
authoritarianism rather than democracy in the developing countries.6 In addition, 
modernization theory attracted criticisms beyond the dependency theorists. One 
important critic of the theory in the 1960s, Samuel Huntington, contended that high levels 
of political participation, in the absence of corresponding political institutions, caused 
political instability and democratic breakdowns in the developing countries.7 Therefore, 
he underlined the significance of political institutions for the stability of democratic 
regimes. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the “transitology’’ studies in the literature shifted 
attention to non-structural dynamics such as moderation, contingency, leadership-elites, 
and bargaining. In this respect, Dankwart Rustow’s article, “Transitions to Democracy” 
(1970) and O’Donnell and Schmitter’s edited, multi-volume work, Transitions from 
Authoritarian Rule (1986) can be noted as major examples. Indeed, the increase in cases 
of democratic transitions from the mid-1970s to the early 1990s (the “third wave” of 
democratization8) made the “transitology” genre highly relevant for the policy world.  
In the 1990s, the democratization literature witnessed a growing number of 
eclectic studies. Huntington’s The Third Wave (1992), Rueschemeyer et al’s Capitalist 
Development and Democracy (1992), Linz and Stepan’s Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation (1996) and Ruth Collier’s Paths to Democracy (1999) can 
be taken as key examples of these studies. The central feature of the eclectic studies is 
                                                          
6 For a larger discussion on this approach, see Collier 1979, The New Authoritarianism in Latin America. 
7 Huntington 1968, Political Order in Changing Societies 
 
8 Huntington 1992, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century 
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their inclusion of multiple factors (economic development, state, class, elites, institutions, 
prior regime type, civil society, attitudes etc.) to explain the democratic transitions and 
consolidations. 
A major weakness for the democratization literature, from the 1950s to the early 
1990s, was related to the domestic orientation of comparative politics. The research on 
regime change focused primarily on domestic factors, and ignored international dynamics 
to a large extent.9 Two major developments in world politics have posed serious 
challenges for the domestic bias. First, the unexpected collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the breakdown of communist systems in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have 
demonstrated the importance of international factors for democratic transitions. Later, the 
EU membership process, particularly the democratic conditionality, resulted in sweeping 
democratic reforms in the CEE countries. Second, the increasing salience of international 
financial institutions, NGOs, and international organizations in the contemporary age of 
globalization has made the boundaries between the domestic and the international less 
visible. All these developments require the democratization literature to pay more 
attention to international factors (Remmer 1995: 103-106). 
Taking international actors into consideration to explain democratization 
processes comes with two major challenges. First, a variety of international factors can 
                                                          
9 A few exceptions should be noted here; In Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (1971) R. Dahl put 
foreign control/domination as one of the seven key conditions shaping democratic transitions. In addition, 
Theda Skocpol’s States and Social Revolutions (1979) emphasized the importance of international contexts 
for the outbreak of revolutions in France, China and Russia. Moreover, the bureaucratic authoritarianism 
approach held that the oligarchy of bureaucratic-technocratic elite (coalition of military, domestic 
bourgeois and international capitalists) resulted in authoritarianism in many Latin American countries in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Finally, the Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (1986) project assessed the role of 
US and European policies of democracy promotion for democratic transitions in the 1970s and 1980s. 
However, the project provided only a secondary importance to international factors while assigning the 
primary role to domestic dynamics. 
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have influence over democratic transitions and consolidations. International 
organizations, NGOs, regional organizations, transnational party linkages, the Catholic 
Church, the international political system, international economic crises and globalization 
itself all might play a role when a country experiences democratic breakdown, transition 
or consolidation. Then, one should identify the degree to which each relevant 
international factor has a positive or negative effect in these processes. Of course, this 
task is not an easy one, as it requires a rigorous effort to deal with the causal mechanism 
between international factors and regime change outcomes.   
The second challenge is related to the interaction between domestic and 
international dynamics of democratization. Although the domestic phenomena alone may 
not be sufficient to understand the causes and nature of democratization, they are 
critically important not only in making a direct impact on democratization but also in 
responding to international dynamics. In other words, the international does not work in a 
vacuum; its impact has been filtered through domestic politics (Remmer 1995, Keohane 
and Milner 1996).   
 
 (ii) Domestic-International Linkages 
The domestic-international linkages genre is a relatively new research area in the 
field of international relations. The two major International Relations (IR) theories, 
realism/neorealism and neo-liberal institutionalism, have dealt with neither international 
sources of domestic politics nor the domestic-international interactions. The state-centric 
realist theories have been primarily interested in international outcomes such as war and 
alliances, and they have not assigned any autonomous role to international institutions 
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and multinational corporations (MNCs) (Waltz 1979, Mearsheimer 1994). In contrast to 
the realist theories, neo-liberal institutionalism has underlined the importance of MNCs 
and international organizations to promote cooperation among states (Keohane and Nye 
1977). Nonetheless, the neo-liberal focus has to a large extent remained at the 
international level with little attention to the domestic impact of international politics.  
Three major developments have brought the domestic-international linkages into 
the forefront of the disciplinary agenda in the IR field. First, the 1973 oil crisis and 
subsequent developments have puzzled many IR scholars trying to explain different 
domestic responses to the crisis. The major challenge has been to explain why the 
international impact differs across countries. The research question made unpacking 
domestic politics necessary to understand cross-country variation. Then, many scholars 
got involved into the study of the domestic-international linkages. Peter Gourevitch’s 
path-breaking article, “The Second Image Reversed” (1978), and his book, Politics in 
Hard Times (1986) along with Peter Katzenstein’s Between Power and Plenty (1978) can 
be taken as foremost examples in this genre.  
Second, the rising pace of globalization in the 1980s and the 1990s expanded this 
research. Keohane and Milner’s edited volume, Internationalization and Domestic 
Politics (1996) asked how and through which mechanisms economic globalization 
influences national economic policies. The study emphasizes the significance of two 
intervening variables -domestic interests/coalitions and domestic institutions- to 
understand the differential impact of economic globalization across countries.10 
                                                          
10 While the Frieden and Rogowski chapter in this volume takes domestic coalitions as the key intervening 
variable, the Garrett and Lange chapter stresses the importance of domestic institutions. 
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Third, transnational actors and relations have been increasingly salient features of 
world politics in recent decades. Several scholars of sociological 
institutionalism/constructivism have argued that non-state actors including NGOs, 
international organizations, transnational social movements and advocacy networks have 
changed the state behavior regarding the rules of war, human rights, development, 
environment and women’s rights.11 An important finding from the transnational relations 
studies is that the transnational impact is not a given; rather, the impact is contingent 
upon the domestic politics of target countries. For example, Kathryn Sikkink’s model of 
“dynamic multilevel governance” suggests that the level of success for a transnational 
advocacy network depends on the nature of opportunity structure at both the domestic 
and international levels (2005: 151-55). For example, if a transnational human rights 
campaign cannot find a strong ally or favorable structure at the domestic level, then it is 
less likely to change the state behavior. As a result, the domestic-international linkages 
are critically important in order to explain the differential impact of transnational actors 
across countries. 
 Arguing that international economic forces, international organizations and 
transnational actors have increasingly shaped state behavior and domestic politics is not 
enough. The key challenge here is to identify significant domestic variables that interact 
with the international or the transnational factors. The domestic-international linkages 
literature is a relatively new research frontier in the field of international relations. By 
challenging the conventional boundaries between comparative politics and international 
relations, this literature is faced with two major tasks. First, it needs to establish models 
                                                          
11  For example, Finnemore 1996, Keck and Sikkink 1998, Khagram et al 2002 
 10 
 
that can successfully integrate the domestic and international levels of analysis. Second, it 
has to specify relevant domestic dynamics that pave the way for the differential impact of 
the international/transnational across countries. A good opportunity to handle these tasks 
is provided by the research on the European Union’s democratizing efforts in the 
candidate countries.  
  
(iii) Europeanization, “EUization” and Democratic Conditionality 
 A concrete regional case for the first two literatures discussed earlier comes from 
Europe. In this regard, two overlapping bodies of research, Europeanization and 
EUization, have provided a good opportunity to examine how regionalization of domestic 
politics can occur. While Europeanization studies have been dealt with public policies 
and legislation of the EU member states12, the research on EUization has examined the 
EU’s pressures over the candidate countries to comply with the acquis communautaire 
(“EU acquis”), which refers to the total body of EU law.13 The European Union has 
required the candidate countries to meet the Union’s democratic conditionality before 
launching the accession negotiations, which are mostly dealt with the harmonization of 
candidate countries’ legislation with the EU acquis. An important puzzle in this area is 
                                                          
12 Three major examples of such studies; Caporaso et al (eds) 2001, Transforming Europe: 
Europeanization and Domestic Change, Schimmelfennig et al (eds) 2005, The Europeanization of Central 
and Eastern Europe, Featherstone and Radaelli (eds) 2003, The Politics of Europeanization.  
 
13 The EU acquis involves more than one hundred thousand pages that includes the treaties on which EU 
was formed, the changes to these treaties, the legislation enacted by the EU institutions (the Commission, 
the Council, the Court of Justice i.e.), and  the EU’s declarations and resolutions. Candidate countries have 
to accept the ‘acquis’ before they join the EU, and must make the acquis part of their national legislation. In 
addition to fulfilling the political criteria, alignment with the EU acquis chapters (31 chapters for the CEE 
candidates, 35 chapters for Croatia and Turkey) constitutes the heart of accession negotiations between the 
EU and candidate countries. Complying with the acquis requires extensive standardization of public 
policies among the EU member states. On the acquis chapters, see “Chapters of the acquis” at the website 
of the EU: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu
/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm#5 
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that the EU candidate countries complete this process within varying periods of time. 
While some countries followed a faster path in the accession process, other countries met 
the democratic conditionality and the EU acquis requirements in a longer time frame. 
Domestic politics of the candidate countries emerges as critically important in explaining 
this variation.  
 The literature in this area has thus far discussed a variety of domestic factors that 
shaped the EU’s democratizing impact. For example, Pridham 2001 argues that 
consensus among political parties over the EU accession process is a major dynamic. In 
addition, the study underlines the commitment level of the governing party to the EU 
process. Then, one can expect that a candidate country with a high degree of cross-party 
consensus and political will for membership will handle the EU related democratization 
reforms in a shorter period of time. Otherwise, the EU may have limited democratizing 
impact when it encounters a political landscape that is not very favorable at the party and 
government level, for European integration. In this regard, Pridham and many others 
have noted a clear cut example: Slovakia under the 1994-98 Meciar government. The 
authoritarian, nationalist, and Euro-skeptical Meciar government retarded the country’s 
bid for the EU membership, and fell behind the first-track CEE candidate countries, 
which started accession negotiations in March 1998.14 Later, Slovakia’s EU process did 
get accelerated only after the election of the pro-EU Dzurinda government in October 
1998. The significance of government change through elections was also relevant for 
Bulgaria and Romania. The 1996 presidential elections in Romania and the 1997 
                                                          
14 These countries are Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia, and Cyprus. 
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parliamentary elections in Bulgaria created a more favorable domestic context for the 
EU’s democratizing impact (Vachudova 2005).  
 The literature on the EU’s democratic conditionality cites several other domestic 
factors that substantially shape the EU’s democratic leverage. These factors include mass 
and elite support for EU membership, availability of pro-EU groups in society, adoption 
costs of the EU related reforms for government and state elites, ethnic nationalism, and 
cultural traditions/norms (Kelley 2004, Williams 1999, Checkel 1999, Ziolanka 2001, 
Schimmelfennig 2007, Rupnik 2000, Pridham 2002, Kubicek 2003). The existence of 
numerous factors poses a serious challenge in identifying the causal process between the 
EU impact and the democratization outcome. For this reason, the analysis of domestic 
politics is indispensable in explaining the relative value of European integration for the 
candidate countries. In this regard, the domestic-international linkages framework offers 
a good opportunity to handle such a research task.  
 How does the European Union promote democracy in the candidate countries? 
The EU has several mechanisms of influence such as the provision of legislative and 
institutional templates, monitoring through annual progress reports, financial assistance, 
and the democratic conditionality principle (Grabbe 2006, Schimmelfennig et al 2005). 
Particularly important, the strict democratic conditionality rules have succeeded in paving 
the way for fundamental institutional and normative changes in favor of better democratic 
standards in the candidate countries. Moreover, the European integration process has 
made some indirect democratizing impacts: socializing elites, institutions and society into 
democratic norms and attitudes, empowering pro-democracy groups, and promoting 
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better democratic governance through public administration reforms (Pevehouse 2005, 
Pop-Eleches 2007). 
 An important finding from the studies on European integration is that the EU’s 
democratizing impact varies across countries and over time. As suggested earlier, 
variation across countries is much related to the domestic political structure of candidate 
countries. For the temporal variation, many scholars have underlined the changing status 
of relationship between the EU and the candidate country. In the case of Eastern 
enlargement, the EU did not have much democratizing leverage in the early 1990s, when 
it avoided giving a clear prospect for full membership. With the establishment of the 
Copenhagen conditionality rules in 1993, the EU did have an increasing amount of 
leverage on the candidate countries (Grabbe 2006, Vachudova 2005, Atanasova 2004, 
Rupnik 2000). Furthermore, the EU’s democratizing impact has varied across different 
policy areas such as human rights, minority rights, public administration and judicial 
reforms (Dimitrova 2004, Ram 1999, Haughton 2007). For example, Bernd Rechel 
argues that the EU has had only a limited impact on minority rights in Bulgaria for 
several reasons: the failure of addressing public attitudes towards minorities, the absence 
of clear EU conditionality in this policy area, superficial monitoring, and the lack of 
expertise on minority rights (2008: 171). Overall, the existing literature asserts that the 
EU’s democratizing impact is not uniform; it varies across the candidate countries, policy 
areas and over time. In this regard, comparisons across the different EU candidate 
countries could be very helpful to identify these variations.  
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 The Three Literatures and the Dissertation: Potential Areas of Contribution 
 The dissertation will contribute to the three literatures in several ways. First, the 
three literatures are relatively new areas of academic interest in the discipline of political 
science. Even though there has been increasing attention to these issues over the past two 
decades, the theoretical ground is still underdeveloped and warrants further research. A 
comparative study of Spanish, Polish and Turkish democracy in the context of European 
integration, if theoretically grounded and methodologically rigorous, can enhance our 
knowledge in the three research areas.  
Second, the attempt to understand the relative significance of European 
integration for democratic consolidation processes of these countries requires unpacking 
the domestic politics. The domestic-international linkages framework is a necessary part 
of the inquiry about the international sources of democratic consolidation. By carefully 
examining the domestic political contexts of Spain, Poland, and Turkey through the 
process-tracing method, the dissertation will identify the power and the limits of 
European integration for democratic consolidation. In particular, such a comparative 
study will help to clarify the relevant domestic intervening variables which shape the 
EU’s democratizing impact.  
Third, choosing one country from the three different waves of European 
enlargement will illuminate the varying nature of EU conditionality rules over time. The 
dissertation would be a good addition to studies that compare and contrast different EU 
enlargement phases. Finally, the research outcome will contribute to studies that examine 
the conditions under which regional/international organizations help foster democratic 
consolidation.    
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Research Design 
Research Question:  When, under what conditions, and to what extent did 
European integration, particularly the European Union’s democratic conditionality, 
contribute to democratic consolidation in Spain, Poland, and Turkey?  
The question deals with two major research tasks: (1) to clarify the causal 
mechanism of the interaction between EU’s democratizing impact and domestic political 
factors, and (2) to assess the relative significance of the EU’s democratizing role vis-à-vis 
the domestic and non-EU international dynamics of democratization in these countries. 
 
Hypotheses: 
# 1 The European integration process, particularly the EU’s democratic 
conditionality, favors democratic consolidation but its magnitude is conditioned by 
domestic factors. Therefore, one can expect that the EU’s democratizing impact will be 
limited in the face of an unfavorable domestic context. In addition, the candidate country 
will have faster progress in the process of democratic consolidation when favorable 
domestic factors converge with the EU promoted political reforms. 
# 2 The degree to which the candidate country has prospect for membership 
affects the democratizing leverage of the European Union. Then, the hypothesis 
generates the following expectation: the EU’s democratizing contribution will not be 
significant unless the EU provides a clear prospect of membership. 
The existing literature on European integration has suggested several domestic 
factors that shape the EU’s democratizing impact: the degree to which the national 
government has a commitment to the EU membership process, the degree to which 
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parties in the parliament have support for the EU accession process, and the level of mass 
support for European integration. The process-tracing analysis of the three cases will 
identify the relevant domestic factors in influencing the EU’s democratizing impact. 
 
 
Independent Variable 
The independent variable in this dissertation is the European integration process, 
which refers to the EU’s institutional and non-institutional dynamics of democratization 
in the period preceding accession to the Union. Henceforth, the EU’s democratization 
effects after the accession will not be part of the dissertation. The study will observe the 
EU’s democratizing impact in Spain, Poland, and Turkey for the following years, 
respectively: 1977-86, 1994-2004, and 1999 to present. As a result, the European 
integration process in this study will be bounded by a temporal limit. 
The EU’s democratizing impact in the dissertation is operationalized through the 
EUs institutional and non-institutional dynamics of democracy promotion. The EU’s 
policy of democratic conditionality is the pillar of institutional dynamics. In addition, 
legislative and institutional templates, monitoring through annual progress reports and the 
membership prospect are other key resources that give the EU an important leverage to 
shape democratization processes of the candidate countries. 
As for non-institutional effects of the European integration process, two dynamics 
are noteworthy. First, accession to the European Union, which is composed of only 
democratic members, poses a significant symbolic value for the candidate countries. As a 
result, the EU accession signifies having both European and democratic identity for these 
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countries. Second, the European integration process includes a dynamic of socialization 
to democratic norms for political, economic, and intellectual elites of the candidate 
countries through communication with not only the EC institutions but also European 
political parties and civil society. 
In assessing the democratizing impact of European integration in the pre-
accession period, the dissertation will also look at whether and to what extent non-EU 
international factors play a role at that time. In this regard, the Council of Europe, NATO, 
and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are the major 
international players, which may have democratizing effects in the EU candidate 
countries.  
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is democratic consolidation. However, in the existing 
literature on democratization, there is no standard, commonly agreed definition for it. 
Many scholars agree that democratic consolidation is largely a separate phenomenon 
from democratic transition although the two may sometime overlap in a period of time.  
 
Democratic Consolidation: A Conceptual Discussion 
Defining democratic consolidation is not an easy task. In parallel with the 
existence of various definitions of democracy in the literature, the concept of democratic 
consolidation suffers a similar problem. Some scholars argue that democratic 
consolidation is primarily related to the prospect of regime survival. Then, the key issue 
at stake is the degree to which democracy is free from the risk of a breakdown (Schedler 
1998: 103-5). As a result, consolidated democracies differ from unconsolidated 
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democracies in thay they enjoy higher prospects of endurance. According to maximalist 
accounts of democratic consolidation, consolidated democracies are distinct by a higher 
quality along many dimensions such as state-society relations, legislative-executive 
relations, participation, and equality.15  
Although it is not easy to draw a clear-cut line when identifying consolidation, 
one can discuss several elements that make a democracy less or more consolidated. First, 
rulers are elected by free and fair elections through universal suffrage. However, holding 
elections is not enough to make a democracy consolidated. In addition, some behavioral 
and normative characteristics are also required. On the behavioral side, many scholars 
have suggested that democratic control of the military and absence of strong anti-system 
parties/groups are essential for the consolidation (Huntington 1991, Valenzuela 1992, 
Gunther and Higley 1992, Mainwaring et al 2000, Pridham 2001). If a country 
experiences coups or serious coup plots, then this county suffers the lack of serious 
component of democratic consolidation.  The behavioral dimension also includes the fact 
that no ethnic group is seriously working for secession in a consolidated democracy (Linz 
and Stepan 1996).   
Democratic consolidation has normative and attitudinal features too, such as a 
high degree of public support for the democratic regime (even under conditions of low 
government effectiveness when dealing with major economic problems), internalization 
of democratic norms at the elite and mass public levels, broad elite consensus on the 
basic rules of the democratic game, and legitimation of democratic institutions (Linz and 
Stepan 1996, Gunther et al 1995, Pridham 2001). In addition to the behavioral and 
                                                          
15 For a discussion on the quality of democracy; see Diamond and Morlino 2005 (eds), particularly the 
introductory chapter in this volume. 
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normative dimensions, some scholars have suggested two more elements: (1) stronger 
civil society, and (2) protection of fundamental rights and liberties (Linz and Stepan 
1996, Mainwaring et al 2000).  
Overall, the attribution of various characteristics to democratic consolidation 
shows that it is a multidimensional and complex phenomenon. This also implies that 
holding elections even by free and fair means, does not guarantee consolidation. An 
important question in democratization studies is whether putting the threshold for 
democratic consolidation too high can make this concept complicated and impractical. 
Andreas Schedler’s analysis of democratic consolidation is helpful here.  
Schedler classifies political regimes into four categories: authoritarianism, 
electoral democracy, liberal democracy, and advanced democracy. Then, he argues that 
democratic consolidation basically deals with “completing democracy” (progress from 
electoral democracy to liberal democracy). In addition, it is related to “preventing 
democratic breakdown” (retreat from liberal democracy to authoritarianism) and 
“preventing democratic erosion” (move back from liberal democracy to electoral 
democracy). Moreover, he contends that democratic consolidation is basically about 
survival of the democratic regime rather than high quality of democratic governance 
(Schedler 1998)16.  
                                                          
16 Schedler’s use of ‘advanced democracy’ may be considered in parallel with the analysis in Diamond et al 
2005 (Assessing the Quality of Democracy) where the ‘quality of democracy’ is related to the rule of law, 
vertical accountability, responsiveness, equality, participation, and horizontal accountability. Here, 
O’Donnell’s article, “Illusions about Consolidation”, underlines the difference between the formality and 
reality of democratic consolidation. 
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An important characteristic of Schedler’s definition is that it is neither a 
minimalist nor maximalist assessment of democratic consolidation. For this reason, it 
shapes the way the consolidation concept is conceived in this dissertation. 
What is democratic consolidation in this study?   
 The working definition of democratic consolidation in this dissertation follows a 
middle ground benefiting from the works of several scholars in the literature. It takes 
regime survival as a key component but it also requires a considerable amount of public 
legitimacy and elite consensus for the democratic regime. In addition, it pays attention to 
whether a multi-national democratic regime faces a substantial risk of secession. Then, 
the dissertation holds that a consolidated democratic regime has the following four 
components.   
 
1. Free, fair, competitive elections with universal suffrage; no politically significant 
group should be excluded from the electoral competition.  
 
2. The protection of fundamental rights and liberties including human and minority 
rights 
 
The above two conditions constitute a procedural definition of democracy. (Dahl 
1971: 1-9) Meeting these conditions is essential for a democratic transition to be 
completed. But additionally, consolidated democracies also have the following features: 
 
3. Higher prospects of regime survival. Consolidated democracies have civilian 
control of military; coups and/or severe coup plots make a democracy 
unconsolidated (Schedler 1998: 103-5, Huntington 1991: 231-53).  In 
consolidated democracies, the military do not intervene in politics; they neither 
have tutelary powers nor reserved domains (Valenzuela 1992: 62-6, Aguero 1995: 
16-7, Mainwaring et al 2000: 2-4). 
 
4.  Public legitimacy and elite consensus for the democratic regime. Democracy is 
the most preferable type of political regime for the majority of people; no 
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politically significant group or political party works for an alternative political 
regime or seeks for secession (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5-7, 16-37, Higley and 
Gunther 1992: 3-7, Gunther et al 1995: 5-10). Anti-system parties and separatist 
groups with a strong public support make a democracy unconsolidated.  
 
 A middle ground position in defining the democratic consolidation has two 
important benefits. On the one hand, focusing only on the prospects of regime survival 
(minimalist definition) fails to notice the significance of legitimacy. Hence, the attitudinal 
dimension should not be understated. On the other hand, requiring countless numbers of 
conditions for a democracy to be consolidated (maximalist definitions) makes the concept 
less useful in the real world. For this reason, making a distinction between consolidated 
democracies with a low level of quality and the ones with a high level of quality could 
help us to understand variations across different democratic regimes.  
 Instead of a general, even sometimes ambiguous, concept of democratic 
consolidation, the four-part approach here will facilitate a systematic analysis of the 
democratizing impact of European integration in the consolidation processes of Spain, 
Poland, and Turkey. 
 
Methodology 
In order to identify the links between independent, intervening and dependent 
variables, the study benefits from two qualitative methods: case study and process 
tracing.  
1. The Case Study Method 
As one of the major types of qualitative research techniques, the case study 
method has various strengths. George and Bennett (2005) define it as “the detailed 
examination of a historical episode to develop or test historical explanations that may 
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generalizable o other events” (p.4). They argue that case studies are particularly helpful 
to explain causal mechanism and to assess complex causal relations. For Ragin (1987), 
“systematic investigation of a constant reflection on a limited number of cases may lead 
to ‘medium range’ theories bound with in time and space”. Overall, the case study 
method, Ragin contends, appreciates complexity of social life by being sensitive to 
human agency.   
 The case study method has also some weaknesses. As Gerring 2004 and George 
& Bennett 2005 suggest, it might be hard to make generalization on the basis of a limited 
number of cases. For example, one can argue that research on Spain, Poland and Turkey 
cannot produce overall conclusions for other cases of European integration either from 
Southern or Eastern Europe. Although this is a fair criticism, an in-depth analysis of three 
country cases can generate many insights to understand the relative significance of 
European integration for other cases as well. In this regard, Ragin’s concept of “multiple 
conjunctural causation” might be relevant. It suggests that social life involves many cases 
in which different combinations of causes might lead to same outcome. Such a causal 
heterogeneity, Ragin argues, respects complexity of social life.  
Another major limitation, or challenge, for case studies is poor case selection. 
Case studies can be a very useful technique only if they are theoretically grounded (Ragin 
1987, Peters 1998). In this regard, the research design should included sufficient 
justification for the selection of cases. Methodologists suggest that choosing cases on 
dependent variable poses an important limitation for case study methods, and they urge 
selecting cases on the basis of variation in the independent variable.  
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The case study method may involve both within-case analysis of single cases and 
comparisons of a small number of cases in order to explore causal mechanism (George 
and Bennett 2005: 17). In this dissertation, the within-case analysis along with the 
process-tracing method will be employed in the case study chapters while the concluding 
chapter will compare the three cases on the basis of hypotheses set here. 
 
The Logic of Case Selection 
Several reasons guide the selection of Spain, Poland and Turkey for a 
comparative analysis in this dissertation. First, each country comes from a different wave 
of European enlargement, and this set of countries could facilitate assessing the evolution 
of EU’s democratic conditionality over time. The existing literature argues that the EU 
imposed a stricter conditionality for the Central and Eastern European candidate 
countries vis-à-vis the Southern enlargement. The three-county comparison in this study 
will be able to examine this argument in an elaborate way. Second, the pairs of Spain-
Turkey and Poland-Spain have a number of important similarities that can facilitate 
understanding the relative salience of EU’s democratizing impact for democratic 
consolidation processes in these countries. For example, ethnic nationalism/separatism 
and the military have posed substantial challenges for democratic regimes both in Spain 
and Turkey. In addition, democratic transitions in both Spain and Poland were “pacted 
transitions”17, which favored the transition and consolidation processes.  Third, Spain and 
Poland as two success stories in the realm of democratization and European integration 
                                                          
17 O’Donnell et al 1986, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule 
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can offer many insights for Turkey-EU relations, which attract recurring attention in 
contemporary world affairs.  
 
 
 
2.  Process-Tracing; Ascertaining Causality Within Countries  
Process-tracing method traces and compares the sequences of events, and enables 
structured comparisons. It maps out the links between possible causes and observed 
outcomes, and helps identifying causal mechanism. Process-tracing explores the links 
between independent, intervening, and dependent variables in a theoretical explanation. 
Process-tracing may take three different forms: detailed narrative, analytic explanation, 
and more general explanation. While analytic explanation is explicitly theory-oriented, 
detailed narrative may follow highly specific historical explanation without following a 
theoretical analysis. Moreover, process-tracing may be employed in a case study (George 
and Bennett 2005: 210-12, Faletti 2006)  
In this dissertation, the employment of process-tracing method will be helpful to 
identify the links between the EU’s democratizing conditionality, domestic intervening 
variables, and the processes of democratic consolidation. For example, process-tracing 
will shed light on understanding the degree to which the EU’s requirement for democratic 
conditionality contributed to democratization and human rights reforms in Spain, Poland, 
and Turkey. For this purpose, official documents, newspapers, and elite statements 
(government officials, members of parliament, party members i.e.) will be utilized. The 
author’s interviews with political and intellectual elites in the three countries will also be 
helpful. Moreover, process-tracing method will be useful in assessing the relative 
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salience of EU’s democratizing leverage vis-à-vis the democratic effects of non-EU 
international and domestic dynamics of democratic consolidation. For instance, process-
tracing will help exploring the democratizing impact of NATO accession process for 
civilian control of the army in the three countries. 
 Data 
 EU official documents (the EU Presidency Conclusions, the European 
Commission’s annual progress reports on the candidate countries, and others) 
 Official documents from Spain, Poland, and Turkey (government documents and 
legislative records for the EU harmonization reforms i.e.) 
 Field study in Spain, Poland, and Turkey from June 2009 through January 2010. 
During the field study, the author interviewed with Members of Parliament, political 
party officials, academics, experts, journalists and bureaucrats.18 Of the sixty interviews, 
two-third of them was made in a face-to-face format while the rest of the interviewees 
preferred to give his/her views by responding to the twelve question interview document. 
The interview questions, which were also used in the face-to-face interviews, were dealt 
with three major issues: (i) democratizing effects of the European accession process, (ii) 
major problems of democracy during the accession process, and (iii) domestic dynamics 
of the accession process (cross-party consensus on the EU membership, i.e.).19 
 Newspapers.  
 Secondary sources: books, journal articles, and dissertations. 
 
 
                                                          
18 See Appendix 2, 3, and 4 for the list of interviewees.  
 
19 For the interview questions, see Appendix 1.  
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Outline of the Chapters 
 This introduction presented the research question, made a literature review, and 
then discussed issues relating to the research design: hypotheses, independent and 
dependent variables, methodology, and data. The second chapter first discusses 
international dynamics of democratization, and then delves into how the European Union 
has involved in the realm of democracy promotion. In addition, it examines the EU’s 
democratizing contributions in the Southern and CEE enlargements in comparative 
perspective. Finally, the chapter evaluates the historical evolution of EU’s democratic 
conditionality rule. The case studies in chapters 3, 4, and 5 examine the relative salience 
of European integration in the democratic consolidation processes of Spain, Poland, and 
Turkey respectively by means of the process-tracing method. These chapters give 
particular attention to the power and limits of EU’s democratizing impact vis-à-vis 
domestic and non-EU dynamics of democratization in the three countries. The concluding 
chapter reviews the three case studies, and undertakes a cross-national comparative 
analysis of the EU’s democratizing impact in the three countries. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
INTERNATIONAL DYNAMICS, EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND 
DEMOCRATIZATION 
 
 The international dynamics of democratization have attracted a growing attention 
in recent years. Herein I review the increasing focus on international dynamics within the 
comparative and the international fields of political science. The first part of the chapter 
discusses five key issues in regard to the sources of and solutions for the causal 
complexity problem in this area. The second part deals with the democratizing potential 
of European integration. To do so, the section first examines the distinctive features of 
EU’s democratic promotion policies. Then, it compares the EU’s democratizing impacts 
in the Southern Enlargement (1975-86) with those in the Eastern enlargement (1994-
2004). Finally, the chapter ends with an analysis of the historical evolution of the EU’s 
democratic conditionality. 
 
1.  International Dynamics of Democratization  
 Democratization studies occupied an important part of the discipline of political 
science in the post-Second World War period. In searching for the origins of democratic 
transitions and stability, political scientists and sociologists came up with three major 
explanations in the 1950s and 1960s: (i) culture, (2) class structures, and (3) economic 
development. Cultural explanations emphasized the significance of democratic political 
culture (Almond and Verba 1963, i.e.). Class-centered explanations argued for the 
primacy of balances of power among different social classes (Moore 1966, i.e.). 
Modernization studies were mainly interested in the level of economic development. 
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These works anticipated that high-income levels generate stable democratic systems 
(Lipset 1959, i.e.). In the following two decades, the democratization literature witnessed 
the rise of two additional explanations: institutions and elite dynamics. Institutional 
explanations have asserted the importance of political institutions for the stability of 
democratic regimes, while elite-centered/transitology studies have paid a close attention 
to the behavior of political-military elites for the democratic transitions.20 
 An important feature of the democratization studies in the post-war period is that 
international dynamics of regime change have been rarely examined. Until the mid-to-
late 1980s, the field of comparative politics witnessed only a few studies that attribute 
importance to international factors.21 Then, the outbreak of the “third wave” of 
democratization in the mid-1970s became a turning point for an increasing focus on the 
international realm.22 Thereafter, democratization scholars have begun to incorporate 
international factors to explain the causes of authoritarian breakdowns and democratic 
transitions, which occurred in Southern Europe, Latin America, and Eastern Europe. 
They have discussed a variety of international factors in the analysis of the third wave 
democratic transitions. In their analyses, many international factors (military defeat, the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, American and European policies of democracy promotion, 
and globalization i.e.) have been complemented to the domestic dynamics of 
democratization (Schmitter 1986: 3-10, Whitehead 1986: 3-46, Huntington 1991: 85-100, 
Pridham 1994: 29-30, Remmer 1995: 105-8, Linz and Stepan 1996: 72-81).  
                                                          
20 Huntington 1968 was a seminal work for the institutional arguments while O’Donnell and Schmitter 
1986a pioneered the transitology studies. 
 
21 For example: Dahl 1971, Skocpol 1979, Collier 1979, O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986a 
 
22 The “third wave” term belongs to Samuel P.Huntington (1991). 
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 Beginning with the mid-1980s, international factors have gradually attracted a 
growing attention in the democratization studies. For example, O’Donnell and Schmitter 
(1986) give some credit to international factors, although domestic factors play a primary 
role in their explanation of the origins and evolution of democratic transitions (1986a, 
1986b: 18). Later, many studies attributed much more importance to the external context. 
The increasing level of significance has been especially prevalent in examining 
democratic transitions in Central and Eastern Europe. In the past two decades, the 
question is no longer whether the international matters but under what conditions the 
external factors shape the processes of democratic transition and consolidation.  
Although there has been an increasing focus on international dynamics, recent 
studies have demonstrated the existence of a causal complexity problem in this area. The 
problem deals with the exploration of linkages among the international phenomena, 
domestic dynamics, and democratization. In what follows, five key issues will be 
discussed to examine the sources of and the solutions to the causal complexity question. 
These issues have been considerably visible in recent studies on the international 
dynamics of democratization. 
 (i.) The international dynamics of democratization are composed of a very wide 
range of actors and processes, and that complicates identifying the relative impact of 
international factors vis-à-vis domestic. The literature has cited the following actors as 
agents of democracy promotion: states, international/regional organizations, political 
party internationals, transnational network of political foundations, the Catholic Church, 
and transnational civil society.  
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 On the state-level, major attention has been paid to foreign policies of the United 
States and the Soviet Union. In this regard, both positive and negative roles have been 
recognized. On the one hand, some scholars concur about in the positive impact of 
American interventions in the post-war democratic transitions in Germany, Italy and 
Japan (Dahl 1971: 192, Pridham 1991a: 23-24). In addition, the US policies of human 
rights and democracy promotion have been found helpful in other places such as Puerto 
Rico and Argentina (Whitehead 2001a: 64), Sikkink 2001: 114). On the other hand, 
several studies underline that strategic priorities of the US during the Cold War generated 
anti-democratic outcomes in many countries (Rueschemeyer et al 1992: 73, Schmitter 
2001: 33). 
 A seminal example of the decisive role of international dynamics of 
democratization is the end of Soviet military veto for the CEE countries. In contrast to the 
Soviet veto during the heydays of the Cold War, Gorbachev’s non-interference policy 
was taken as the key factor that made democratic transitions in the region possible 
(Pridham 1994: 18-19, Whitehead 2001c: 358).  
 International organizations have also been considered as important actors of 
democratization in the literature. In this regard, the EU,  NATO, the Council of Europe 
(CE), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and the 
Organization of American States (OAS) have attracted the most attention. Several studies 
suggest that prospects and processes of EC/EU membership have made significant 
contributions to democratization in the Southern, Central and Eastern Europe 
(Huntington 1991: 87-91, Pridham 1994: 23-25, Linz and Stepan 1996: 140-1, Whitehead 
2001b: 261, Schmitter 2001: 33, Pridham 2000: 285-314). Particularly important, 
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democratic conditionality has been noted as a key dynamic behind the EU’s 
democratizing power in the candidate countries. 
 Although not equal to the systematic and powerful democratizing force of the EU, 
many scholars of democratization agree upon the direct and indirect democratizing 
effects of NATO membership. In this regard, they have pointed out two positive roles: (1) 
help to establish a favorable international context for democratization by providing 
security for the CEE states in the post-Cold War era, and (2) contribute to the 
development of democratic civil-military relations in the Southern, Central, and Eastern 
European countries (Pridham 1994: 109-110, Pravda 2001: 7-10). 
 Furthermore, the Council of Europe and the OSCE have been examined as actors 
of democratization. However, neither the CE nor OSCE has had effective democratic 
conditionality. Democratizing effects are expected primarily in the aftermath of 
accession. Membership to these organizations has been considered as a step for EU and 
NATO membership (Kelley 2004a: 22). The Organization of American States (OAS) has 
also been analyzed whether it has had any democratizing impact on its members. Many 
scholars argue that OAS has made modest contributions in some cases (the 1993 
democratic crisis in Guatemala, i.e.), while it has failed to influence elsewhere 
(Whitehead 2001d: 399-400, Pevehouse 2005: 190-2, Levitt 2006: 116-8). 
 An important development in the area of democratization studies has been the 
growing salience of transnational non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in promoting 
democracy, particularly in the post-Cold War period (Remmer 1995: 105, Schmitter 
2001: 46, Ziolanka 2001: 515). For example, Huntington (1991) has taken pro-
democratic role of the Catholic Church one of the key causes for the third wave 
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transitions. Other studies emphasize the democratizing effects of transnational social 
movements through democracy and human rights campaigns (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 
79-120, Sikkink 2005: 151-173, Khagram et al 2005: 3-23). Moreover, political 
foundations have been noted as agents of democracy promotion. In this regard, German 
political foundations (FES, KAS i.e), the Soros Foundation, and some non-profit 
organizations in the U.S. (Freedom House i.e.) are usually given as primary examples 
(Grabendorff 2001: 216-18). Finally, transnational political party networks are also found 
to have played a role in promoting democratic ideas and practices. Many scholars argue 
that European party internationals (the Socialist International, the Christian Democrat 
International, and the Liberal International i.e.) contribute to the diffusion of democratic 
norms among political party elites in the Southern, Central, and Eastern Europe (Powell 
2001: 300-310, Pridham 2005: 164-8). 
 As seen from the above discussion, many actors (state, non-state, and IOs) have 
been involved in the realm of democratization. In addition, various process type and 
systemic international dynamics influence, to a varying extent, the democratic transition 
and consolidation. These dynamics include globalization, information technology, 
zeitgeist, demonstration/diffusion effects, and international economic crises. For some 
scholars, globalization and modern information technology have created a more favorable 
international context for democratization (Remmer 1995: 105). Moreover, others contend 
that zeitgeist, the hegemony of the idea of democratic regime in the current global 
context, has provided a favorable context as compared to the rise of fascism in the inter-
war years (Rupnik 2000: 116-121, Linz and Stepan 1996: 74-76, Rueschemeyer et al 
1992: 74). Demonstration/diffusion effects have been referred to as a potential impact of 
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democratic transition in neighbor countries. For example, the outbreak of democratic 
transition in Portugal in 1974 may have had some democratizing effects in Spain and 
Greece. Similar effects may be explored in the Central and Eastern European transitions 
(Schmitter 2001; 41, Linz and Stepan 1996: 76, Kubicek 2003a: 5). Moreover, 
international economic crises may have some role in pushing for authoritarian 
breakdowns. For example, one can argue that the oil shocks in the 1970s did have such an 
impact in Southern Europe and Latin America (Remmer 1995: 106). Finally, changes in 
the international political system may generate a context conducive to democratization. 
For example, strategic interests of the US during the Cold War did produce authoritarian 
outcomes in many countries while the end of the Cold War may have resulted in a more 
promising international context. 
 As suggested earlier, democratization studies have paid more attention to the 
international dynamics in the past few decades; yet, the existence of a wide range of 
international factors generates causal complexity. Although every international actor and 
process may not be relevant in all cases of democratization, a country may be subjective 
to more than one international dynamic. Then, it makes it difficult to find out the exact 
impact of each international factor vis-à-vis the domestic dynamics of democratization.  
 (ii.) The causal complexity has also stemmed from the fact that the 
democratization process involves many phases. Here, the literature identifies three main 
phases: (1) liberalization, (2) democratic transition, and (3) democratic consolidation 
(O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986b: 6-14, Huntington 1991, Linz and Stepan 1996: 1-6, 
Pridham 2000: 16-24). Although these phases sometime overlap, each has some unique 
aspects. In general, liberalization deals with the expansion of basic rights and freedoms. 
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Democratic transition refers to the introduction of free and fair elections. Democratic 
consolidation involves deepening of democratic norms and institutions at the political and 
societal levels; then democracy becomes the “only game in town” (Di Palma 1990: 137-
155, Linz and Stepan 1996: 5). Keeping such multi-dimensionality in mind, the 
international dynamics of democratization may have varying levels of impact in different 
phases. For example, some studies have argued that democratizing impact of European 
Community was more decisive in the consolidation phase in Southern Europe in the 
1980s while it did not have such a role in the transition period (Linz et al 1995: 119-120, 
Pridham 1991a: 14). For this reason, it is necessary to pay attention to such potential 
variations in assessing the impact of the international dynamics. 
  (iii.) The analysis of domestic-international linkages is one of the key issues 
dealing with the causal complexity problem. Many scholars of democratization have 
agreed that although the international dynamics are important, their impact has been 
contingent upon domestic politics (Whitehead 1991: 52, Pridham 1991b: 223, Williams 
1999: 5-7, Schmitter 2001: 46-47). In other words, the international impact has been 
mediated through the domestic. Then, the literature has examined a wide range of 
domestic mediating variables that shape the democratizing impact of international 
factors. Such variables include, for instance, regime type (illiberal vs liberal), ethnic 
nationalism, cultural traditions and authoritarian leadership (Vachudova 2005: 3-5, 
Kelley 2004b: 428-33, Williams 1999: 16, Pravda 2001: 24-7, Kubicek 2003a: 12-20). As 
a result, the linkages between the international and various mediating domestic factors 
complicate the assessment of the degree to which the international dynamics of 
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democratization matter. To understand the exact role of the international factor, then one 
has to explore domestic politics as well. 
(iv.) The fourth key issue deals with an important observation in the literature: the 
impact of international dynamics varies across countries and over time. In addition, it 
may have varying levels of effects across policy areas related to democratization. For 
example, many studies argue that the international factors have generally played a more 
substantial role in the CEE transitions than the ones in Southern Europe (Pridham 1994: 
3, Schmitter and Brouwer 1999). Moreover, as suggested earlier, the democratizing 
impact of the European Community appeared more visibly in the consolidation than in 
the transition phase of the Southern European countries. Similarly, several scholars have 
argued that the EU did not have much democratizing role in the early 1990s while it 
made significant contributions in the mid-to-late 1990s in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(Papadimitriou 2002: 1-6, Vachudova 2005: 3-5). The changing levels of EU 
commitment to the full membership goal can be suggested as an important reason for 
such a variation. Furthermore, domestic politics in the CEE countries may have resulted 
in different levels of EU impact across countries. For example, the Meciar government in 
Slovakia (1994-8), with authoritarian, nationalist, Euroskeptical features, delayed the 
beginning of accession negotiations. In contrast, the subsequent Dzurinda government 
undertook the EU related democratization reforms, and succeeded in opening the 
negotiations (Vachudova 2005: 200-2). 
 (v) Finally, keeping the differential impact of international factors across 
countries and over time in mind, it will be quite useful to have comparative studies that 
might involve cross-national, inter-regional or intra-regional dimensions. The 
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democratization literature has witnessed some comparative studies in recent decades; 
nonetheless, the gap has not yet been closed. In this regard, the following type of 
comparative studies can be helpful: (1) the role of international factors in different 
regions of the world (comparisons across Southern Europe, CEE, and Latin America 
i.e.)23, (2) the democratizing impact of international factors within a region across 
different countries, and (3) the varying international impact in one country over time.  
 In recent years, the fields of international relations and comparative politics have 
witnessed an increasing interest in the role of various international factors in the 
processes of democratization. As discussed above, academic studies in this area examine 
numerous international actors and processes in regard to the impacts on multiple 
dimensions of the democratization phenomenon. One should notice that such scholarly 
inquiry involves a high degree of causal complexity due to the presence of several 
independent and dependent variables. To handle such a causal complexity is not easy; 
nevertheless, one can better deal with the problem if two major tasks are undertaken: (1) 
the analysis of domestic-international linkages to assess how domestic and international 
factors interact with each other, and (2) making comparative studies across countries, 
regions, and over time. Then, one can better grasp when, how, and to what extent the 
international dynamics of democratization matter. 
 
2. European Integration and Democracy Promotion 
 The democratizing potential of the European integration process has been 
analyzed in an increasing number of studies in recent years. These works examine a 
                                                          
23 For example, Schmitter (1986: 4) argue that democratic transitions in Southern Europe happened in a 
much more favorable international context than those in Latin America.  
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unique capacity of the European Union in making contributions to the democratization of 
the applicant and candidate countries. In this respect, the EU’s democratic conditionality 
has attracted a particular attention. The following section will first discuss the particular 
features of European democracy promotion. Then, it will briefly compare the EU’s 
democratizing impacts in the Southern and Eastern enlargements. Finally, the historical 
evolution of the EU’s democratic conditionality will be assessed at a broader length. 
 
 The EU and Democracy Promotion 
 Many scholars of democratization and European studies have suggested that the 
European Union has had some unique democratizing capacity. Overall, that capacity has 
been different not only from the US efforts of democracy promotion but also from the 
democratizing impacts of other international organizations. 
 While comparing American and European policies of democracy promotion 
during the Cold War, Laurence Whitehead (1986: 8-46) notes important distinctions: 
American policies frequently involved the use of force, and were concerned most with 
electoral democracy. In addition, these policies did not much care about domestic 
dynamics, and were realized without clear guidelines. In contrast, European policies were 
based on consent not on the use of force; they occurred gradually but in a consistent 
manner. In general, European policies included both institutional and societal channels of 
influence. In the aftermath of the Cold War, such distinctive patterns continued. Overall, 
the US has frequently used coercion for the cause of democracy while the EU’s policies 
have been largely based on consent and conditionality (Kubicek 2003a: 4-7).  
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 In terms of democratizing capacity, the EU has also been distinct from other 
international organizations. First of all, the EU is composed of only democratic member 
states, and it has taken democratic conditionality seriously as a requirement for 
membership. Hence, democracy has been central to the EU’s enlargement strategy 
(Kubicek 2003b: 197). Although some other international organizations (NATO, the 
Council of Europe, the OSCE, the OAS i.e.) too have worked in the area of democracy 
promotion, they have sometimes had non-democratic members or members, which suffer 
from serious democracy problems. In contrast, the EU has never had non-democratic 
members, and it has taken democratic conditionality to an extent unmatched by other 
international organizations.  
 Second, the European Union has had a wide range of resources for democracy 
promotion and democratic conditionality. Basically, the EU’s scale of attraction has been 
higher than other IOs (Pravda 2001: 7-12). As a prestigious club of wealthy and 
democratic states, the Union has had promising economic and political benefits for the 
member states. As a result, the applicant and candidate countries have had stronger 
incentives to join the EU (Vachudova 2005, Pridham 2006, Grabbe 2007). With 
combination of the strict application of democratic conditionality, that incentive structure 
has made the EU a major agent of democracy promotion in the world. 
 Third, the EU’s democratizing capacity has gone a further than other IOs. The EU 
has employed a broad spectrum of institutional and non-institutional mechanisms. 
Although democratic conditionality has played a central role, the EU has also benefited 
from European networks of political parties and civil society.  
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 Institutional effects constitute an important part of the EU’s democratizing 
impact. The prospect of accession to a prestigious democratic entity has created great 
incentives for the applicant countries to improve the quality of their democratic systems 
(Pridham 2000: 299-301). In addition, the EU has provided financial aid to candidate 
countries to help harmonize their legislation in line with the EU acquis. Moreover, the 
candidates can face suspension of aid or membership prospects if they have serious 
democratic crises. For example, the EC suspended the associate agreement with Greece 
when the military junta took over power in April 1967. In the aftermath of a military 
coup in September 1980, Turkey faced the same reaction (Pridham 1991b: 216, 
Pevehouse 2005: 141). Therefore, the membership process has included both carrots and 
sticks. Such institutional tools have made the EU a credible actor of democracy 
promotion. Sticks include the threat of suspension of financial aid or the membership 
process along with the EU’s criticisms through annual progress reports. Carrots contain 
financial aid and status upgrade (beginning and completing the accession negotiations 
i.e.) (Kelley 2004b: 428-31, Pridham 2002: 958).  
 The EU’s major institutional mechanism for democracy promotion has been the 
democratic conditionality principle. As will be discussed broadly later in this chapter, the 
EU’s democratic conditionality evolved over time from the early 1960s to the mid-1990s. 
The EU has always had some form of democratic conditionality. For example, Spain’s 
application for association agreement in 1962 was rejected because of Franco’s 
authoritarian regime. The CEE countries experienced strict application of the democratic 
conditionality requirement through a meticulous overview of their democratic regimes 
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(Vachudova 2005: 111-2). From the 1960s to the 2000s, democratic conditionality has 
been an important device for the EU’s efforts to promote democracy.  
 The EU’s democratizing power has also stemmed from several non-institutional 
effects. First of all, EU membership has carried a great symbolic significance for both the 
Southern and the CEE countries. Joining the EU has re-defined their identity in line with 
democratic Europe. For Spain, the accession meant the end of Franco’s isolationist 
period. For the CEE countries, EU membership has symbolized the “return to Europe”. 
Then, such a symbolic value of EU membership enhanced the EU’s democratizing 
capacity. (Pridham 2000: 299) Moreover, transnational party and civil society networks 
in Europe complemented the EU’s democratizing effects. During the course of the EU 
membership process, these networks have been particularly helpful in socializing 
politicians, businessman, and intellectuals into democratic norms. The candidate 
countries have had a much more favorable international context for democratization.  
 
 The EU’s Democratizing Impact in the Southern and the CEE Enlargements 
 The literature on European Union studies has identified several similarities and 
differences across the two enlargement waves. In this regard, two major issues are 
noteworthy: (1) particular features of the Southern and CEE transitions, and (2) the EU’s 
responses to the processes of democratization in these transitions.  
 When comparing democratization tasks in the CEE transitions with those in the 
Southern transitions, one could note several important distinctions. First of all, 
democratic transitions in CEE involved the task of “double transformation”, which refers 
to transition into democracy and a market economy (Pridham 2000: 295-6, Pravda 2001: 
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2-3). In contrast, the Southern enlargement cases (Spain, Portugal, and Greece) did 
already have market economy in the pre-transition period of authoritarian rule.24 In 
addition, the CEE transition cases did have to establish an autonomous state bureaucracy, 
which is deemed as an important component of democratic regimes (Linz and Stepan 
1996: 244-53). As a result, the legacy of communism posed a distinctive challenge for 
democratic transitions in the CEE enlargement. Second, the CEE states began democratic 
transitions with lower levels of income in contrast to the Southern transitions (Whitehead 
2001e: 420).  Therefore, they had more urgent need for external sources of economic aid. 
Then, the EU’s financial aid, through trade agreements and structural reform funds, was 
critical for the CEE states. Third, the CEE transition countries were more open to external 
influences than the Southern transition cases as they experienced a far deeper process of 
transformation (Williams 1999: 12, Grabbe 2006: 43, Borzel et al 2007: 489). Keeping all 
these particular features in mind, the European Union might have a greater democratizing 
impact in CEE. 
 Despite the existence of several important differences between the Southern and 
Eastern transitions, they have two important similarities with regard to their views on 
European integration. First, political elites in both regions have considered the bid for EU 
membership a critical enterprise not only for democratization but also for re-integration 
with the Western world, particularly with Europe. In other words, they have taken 
democratization and Europeanization as complementary processes (Pridham 1995: 179-
183, Grabbe and Hughes 1998: 6-9, Whitehead 2001c: 373). Second, the elite and masses 
                                                          
24 The democratic transitions of Southern Europe might also be considered as cases of ‘re-democratization’ 
since they had the experience of democratic regime earlier. The CEE transitions cases did not have such a 
legacy with the exception of Czechoslovakia during the inter-war years. 
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in both the Southern and CEE countries maintained a wide support for European 
integration. 25 
 In comparing the EU’s democratizing impact in Southern Europe with CEE, one 
also has to analyze the EU’s types of influences. In this regard, a few remarkable 
similarities and differences should be noted. First of all, the EU’s impact was not decisive 
when the Southern and CEE democratic transitions began. In contrast, the EU made 
important contributions during the process of democratic consolidation. In other words, 
the EU’s democratizing impact primarily occurred in the consolidation rather than in the 
transition stage (Linz et al 1995: 120). In regard to the causes of democratic transitions, 
domestic or non-EU international factors were more important than the EU’s role. For 
example, military defeat in the Cyprus War (1974) against Turkey annihilated the 
military rule in Greece; the end of Soviet military veto made the CEE transitions possible 
(Pridham 1994: 8, Tsingos 2001: 346). The Southern European countries applied for EC 
membership a few years after the beginning of democratic transitions. Although the EU 
provided some financial aid in the early 1990s, there was no prospect of EU membership 
for the CEE countries until June 1993 (Papadimitrou 2002: 29-46). Therefore, the EU’s 
democratizing impact was limited for both Southern and CEE democratic transitions. 
Domestic dynamics or non-EU international factors played more important role at this 
stage. 
 Another similarity between the two transitions occurred in respect to the limits of 
the EU’s democratizing impact. First of all, the EU’s democratizing power has been 
                                                          
25 Although that has been a general orientation, there is also a skepticism for or resistance against EU 
membership in some countries. The Social democratic party in Greece (PASOK) for many years and the 
Meciar government in Slovakia (1994-98) can be cited as notable examples (Pridham 1995: 175, 
Vachudova 2005: 200). 
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contingent upon domestic politics of the candidate countries (Williams 1999: 7-8, 
Kubicek 2003b: 199-200, Kelley 2004b: 431-3, Vachudova 2005: 257-9). When a 
Euroskeptic government is in power (the Meciar government in Slovakia, 1994-98 i.e.), 
the EU related democratization reforms have been stalled. Second, the EU has had 
limited power to prevent democratic crises (the February 1981 coup plot in Spain i.e.) in 
the candidate countries (Pridham 1991b: 225-226). 
 Although there are such important similarities between the two enlargement 
waves, a few important differences have been suggested. First, the CEE countries face a 
larger task of implementing the EU acquis26 for two major reasons: (1) communist 
legacies that require fundamental reforms relating to market economy and state structure, 
and (2) the EU acquis expanded much further in the 1980s and 1990s (Grabbe and 
Hughes 1998: 1-3, Whitehead 2001e: 420, Dinan 2004: 13-15, Vachudova 2005: 111). 
Second, the European Union required far stricter rules of democratic conditionality for 
the CEE states as compared to the Southern enlargement countries (Pridham 2000: 301, 
Grabbe 2006: 14-18). Having procedural/electoral democracy was not enough; the EU 
demanded the CEE candidates to have higher standards of democracy, which were set by 
the Copenhagen political criteria. For instance, while minority rights were not part of 
democratic conditionality during the Southern enlargement, the EU put them as a 
requirement for the CEE countries (Kelley 2004b: 427). The following section will have 
a broader discussion on the evolution of EU’s democratic conditionality since the early 
1960s. 
 
                                                          
26 The EU acquis refers to the total body of EU law. The EU candidate countries have to comply with the 
acquis after they become a member. For more, see the 13th footnote. 
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 Historical Evolution of the EU’s Democratic Conditionality 
 The Treaty of Rome (March 1957), the founding treaty of the European Economic 
Community, did not specify whether democracy is a necessary condition for the EEC 
membership.27 As seen in the 237th article (“any European State may apply to become a 
member of the Community”), the EEC was open to new members; nonetheless, the 
institution did not have any specific rules about the application process.  
A few years later, the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliamentary 
Assembly adopted the Birkelbach Report in December 196128. The report primarily dealt 
with defining who is eligible for the EEC membership, and it set three conditions: (1) 
geographical (2) economic, and (3) political. The geographical prerequisite, in line with 
article 237 of the Rome Treaty, required that only European states could join the 
Community. The economic condition underlined the economic capacity of the applicant 
country to work with the EEC, particularly dealing with free trade and the common 
market. Finally, the section on political conditionality discussed issues of political 
character, and put political prerequisites for associate and full membership. The report 
included an article as follows:  
 
 
                                                          
27  Full-text of the treaty is available at: http://europa.eu/scadplus/treaties/eec_en.htm.  
The following link provides the treaty in pdf version: 
http://courses.essex.ac.uk/gv/gv546/Rome%20Treaty.pdf 
 
28 Willi Birkelbach, a member of the European Parliament from Germany’s SPD at that time, played a 
major role in the preparation of such a report. He also was the rapporteur of the report. Full-text of the 
Birkelbach Report (in French) is available at: 
http://www.ena.lu/report_willi_birkelbach_political_institutional_aspects_accession_association_with_com
munity_december_1961-020006013.html 
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The guarantee of the existence of a democratic form of State, within the 
meaning of a liberal political organization, is a condition for adhesion. 
States, whose governments do not have democratic legitimation and 
whose people take part in the decisions of government neither directly nor 
by freely elected representatives, cannot claim to be allowed in the circle 
of the people which form the European Communities. (Article 25; 
translated from the original language, French) 
 
 
The report underlined the political character of EEC with a concern that the 
Community cannot be relegated into an international economic organization or an 
economic integration, which is devoid of political element (articles 66, 69, 87 and 88). 
When Spain applied for associate membership of the EC in February 1962, the 
Birkelbach Report shaped the EC’s decision of rejection. The authoritarian Franco regime 
was not considered as an eligible state for an associate status, let alone full membership. 
The Benelux countries, which were ruled by Social Democratic governments at that time, 
were particularly against Franco’s application (Pridham 2005: 30). Moreover, the Spanish 
opposition to the Franco regime called for the EC to reject the associate application, and 
it demanded a democratic Spain to join the EC (Powell 1995: 23, Vidal-Beneyto 2004: 
21). In this regard, the June 1962 Munich Conference, which gathered the Spanish 
opposition and European parties to evaluate the prospects of democratic transition in the 
country, was a key event influencing the decision of EC officials. Thereafter, the 
European Community rejected the application for associate agreement but it made a 
preferential trade agreement with Spain in June 1970 (McClellan 1978: 199, Powell 
2001: 296).      
The EC’s rejection of Spain’s application set an important precedent for the 
Community’s political conditionality during the period of Southern enlargement. 
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Furthermore, the European Community, in line with the democratic conditionality, froze 
association agreements with Greece and Turkey following the military coups in April 
1967 and September 1980, respectively (Pridham 1991b: 216). These actions 
demonstrated that the EC did have a substantially political character, and that democratic 
regime is an important prerequisite even for associate membership. 
A few years after the beginning of democratic transition, Greece (1974), Portugal 
(1974) and Spain (1975) applied for the EC membership in July 1975, March 1977, and 
July 1977, respectively29. As suggested earlier, the political elites in all three countries, 
albeit in varying degree, considered Europeanization and democratization as two 
complementary processes. The EC responded to the applications affirmatively but it 
required the survival and improvement of democracy in the applicant states. Yet, the 
European Community did not have any rigorous method of conditionality for the 
Southern transitions. For example, as many scholars suggested, Greece joined the EC in 
January 1981 although it had substantial deficiencies in the implementation of the EC 
acquis (Grabbe 2006: 144, Vachudova 2005: 111). During that time, the European 
Council overruled the Commission’s negative opinion in which the early Greek accession 
could cause to serious problems in the implementation of the EC acquis (Grabbe 2007: 
113). The Council expected that Greece would sufficiently align with the EC acquis after 
the accession. In contrast, the CEE enlargement countries have not been tolerated in such 
terms in their accession process.  
The European Union did have a policy of democratic conditionality during the 
Southern enlargement but it developed a more stricter conditionality rules for the Central 
                                                          
29 “The Enlargement of the European Community: European File 5/79”, The European Commission, March 
1979 (http://aei.pitt.edu/4590/01/003956_1.pdf)  
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and Eastern European countries. As suggested earlier, the EU was slow in responding to 
the 1989 events in the CEE. The Union established trade agreements and provided some 
financial aid for the CEE states in the early 1990s. In addition, the EU established 
associate agreements with Poland (1991), Czechoslovakia (1993), Hungary (1991), 
Bulgaria (1992), and Romania (1993) (Ram 1999: 434-435). Nevertheless, the EU did 
not provide any prospect for full membership until the June 1993 Copenhagen European 
Council summit. Until the historical Copenhagen summit, the Union followed a cautious 
and step by step approach towards the accession requests of the CEE countries 
(Papadimitrou 2002: 34, Pridham 2005: 35). 
 By explicitly confirming the prospect for full membership, the June 1993 
Copenhagen European Council set conditions for the CEE. Later, the EU clarified its 
strategy towards the CEE enlargement in the December 1997 Luxembourg European 
Council meeting. The Luxembourg meeting also paved the way for opening the accession 
process with the six applicant countries (Grabbe and Hughes 1998: 41-43).  
The Copenhagen summit was a key event in defining conditionality rules for the 
EU candidate countries. The Copenhagen criteria included both political and economic 
conditions, and asked the candidate countries to align with the EU acquis. The criteria 
underlined that the EU’s absorption capacity is an important factor in setting the timing 
of accession. Conclusions of the summit included as such: 
 
The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the 
European Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is 
able to assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and 
political conditions required. 
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Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and 
respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning of a 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union. Membership presupposes the candidate’s 
ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
The Union’s capacity to absorb new members while maintaining the 
momentum of European integration is also an important consideration in the 
general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries. 
The European Council will continue to follow closely progress in each 
associated country towards fulfilling the conditions of accession to the Union 
and draw the appropriate conclusions.30 (p.13) 
 
The Copenhagen meeting in June 1993 became a milestone in the pre-accession 
strategy of the EU towards the CEE countries. Like the Birkelbach report, the 
Copenhagen conditionality rules considered democratic regime as a prerequisite for the 
membership. Yet, the latter have gone further with the inclusion of human and minority 
rights. In this regard, the EU’s democratic conditionality set by the Copenhagen meeting 
did have broader dimensions. In other words, the Union pursued a more rigorous 
application of the conditionality for the CEE countries vis-à-vis the Southern enlargement 
(Pridham 2000: 293, Pridham 2005: 35-51, Vachudova 2005: 110-2, Grabbe 2006: 43-
44). Therefore, the CEE states were faced with a more rigorous conditionality to join the 
European Union. 
In applying a stricter form of democratic conditionality, the EU used several 
mechanisms during the CEE enlargement. Many of those mechanisms were novel as 
compared to the Southern enlargement. For example, the EU closely monitored the level 
of progress taken by the candidate countries in numerous issue areas: fundamental rights 
                                                          
30 “Conclusions of the Presidency”, European Council in Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993  
(The full-text is available at the European Council website:  
http://europa.eu/european-council/index_en.htm)  
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and freedoms, stability of democratic institutions, rule of law, judiciary, human and 
minority rights, corruption, effective administration, civil society, and the civil-military 
relations. Overall, the Union required the candidate countries to align with liberal 
democratic institutions and norms in the EU member states. For this purpose, the EU 
asked the candidate countries to align their legislation in line with the EU acquis, and 
demanded effective implementation. Beginning with the fall of 1998, the European 
Commission prepared annual progress reports for each candidate country. The reports 
assessed to what extent the candidate countries fulfilled the Copenhagen conditionality, 
and aligned with the thirty-five chapters of the EU acquis31. Although harmonization of 
laws for the EU acquis continued during the accession negotiations, the EU put the 
political criteria of Copenhagen conditionality as a prerequisite to launch the accession 
negotiations. In other words, a candidate country, which fails to meet the political 
criteria, could not move to the negotiations phase. Such a pre-accession strategy provided 
the EU with unprecedented power to shape democratization in the candidate countries.32  
The Slovakia case is a seminal example to which the EU applied the democratic 
conditionality seriously in the pre-accession strategy. In the December 1997 Luxembourg 
European Council meeting, the EU excluded Slovakia from the countries, which were 
scheduled to start accession negotiations in March 1998. The Union concluded that the 
                                                          
31 The website of the European Commission provides information about the EU acquis chapters. 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu
/negotiations_croatia_turkey/index_en.htm#4 
 
32 The EU’s efforts to check democratic credentials and human rights record in the candidate countries were 
not all easy. In contrast to the economic criteria, measuring the political criteria posed an important 
challenge. As Grabbe 2006 and Ziolanka 2001 point out, the monitoring process involved a certain amount 
of subjective evaluation, and it sometimes entailed inconsistency and the lack of precision. Nevertheless, 
the EU demanded higher standards of democracy and human rights from the CEE countries as compared to 
the Southern enlargement countries. 
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Meciar government (1994-98) failed to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria (Grabbes 
and Hughes 1998: 44). At the same meeting, the EU excluded Turkey from the accession 
negotiation process on the basis of political and economic reasons.33 Moreover, the EU 
paid close attention to human rights issues in the CEE countries, and it included human 
and minority rights as part of the Copenhagen conditionality.  
To reiterate, the EU applied a more comprehensive and tighter conditionality, 
including the political one, towards the CEE countries as compared to the Southern 
enlargement countries. The political conditionality involved areas beyond formal 
democracy, and it demanded higher standards of democracy (Kubicek 2003a: 21, 
Pridham 2005: 42; 2006: 380). The annual progress reports noted developments in the 
candidate countries in regard to freedom of the press, social pluralism, effective 
administration, corruption, protection of minorities, civil society and political parties.34 
Overall, the CEE accession countries were expected to realize substantial progress in 
these areas before joining the EU while fulfilling the political criteria was a prerequisite 
to begin the accession negotiations. 
What caused the application of a tighter conditionality in the Eastern 
enlargement? In this regard, two major reasons are notable for many scholars: (1) the 
CEE states, due to their communist legacies, did have substantial deficiencies regarding 
market economy and state structures, and (2) the EU acquis in the 1990s was far more 
expanded and complicated vis-à-vis the one in the 1970s & 1980s. The acquis had 
                                                          
33 “Conclusions of the Presidency”, European Council in Luxembourg, 12-13 December 1997  
(The full-text is available at the EC website:  
http://europa.eu/european-council/index_en.htm) 
 
34 The annual progress reports are available at the website of European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/index_archive_en.htm  
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extended to common currency and economic policies, immigration, border control and 
foreign policy (Grabbe and Highes 1998: 1, 59-63, Vachudova 2005: 111, Dinan 2005: 
15, Pridham 2005: 42, Grabbe 2006: 33-35). As a result, the CEE countries, which started 
with comparatively lower levels of EU acquis capacity, had to meet the expanded EU 
acquis tasks. Therefore, they were faced with tougher conditionality rules. 
Moreover, the European Union was particularly cautious about the potential 
impact of the CEE enlargement on the EU’s absorption capacity. As mentioned earlier, 
the 1993 Copenhagen criteria included the absorption capacity as a part of the 
conditionality rules. The extent of the CEE enlargement (ten countries) made the EU 
member states more cautious; and it influenced to a great extent the drive for tougher 
conditions.35 In the aftermath of the CEE enlargement in 2004 and 200736, the next wave 
of EU candidate countries (Turkey, Croatia, and the Western Balkan countries) have 
faced an increasing amount of references to the ‘absorption capacity’. In addition, the EU 
required Croatia and Serbia cooperating with the International Criminal Court for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY). For Turkey, the Cyprus conflict has become a key dynamic 
in shaping the pace of the accession negotiations.37 As a result, the EU develops tougher 
conditions for the current and potential candidate countries as compared to the CEE and 
the Southern enlargement countries.  
 
                                                          
35  Another important feature of the CEE enlargement is that the European Commission played a more 
important role in the accession process while the European Parliament was the key EC institution during 
the Southern enlargement (Pridham 2005: 42, Grabbe 2006: 26). 
 
36 Bulgaria and Romania joined the Union in 2007 while all other CEE countries acceded in 2004. 
 
37 In December 2006, the EU put hold on the eight of thirty-five acquis chapters because Turkey has not yet 
opened its ports and airports to trade from Cyprus. 
 52 
 
Conclusion 
The international dynamics of democratization have attracted a growing attention 
after the outbreak of the third wave of democratic transitions in the mid-1970s.  With the 
end of the Cold War and the increasing pace of globalization, the international dynamics 
have frequently been part of the scholarly inquiry about democratic transitions and 
consolidations. However, the growing attention to the international factor met a serious 
challenge in the literature: a high degree of causal complexity. As discussed earlier, the 
presence of various international actors and processes along with multiple dimensions of 
the democratization phenomenon make it difficult to identify the relative salience of 
international dynamics vis-à-vis domestic factors. In this regard, two major research tasks 
could be helpful:  (1) the analysis of domestic-international linkages, and (2) the exercise 
of further comparative studies across countries, regions, and over time. Then, the 
literature on democratization will have a better assessment of the international dynamics 
of democratization. 
The literature on European integration has underlined the unique democratizing 
power of the European Union over candidate countries. In this chapter, the EU’s 
democratizing potential has been analyzed in the context of the Southern and the CEE 
enlargements. As suggested earlier, the EU did have a wide range of resources 
(institutional and non-institutional) to shape the democratization processes of the 
candidate countries. One also should note that the EU’s democratizing impact was most 
visible in the process of democratic consolidation, not in the democratic transition. The 
EU did have the democratic conditionality for both the Southern and CEE accession 
cases. The Union had a considerable leverage for democracy promotion but this leverage 
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was limited when the domestic political context in the candidate country was 
unfavorable. The EU’s democratic conditionality rules evolved over time. Particularly 
important is that for various reasons discussed earlier, the Central and Eastern European 
states faced tougher conditions as compared to the Southern enlargement cases. 
Nonetheless, the CEE countries achieved fulfillment of the conditions, and joined the 
European Union in 2004 and 2007.  
This chapter has assessed first the increasing attention to international dynamics 
of democratization in recent years. Then, it has examined the EU’s policy of democracy 
promotion, particularly in the context of democratic conditionality rule. In doing so, the 
chapter has also discussed major similarities and differences between the Southern and 
CEE enlargements. Now, the dissertation turns to the case study chapters where the EU’s 
democratizing impact is assessed in democratic consolidation processes of Spain, Poland, 
and Turkey.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: 
THE CASE OF POST-FRANCO SPAIN 
 
 
 European integration was one of the key dynamics of political transformation in 
the post-Franco Spain. The transformation went through two distinct phases: democratic 
transition and democratic consolidation. One of the most fascinating cases of the third 
wave of democratization in the late twentieth century, Spain’s transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy occurred in a favorable international context while 
domestic factors were primarily responsible during the transition. The changing balance 
of political forces in the late Franco period made the democratic transition more likely 
after Franco’s death. Having kept the trauma of the Civil War (1936-39) in mind, the 
Spanish political elite played a decisive role for the transition. The European Community 
(EC) and European political parties encouraged pro-democracy actors, and supported the 
transition; yet, their democratizing role remained secondary vis-à-vis the internal 
dynamics of the transition. 
 Only about one and a half years after the death of Franco, the Spanish people 
voted in a democratic election for the first time in forty-one years. Holding the elections 
did not result in consolidation of the young democracy. From 1977 to 1985, the reborn 
democracy faced six coup plots organised by hardliner officers. The decentralization of 
the Spanish state and the Basque separatism also put serious hurdles against the 
consolidation. King Juan Carlos’s strong commitment to the democratic regime, tested in 
the 23 February 1981 coup attempt, was critical in the consolidation process. In addition 
to other domestic factors, Spain’s accession process into the European Community made 
 55 
 
a significant contribution to the consolidation of democracy. Particularly notable, the 
critical linkage between European integration and democratic consolidation existed in the 
consciousness of key Spanish elite, including King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister 
Felipe Gonzalez (1982-1996). In the post-Franco period, European integration became an 
intrinsic part of the democratization process when it received overwhelming support from 
the King, the political parties, the business, the labor, and the Spanish people. 
 Anchored by the democratic conditionality, the prospect and actual EC 
membership set a highly favorable ground for the consolidation of Spanish democracy. 
The EC institutions, the EC member states, and European political parties contributed to 
democratization before and during the democratic transition: yet, the democratizing 
impact of European integration reached at an unprecedented level during the actual EC 
accession process (1977-1986). The EC’s political conditionality required upholding the 
democratic regime. That was necessary not only to conduct the accession negotiations but 
also to maintain membership status after the accession. Nonetheless, as demonstrated in 
the February 1981 coup, the EC did not have a leverage to prevent democratic 
breakdown. In addition, the EC’s democratizing impact was effective only after the 
Spanish public and elites provided a strong support for the membership. 
 This chapter will examine the degree to which Spain’s democratic consolidation 
benefited from the European Community accession process (1977-1986). To do so, first it 
will briefly discuss some central aspects of Spain’s democratic transition (1975-1978). 
Then, the chapter will assess the extent to which European integration contributed to the 
consolidation of Spanish democracy vis-à-vis other dynamics of the consolidation. 
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 The Spanish Transition to Democracy: A Nuanced and Eclectic Approach 
 In order to understand democratic consolidation, one needs to start with an 
analysis of the democratic transition. As a seminal case of the third wave of 
democratization, the Spanish transition has been examined extensively in several 
studies.38 In what follows, major dynamics of the transition from the Francoist political 
order to a democratic regime is discussed, along with Europe’s democratizing effects 
received by Spain before and during the transition period. 
 In contrast to structural and cultural theories of democratization, dominant in the 
1950s and 1960s, the elite centered approaches became highly influential in explaining 
the third wave democratization cases in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, Spain’s transition to 
democracy after the death of Franco attracted the attention of the elite oriented 
“transitology” scholars.39 Although “pacts” among the key political/military elites were 
not taken as a necessary condition for successful democratic transition, these studies 
focused on bargaining and negotiations between the authoritarian regime incumbents and 
the democratic opposition. According to the elite oriented scholarship, the Spanish 
transition was a highly successful case due to the critical roles played by key Spanish 
elites, including King Juan Carlos, the reformist Prime Minister Adolfo Suarez, the 
Socialist leader Felipe Gonzalez, and the Communist Party chief Santiago Carrillo. Even 
though compromises and moderation among the key leaders substantially shaped the 
Spanish transition, one cannot understate the significant role of the changing balance of 
                                                          
38 For example; Carr and Fusi 1981, Marawall 1982, Graham 1984,  Abel and Torrents 1984,  Lancaster 
and Prevost 1985, Share 1986, Clark and Haltzel 1987, Gunther 1993, Maxwell and Spiegel 1994, Arango 
1995, Linz and Stepan 1996: 87-115, Palomares 2004: 116-187, Tusell 2007: 270-328 
 
39 Leading study in this genre is the four-volume long “Transitions from Authoritarian Rule” (O’Donnell 
and Schmitter, Eds, 1986). Higley and Gunther (Eds, 1992) is another major work among these studies. 
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political forces at the time of Franco’s death. Critical elite choices were not the result of 
preferences of a few people; rather, they were largely conditioned by structural changes 
in the late Franco period. In addition, one should acknowledge the conciliatory role of the 
tragedy of the Spanish Civil War for the post-Franco period of moderation at the elite and 
public level. Structural factors were favorable for the democratic transition, and they 
largely influenced elite behavior. Yet, the transition process was not easy at all. 
Hardliners among the military officers, violent-extremist on the right and on the left, and 
the ETA terrorists raised serious obstacles against peaceful democratic change. 
Henceforth, the Spanish success story should not be taken for granted. The transition 
process can only be thoroughly understood by applying an eclectic and nuanced approach 
that respects both elite behavior and the structural factors in a larger historical context.   
  Comparing the early Franco period with the late Franco era in regard to societal 
foundations of the political regime, helps to understand that Spain’s democratic transition 
occurred under favorable structural conditions. As a winning side of the Civil War, the 
Franco regime was based on the army, the church, the fascist party Falange, the 
monarchists, and the business. The republicans, including the Socialists and the 
Communists, were the domestic and exiled opposition to the regime. The Francoist rule 
controlled labor through corporatist structure in the first two decades. At that time, the 
Spanish economy was largely autarkic. The regime was isolated from the regional and 
international community until the 1953 agreements with the United States and the 
Vatican. Having benefited from the Cold War international context, the Franco regime 
overcame international isolation through the 1953 agreements, which enhanced its 
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durability (Payne 1967, Arango 1995, Powell 2007: 228 ; 2009: 40-46, Tusell 2007: 108-
114). 
 From a long-term structural perspective, the roots of the Spanish transition to 
democracy were in many ways based on the socio-economic changes of the 1960s. 
Following the 1959 stabilization program, the Spanish economy experienced an 
unprecedented level of economic growth in the next decade. Having recorded the second 
best rate of economic growth among the OECD countries (about 7% annually), GNP per 
capita increased from $300 in 1960 to $3260 ten years later. The country attracted 
millions of tourists from European countries, while two millions Spaniards migrated to 
these countries. The European Community rejected Spain’s application for associate 
membership (1962) due to the authoritarian nature of the Franco regime: yet, the 
expanding socio-economic relations between Spain and the European countries resulted 
in liberalization of the Spanish economy and society. In addition, urbanization and 
secularization were other key changes in the 1960s (Marawall 1973, Gunther et al 1986, 
Powell 2006). 
 A significant development in this period of unprecedented socio-economic 
modernization was the revival of the labor movement. The Spanish workers undertook 
numerous strikes from the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s. While about 1.5 million hours 
were lost through strikes in 1966, that number increased to about 4.5 million in 1969, 8.7 
million in 1970. Although the Franco regime responded to the labor strikes with a high 
level of repression, the workers intensified their resistance in the last years of the regime 
(Marawall 1979: 33-43, Carr and Fusi 1981). Nonetheless, the workers’ opposition to the 
regime never amounted to a level that could cause collapse of the Franco rule. Their 
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mobilization continued in the first years of the transition period (1976-77), yet the labor 
accepted the terms of compromise between the ruling right and the leftist opposition. As 
a result, workers’ militant mobilization substantially declined in the years following the 
June 1977 elections and the September 1977 Moncloa Pact (Marawall 1982, Ben-Ami 
1984, Fred-Lopez 1990). 
 Shifts in the positions of the business and the church were also critical 
components of the structural changes in the late Franco period. The Franco regime did 
not lose their support in an abrupt manner, and the business and the church stood in favor 
of a gradual democratic transition at the time of Franco’s death. For the business, the 
Spanish economy was intrinsically in need of European markets and investments. As the 
rejection of the 1962 application demonstrated, Spain’s membership in the EC was only 
possible in the aftermath of the democratic transition. Consequently, the transition 
received support from the Spanish business (Preston 1976: xv, Gunther et al 1986). Two 
important developments in the 1960s caused the church’s favorable position to the 
democratic transition. First, the Second Vatican Council (1962-65) resulted in the rise of 
ideas supporting social justice and human rights, and this ideational change influenced 
the church in Spain. Second, secularization of the Spanish people and radicalization of 
the Spanish workers in this decade made the church more sensitive to developing close 
relations with the Spanish society. As a result, many church members supported the 
workers’ opposition against the Franco regime. Particularly notable, the Church issued a 
communiqué in 1971, which not only asked a pardon for its role in the Civil War but also 
advocated severing all relations with the Franco regime (Cooper 1976: 73, Brassloff 
 60 
 
1998: 45, Tusell 2007). Therefore, the last years of the authoritarian regime witnessed a 
confrontation between the regime and the Catholic Church. 
 As will be revealed in more detail later, a few political leaders played a critical 
role in the smooth and peaceful democratic transition. However, elite behavior can only 
be understood in the context of the structural changes discussed above. The Spanish 
economic miracle, increasing radicalization of the workers, the business’ drive for further 
Europeanization of the economy, and the pro-democratic evolution of the Catholic church 
in the late Franco period were essential components of the Spanish transition to 
democracy. Therefore, only an eclectic and nuanced approach, which takes into 
consideration both the long-term structural factors and the short-term key elite choices, 
can offer a thorough analysis of the democratic transition. 
 At the time of Franco’s death in November 1975, favorable conditions existed in 
Spain to overcome a four-decade long authoritarian regime but the changing balance of 
social forces supporting democracy in the late Franco era did not guarantee a peaceful 
and swift transition. First of all, Francisco Franco quietly died in his bed. The opposition, 
be the workers, the liberal wing of the Church, the Socialists, the Communists or the 
Basque separatists, was not able to topple his rule. The reformist section of the Franco 
regime be liberal groups such as the Tacito or the Spanish business, waited the death of 
Franco before taking action in favor of democratic change. Second, there was no 
consensus between the regime moderates and the opposition about the pace of transition. 
While the former preferred a gradual transition to a democratic monarchy within the 
Francoist institutional framework (reform), the opposition asked for a complete break 
(ruptura) with the previous regime. The army was certainly against a ruptura mode of the 
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democratic transition while the church and the business supported only a gradual 
transition (Garcia 1976: 44-7, Maura 1976: 47). King Juan Carlos was also a key 
supporter of the reformist mode of change. Table 3.1 reveals positions of key actors at the 
individual, domestic and international levels, by the end of Franco’s rule. 
 
Table 3.1:  Key Actors in the Spanish Transition 
 
  
Support for 
Authoritarian status quo 
 
Support for 
Democratic Transition 
 
Reform                                             Ruptura   
Monarchy                                        Republic 
 
 
 
 
Individual 
 
Franco; died in Nov 1975
 
Carrero Blanco; hardliner PM, 
assassinated in December 1973
 
Arias Navarro; Franco loyalist PM 
1973-76
 
F. Santiago; hardliner general, 
deputy PM, 1975-76 
 
 
The King Juan Carlos; succeeded Franco
 
Adolfo Suarez; reformist PM 1976-1981
 
Fernandez Miranda; president of the 
Parliament (1976-77)
 
G. Mellado; reformist Chief of Staff and the 
Minister of Defense (1976-81)   
  
Cardinal Tarancon, the head of Catholic 
Church, 1971-83   
                                       F. Gonzalez, PSOE 
                                            S. Carillo, PCE  
 
 
Domestic 
 
Hardliner Military Officers 
Falange 
Extreme Right 
 
Church                                           Socialists 
Business                                    Communists 
Regime Moderates                              Labor 
 
 
International40 
  
 
 
  
                                                          
40 The United States was cautious at the time of Franco’s death; concerned primarily with its strategic 
interests (preservation of the military agreement in particular). The Franco loyalist PM Arias received more 
support than the reformist PM Suarez during the transition. In addition, the legalization of the Communist 
Party, a key step in the transition, was not much desired by the U.S. In regard to the 23 February 1981 coup 
attempt, the Secretary of State Alexander Haig said that it was Spain’s “internal affair” (Maxwell 1991: 7, 
Tusell 2007: 315, Cercas 2011: 62, and the author’s interview with Charles Powell). 
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 In the context of structural changes in the late-Franco period, Spain’s transition to 
democracy was not unexpected after the dictator’s death but the pace and mode of 
transition was marked by uncertainty. King Juan Carlos, succeeding Franco as head of 
state, expressed his vision of a democratic and European Spain in his coronation speech. 
The monarch’s vision was in parallel with the majority of Spanish people. Yet, the 
military -one of the key pillars of the Franco regime- was certainly against a ruptura 
mode of transition. The ruptura mode was a choice of the regime’s opposition, the 
Socialists and the Communists. An influential group of hardliner officers, as will be seen 
in several coup attempts in the following years, worked for continuity of the authoritarian 
regime. For the conservative majority in the army, the King, chosen by Franco as the next 
head of State, was the key figure for the direction of post-Franco Spain. Finding himself 
among these different positions, Juan Carlos had to deal with a very delicate process of 
political change. His preference to work with Arias Navarro, the prime minister when 
Franco died, reflects his caution. Arias Navarro, who had a deep loyalty to Franco, failed 
to realize the political reforms necessary for the democratic transition. While his failure 
satisfied the conservative forces (“bunker”) of the Francoist structure, it disappointed the 
democratic opposition. Arias’s stubborn posture also threatened the legitimacy of Juan 
Carlos for the opposition and a large segment of the Spanish people. Then, the King 
dismissed him and appointed Adolfo Suarez as the new prime minister in July 1976 
(Coverdale 1979: 143-4, Marawall 1982: 150, Powell 1996: 93). 
 Having worked in the Arias’s cabinet as Secretary of National Movimiento (a key 
Francoist institution), Suarez’s appointment initially disappointed the democratic 
opposition. With considerable political skill and the King’s support, Suarez undertook the 
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political reforms necessary for the democratic transition in less than a year. His 
leadership skill was most visible in maintaining a delicate balance in his relations with 
the opposition and the military (Lancaster and Prewst 1985: 101).  
 Suarez’s success to move the democratic opposition accept a compromise on the 
model of democratic transition was certainly related to the fact that the Spanish military 
was clearly against the ruptura mode. Let alone the mode, an influential number of senior 
military officials stood against the reform mode. General F. Santiago y Diaz resigned 
from his post of deputy PM in September 1976 with a protest to the Law of Political 
Reform. The Law terminated the Francoist Cortes in order to establish a democratically 
elected parliament. Later, General Santiago involved in the September 1977 coup plot, 
known as the Jativa conspiracy. Furthermore, Admiral Pita de Veiga, the Navy Minister 
in the Suarez Cabinet, resigned following the legalization of the Communist Party in 
April 1977. Then, the democratic opposition came into the reform compromise not solely 
because of Suarez’s leadership skill. The military, particularly the prospect of a 
reactionary coup, enhanced Suarez’s bargaining power vis-à-vis the opposition.  
 Strong support for the democratic transition by the Spanish people, as 
demonstrated in the December 1976 referendum for the Law of Political Reform (94% 
yes, 2.6% no, with 78% turnout), was a key element in Suarez’s success.  As suggested 
earlier, the changing balance of social forces in favor of democratic change in the late 
Franco period certainly made the transition more likely, despite the fact the Spanish 
military, particularly the hardliners, raised serious hurdles in the transition process. 
Neither violence by the extreme right and the extreme left nor the Basque separatists 
were able to halt the process (Story 1977: 485, Preston 1979, Powell 1996: 159). 
 64 
 
Following the enactment of a new electoral law in March, and the legalization of the 
trade unions and the Communist Party in April, the reformist Suarez government set the 
first democratic elections after forty-one years for June 15, 1977. With a 79% voter 
turnout, the Spanish people preferred the center-right (Suarez’s UCD, 34%) and the 
center-left (the Socialist PSOE, 29%) parties, while the neo-Francoist AP (%8) and the 
Communist PCE (%9) largely failed in the founding elections. 
 The June 15, 1977 elections signified a critical point in which Spain’s democratic 
transition took a major step. Following O’Donnell and Schmitter’s definition of 
democratic transition, “the installation of some form of democracy”, one can argue that 
the Spanish transition was complete with the free-fair-competitive elections of June 15.41 
The reborn Spanish democracy still lacked a democratic constitution protecting citizen’s 
basic rights and liberties until the enactment of December 1978 constitution. For this 
reason, it is possible to extend the end of the transition era up to that time.42  
 Domestic factors were primarily responsible for the evolution of Spain’s 
democratic transition. Influenced and constrained by structural changes of the late Franco 
period, a few representatives of the Spanish elite played critical roles. The King’s firm 
commitment to democracy was most visible in his strong support of Suarez’s reformist 
stand. In addition, Juan Carlos, who was the successor to Franco and the commander in 
chief, was the key person to deal with the army’s resistance to the transition. The 
reformist General and the deputy PM Gutierrez Mellado also played important roles in 
                                                          
41 O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, p. 6 
 
42  In regard to the timing of Spanish transition, there are two major views in the literature. While some 
scholars take the period of 1975-78, from the death of Franco to the referendum of 1978 constitution, as the 
period of transition (Share and Mainwaring 1984, Huntington 1991), others extend it until PSOE’s victory 
in the October 1982 elections (Diaz-Ambrona 1984, Preston 1986, Clark and Heltzel 1987, Story and 
Pollack 1991, Tusell 2007, Serra 2010). 
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depoliticizing the army. Adolfo Suarez succeeded to bring the democratic opposition into 
the terms of reform mode of transition. In the process of passing the Law of Political 
Reform, the Cortes President F. Miranda was very helpful in convincing the incumbent 
Cortes members. On the opposition side, Felipe Gonzalez and Santiago Carrillo, the 
leaders of the Socialist and the Communist parties, forcefully demanded democratic 
transition but they were prudent enough not to antagonize the military. The memory of 
the Civil War was an important driving force behind their cautious behavior.43 Finally, 
Cardinal Tarancon, the head of the Spanish Catholic Church, raised his voice in support 
of the democratic transition. 
 In contrast to the 1930s in which the Spanish democracy failed, the international 
context of the 1970s was in many ways favorable for the democratic transition. While the 
1953 agreements with the United States and the Vatican contributed to the durability of 
the Franco regime, the easing tension of the Cold War made the United States, at most, 
neutral for the transition at the time of Franco’s death. Following ideational changes at 
the Second Vatican Council, the Vatican was mostly supportive of democratic change. 
Particularly important, Spain’s European neighborhood contributed significantly before 
and during the transition process. The rapid economic development and modernization of 
the 1960s were to a large extent related to the country’s increasing relations with Europe. 
Socioeconomic relations with European countries indirectly contributed to the structural 
changes which made the democratic transition more likely after Franco. Moreover, the 
European Community’s rejection of Spain’s 1962 application for associate membership, 
not only helped the de-legitimization of the Franco regime, but also increased the 
                                                          
43 Interview with Charles Powell in Madrid on June 29.2009. For the list of interviewees and their 
positions; see Appendix 1. 
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symbolic value of EC membership for the Spanish people, the democratic opposition, and 
the reformist section of the Franco establishment. In addition, European political parties 
and political party internationals (the Socialist International i.e.) provided organizational, 
financial and moral support to the Spanish opposition.44 Yet, the democratizing effects 
from Europe in the late Franco period were not enough to end the authoritarian regime. 
The Spanish transition set into motion only after the death of Franco.  
 
 The Consolidation Process and the Democratic Impact of European 
Integration 
 
        Spain’s transition to democracy following the death of Franco was swift. The 
Francoist political establishment collapsed, and the democratic institutional order set up 
in one and a half years. The June 1977 elections and the December 1978 constitutional 
referendum were the landmark events for the completion of the democratic transition; 
however, the reborn democracy in Spain was nascent and fragile in late 1978. Coup plots 
by hardliners among the military, violence from the extreme right and left, ETA 
terrorism, and process of decentralization posed substantial challenges. The February 
1981 coup attempt showed again that the Spanish democracy had yet to be consolidated. 
It was only around the mid-1980s that post-Franco Spain achieved democratic 
consolidation. In this process, European integration played a crucial role in addition to 
some domestic developments. In particular, the parallel and interdependent nature of the 
two processes-European integration and democratic consolidation- enhanced success. 
                                                          
44 Interview with Jose Manuel Fernandez, 7.9.2009 
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The EC as well as various European political parties and interest groups/NGOs, helped 
the Spanish democracy in several areas.  
 In what follows, the democratizing impact of European integration will be 
discussed on the basis of the middle ground definition of democratic consolidation. As 
discussed earlier broadly (Chapter 1: 15-18), this dissertation has a four-part definition of 
the consolidation. 
 
1. Free, fair, competitive elections with universal suffrage; no politically significant 
group should be excluded from the electoral competition.  
 
2. The protection of fundamental rights and liberties including human and minority 
rights 
 
3. Higher prospects of regime survival. Consolidated democracies have civilian 
control of military; coups and/or severe coup plots make a democracy 
unconsolidated (Schedler 1998: 103-5, Huntington 1991: 231-53).  In 
consolidated democracies, the military do not intervene in politics; they neither 
have tutelary powers nor reserved domains (Valenzuela 1992: 62-6, Aguero 1995: 
16-7, Mainwaring et al 2000: 2-4). 
 
4. Public legitimacy and elite consensus for the democratic regime. Democracy is 
the most preferable type of political regime for the majority of people; no 
politically significant group or political party works for an alternative political 
regime or seeks for secession (Linz and Stepan 1996: 5-7, 16-37, Higley and 
Gunther 1992: 3-7, Gunther et al 1995: 5-10). Anti-system parties and separatist 
groups with a strong public support make a democracy unconsolidated.  
 
 The following section will examine the degree to which particular dimensions of 
Spain’s democratic consolidation benefited from the integration process vis-à-vis 
domestic factors. After assessing particular contributions to different aspects of the 
consolidation, an overall analysis will be made. 
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1.  Free, fair, competitive elections with universal suffrage; no politically 
significant group should be excluded from electoral competition.  
 
 
 The first two components of democratic consolidation are also preconditions for a 
democratic transition to be completed. In the Spanish case, the transition process 
involved the period from the death of Franco in November 1975 to the approval of 
democratic constitution in December 1978. Following the referendum of the Law for 
Political Reform in December 1976, Spaniards participated in the June 1977 
parliamentary elections, and then they overwhelmingly supported the constitution (88% 
yes, 8% no with 67% turnout) in December 1978. The elections were free and fair; no 
politically significant group was excluded from the electoral competition. Although the 
legalization of the Communist Party (PCE) created an anxiety within the army, Suarez 
managed to include the PCE in the elections and in the constitution-making process.  
 Although domestic circumstances played a primary role in the transition process, 
the European Community and European political parties closely observed the process, 
and provided their support in favor of a swift democratic change. The European 
Community made Spain’s membership conditional upon progress in the democratic 
transition. As the Spanish people and political elites strongly desired European 
integration for their country, the EC’s democratic conditionality generated an effective 
incentive for further democratization. 
 In the pre-transition period, the Socialists and the Communists were active 
supporters of democratic Spain’s integration to the European Community. They followed 
a similar position after the death of Franco. The cause of Europeanization/Europeanism 
found support beyond the Spanish left. In parallel with an overwhelming majority of 
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Spanish people, liberals/reformists in the Francoist establishment opted for European 
integration in the transition period. As a result, the Arias and Suarez governments, 
representing the Spanish right, supported the EC membership goal. All major economic 
interest groups including the business, labor unions and farmers, were also in favor of EC 
membership. Finally, the cause of European integration found support from the Catalans 
and the Basque people. Although different political, economic and regional groups had 
varying conceptions of Europe/EC, all were united for European integration. Only the 
extreme-right and the extreme-left forces, marginal in numbers, were against EC 
membership (Tsoukalis 1981:123, Holmes 1983: 178, Arango 1995:253-4, Alvarez-
Miranda 1996:206-14, McLennan 2000:154-59). Overwhelming support for European 
integration across different parties and regions made the EC accession a positive factor 
for the acceleration of transition reforms including the enactment of the first democratic 
elections. 
 In the transition period, the EC institutions and European political parties 
contributed to the conduct of free, fair, and competitive elections. For example, the 
European Parliament provided an enthusiastic support for the legalization of Communist 
Party in April 1977 through a resolution (Powell 2009: 48-51). The parliament also sent 
informal observers for the June 1977 elections, and accepted the elections as free and 
democratic. However, the European institutions including the parliament did not have 
any major role in the supervision of the 1977 and the subsequent elections.45 
Moreover, the Spanish political parties, both the left and the right, received significant 
sources of support (financial, logistic, organizational, expertise, moral i.e.) from 
                                                          
45 Online communication with Professor Charles Powell, who is the director of Fundacion Transicion 
Espanola (October 16, 2011). The author made an interview with him in Madrid on June 29, 2009. 
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European political parties and political party internationals. Particularly notable, the 
Socialist International (SI) and the German SPD played significant roles in the formation 
of PSOE as a powerful opposition party in the 1977 elections. Faced with a competition 
between two wings of the Socialist Party, the SI and the SPD supported the reformist 
wing (led by Felipe Gonzalez) in the party’s congress in December 1976 (Anaya 2002: 
178-9).46  
 European integration received a high level of support from Spaniards and the 
Spanish elite in the post-Franco period. The author’s interviews with current and former 
members of parliament, academicians, and people from political parties, the bureaucracy, 
and think tank organizations in Madrid in June and July 2009 confirmed this cross-party 
consensus on the European cause.47 The EC established a clear link between the 
formation of a democratic regime and the Spanish bid for EC membership. Spain applied 
for full membership a few weeks after the June 1977 elections. The democratizing effects 
came mainly from the EC institutions and European political parties.  
 Furthermore, the Council of Europe (CE) too was helpful during the Spanish 
transition. The Council closely observed the transition process. For example, the 
Council’s Parliamentary Assembly adapted a text (September 1976), which linked 
Spain’s C.E. membership to progress in the transition reforms. The text asked for the 
legalization of trade unions and political parties, and demanded a general amnesty 
(Pereira/ENA Paper). In addition, the Council did have a close dialog with the democratic 
opposition. Like the European Community, the Council of Europe demonstrated its 
anxiety to the stubborn Arias government, and supported the reformist Suarez 
                                                          
 
47 The interviewees in Spain are listed in Appendix 2. 
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government. For the June 1977 elections, the Council sent informal observers and 
endorsed the outcome.48 
 Spain applied for the EC membership six weeks after the June 1977 elections. For 
the first component of democratic consolidation-free, fair, and competitive elections-, the 
EC’s democratic conditionality played an anchor role in the process of democratic 
consolidation. The Spanish political parties continued to have close links with the 
European parties and the party internationals in the years of EC accession process. These 
links were helpful for reinforcement of democratic norms in the new-born Spanish 
democracy. 
 
2.  Protection of fundamental rights and liberties, including human and 
minority rights. 
 
 The Law for Political Reform (December 1976) and the Moncloa Pact (October 
1977) brought changes in the area of political rights and the penal code. Yet, Spain’s 
nascent democracy did not have any basic document limiting the state and protecting the 
individual until the 1978 Constitution (Bonime-Blanc 1987: 13-4). With the democratic 
constitution, the Spanish democracy acquired the major legal basis for the protection of 
citizen rights and liberties.49 
 The first part of the constitution (articles 10 through 55) documents basic rights 
and freedoms. It gives leverage to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other 
                                                          
48 Online communication with Charles Powell 
 
49 The Spanish Constitution is available at: 
http://www.legislationline.org/download/action/download/id/2325/file/Spain_Const_1978_eng.pdf 
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international treaties in the area of human rights.50 The constitution has several liberal 
features such as the abolition of the death penalty (except in war time) and the right of 
conscientious objection (articles 15 and 30). In addition, it allows individuals to appeal to 
the Constitutional Court for protection of basic rights and liberties (article 53).   
 With the enactment of the 1978 Constitution, the Spanish democracy took a 
decisive step in the area of fundamental rights and freedoms. In only three years after the 
death of Franco, Spain moved from 5 (partly free) to 2 (free) on the Freedom House’s 
political rights and civil liberties scale. The following table gives Spain’s standing in the 
Freedom House’s scale for the years of 1975-1986. 
 
  Table 3.2: Political Rights (PR) and Civil Liberties (CL) Scale in Spain (1975-1986)  
 
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
5 4 2.5 2 2 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
 
      Note: Average of the PR and CL scores (1 to 7; 1 most free, 7 least free) 
      Source: The Freedom House 
 
  
 With regard to the second component of democratic consolidation (the protection 
of basic rights and freedoms), post-Franco Spain benefited from European actors and 
dynamics. First of all, the European Community membership symbolized democracy and 
                                                          
50 Spain signed the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR) on June 30, 1981 (Ozcer 2006: 132). The Spanish desire to sign the convention existed well before 
this date. As a condition to join the Council of Europe, representatives of the Spanish political parties in the 
Parliament, signed a declaration in respect of CE ideals including human rights, rule of law and 
fundamental freedoms on October 8, 1977. Then, Spain joined the Council of Europe on November 24, 
1977 (Pereira/ENA Paper). 
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human rights for the Spanish people and political elite.51 The EC’s democratic 
conditionality was a key part of this symbolism. The European Council of Ministers’ 
Copenhagen Declaration in April 1978 stated that “respect for and maintenance of 
representative democracy and human rights in each member state are essential elements 
of the membership of the European Community”. In addition, the Council of Europe 
asked for compliance with CE ideals including human rights, rule of law, and 
fundamental freedoms to be able to join the Council. In preparation of the 1978 
constitution, the Spanish political elite largely emulated the European constitutional 
systems which are based on recognition of fundamental freedoms and human rights. In 
particular, the German constitution did have a considerable level of influence over the 
Spanish elite (Echavarria 2000: 119-21).52 In this process, European political parties were 
also helpful for their Spanish counterparts while the constitution-making process was 
primarily driven by consensus and compromises among the Spanish political leaders.53 At 
the time of Spain’s application for the EC membership, the Community neither put the 
new democratic constitution as a requirement for launching the accession negotiations 
nor did it involve in the constitution-making process. After about a year long screening 
process, the European Commission reached a favorable opinion on the Spanish 
application in November 1978. It concluded that Spain had satisfied the political 
conditionality by “restoring a pluralist democracy, providing guarantees for individual 
                                                          
51 Interview with Enrique Curiel, 6.12.2009. 
 
52 Online communication and interview with Knut Roder, who is a professor of political science in St Louis 
University, Madrid Campus on May 27, 2008 and June 15, 2009 respectively. 
 
53 Before the constitutional referendum, the Spanish Parliament ratified the constitution with an 
overwhelming majority on October 31, 1978 (Votes:  325 yes, 6 no, 14 abstentions). The referendum was 
held on December 6. Results: 88% yes, 8% no with 67% turnout. 
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liberties, and the emergence of new constitution”.54 Then, the European Community 
opened accession negotiations with Spain in February 1979. Therefore, Spain had the 
second component of democratic consolidation in place largely before the EC accession 
negotiations were set in motion. Yet, the EC’s democratic conditionality anchored the 
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms as it did for the maintenance of free, fair, 
and competitive elections. 
 
3.  High prospects of regime survival and civilian control of the military  
 
 A major challenge against the transition and consolidation processes in post-
Franco Spain came from the military. From 1814 to 1936, the country witnessed fifty-
four attempts (twelve of them successful) by the military officers to overthrow the 
existing government (Graham 1984: 190). With such a history one would expect that a 
significant part of Spain’s democratization after Franco was to keep the army in the 
barracks. From September 1977 to June 1985, the Spanish political scene witnessed six 
coup plots. In the most critical one, the reborn Spanish democracy faced a serious risk of 
breakdown on February 23, 1981 (referred to as the 23F in Spain). The King’s strong 
commitment to the democratic regime and the unanimous democratic reaction by the 
Spanish political parties and people not only led to the failure of the coup but also 
accelerated the consolidation process of Spanish democracy. In this realm, 
comprehensive military reforms made by the first PSOE government (1982-86) paved the 
way for democratic control of armed forces to the extent that consolidated democracies 
can have. 
                                                          
54 The European Commission, “Opinion on Spain’s Application for Membership ”, Bulletin of the 
European Communities, Supplement 9/78, pages 9-10 
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 In the third component of democratic consolidation, domestic forces played a 
primary role but direct and indirect effects of the EC integration process were also 
helpful. The King’s role in the 23F along with his critical role in reforming the military 
was decisive. The Spanish political elite and people were all united against the 
reactionary coup. Long years of isolation and authoritarian rule and massive 
socioeconomic changes taking place in the late 1950s, made a democratic and European 
Spain a unanimous goal for the overwhelming majority of the Spanish people. In the 
context of such important domestic dynamics, the EC’s democratic conditionality posed 
an extra incentive to reinforce the democratic regime. For this reason, one should not be 
surprised by the link, which the key Spanish elite, including the King and Prime Minister 
Felipe Gonzalez, established between the processes of European integration and 
democratic consolidation (Tavias 1984: 163, Lieberman 1985: 43, Share 1989: 50-51, 
Huntington 1991: 191-3). Despite such a reinforcing impact, the 23F demonstrated that 
the EC did not have any power to prevent a severe risk of democratic breakdown.  
 In the following section I discuss major issues and developments dealing with the 
third component of democratic consolidation in the post-Franco Spain. The discussion 
will end with an assessment of the extent to which European integration was helpful for 
Spanish democracy. 
 The Spanish military consisted of three major groups by the time of Franco’s 
death: (1) the military hardliners (2) the conservatives (3) the liberals/reformists. The 
conservatives, open to gradual change even if grudgingly, constituted the majority. The 
military hardliners, although fewer in numbers, were powerful enough to attempt six 
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coups between 1977 and 1985. The reformists remained a minority and most of them 
were expelled from the military (Medhurst 1978: 50-56, Lopez 1998: 49, Serra 2010: 93). 
 The military (particularly hardliner generals) was a key challenge in both the 
transition and consolidation processes. As a reaction to the legalization of the trade 
unions and the Communist Party, two senior generals resigned from their ministerial 
posts.55 One of them, General Santiago, played an active role in the Jativa conspiracy in 
September 1977. The conspiracy involved a letter to the King to reverse the transition 
process and establish a government of national salvation (Payne 1985: 96, Preston 1986: 
129, McLauren 2008: 205). One year later, and a few weeks before the constitutional 
referendum, the military hardliners came up with a more serious coup plot to be launched 
on November 17, 1978. The plot (Operation Galaxia) aimed at halting the transition 
process by seizure of the Suarez government while the King was visiting Latin 
America.56 About one year later, the October 21, 1979 coup plot erupted a few days 
before the referendums on the Basque and Catalan autonomy (Preston 2004: 424, 438).  
 The legalization of the Communist Party, the increasing acts of violence by the 
ETA, and the decentralization process (the December 1978 constitutional and the October 
1979 autonomy referendums, all milestone events) made the military hardliners even 
more anxious, and paved the way for further coup plots. In addition, in many instances, 
the hardliners showed disrespect for the King and the pro-democratic/reformist Gutierrez 
                                                          
55 General Fernando de Santiago y Diaz who was the Vice Prime Minister responsible for the defense under 
the first Suarez government resigned in September 1976 when Suarez decided to legalize trade unions as a 
part of the Law of Political Reform. The Navy Minister Admiral Pita de Veiga resigned following the 
legalization of the Communist Party in April 1977. 
 
56 One of the plotters of the Operation Galaxia, Colonel Antonio Tejero was sentenced for seven months 
because of his involvement in the November 1978 coup plot. A few years later, Tejero took over the 
Spanish Parliament on February 23, 1981. 
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Mellado, who served as the Chief of General Staff and the Minister of Defense from 1976 
to 1981 (Vilanova 1983: 157-8, Preston 1986: 147).  
 In these critical years of political transformation, General Mellado made two 
decisive contributions to Spanish democracy. First, he endeavored to keep the military 
out of politics in order to prevent the peril of military intervention. Second, he played an 
active role in several reforms dealing with the army’s depoliticization, modernization and 
professionalization (Graham 1984: 1, Clark and Heltzel 1987: 87). The Law of Political 
Reform (1976) and the 1978 Constitution eliminated several senior officers from high 
administrative and advisory posts in the civilian bureaucracy. The Royal Decree of early 
1977 forbade the participation of military officers in political parties and trade unions. In 
the same year, three separate military ministers were fused into a single ministry, and the 
ministry of defense was created. In December 1978, a new police law ruled out the 
jurisdiction of military tribunals outside the armed forces. Moreover, Mellado replaced 
several hardliner officers with loyal ones (Payne 1986: 183, Preston 1990: 192, Serra 
2010: 103-128). All these legislative and staff changes helped to curb the military’s 
involvement in the civilian sphere. 
 With regard to the civilian control of the military during Spain’s transition and 
consolidation, King Juan Carlos’s role cannot be understated. The King, the legitimate 
successor to Franco, stood firm for the cause of democracy. Navigating between Franco’s 
military and democratic aspirations of the Spanish society, he achieved to keep the 
newborn democracy on the right path.57 The King’s backward legitimacy (chosen by 
Franco as the next head of state) provided him a high level of leverage over the military. 
                                                          
57 Interview with Enrique Curiel. 
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In his speeches addressing the military, he emphasized national unity, military discipline, 
and superiority of the Parliament. The King also attempted to assuage the military’s 
sensibilities regarding the transition process and the ETA terrorism. (Powell 1996: 139-
56, Preston 2004: 377) Moreover, he supported the pro-democratic Mellado in his efforts 
to depoliticize and professionalize the army. In parallel with Mellado’s staff 
replacements, Juan Carlos gradually removed hardliner generals from the military.58 For 
instance, he replaced senior generals at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JUJEM) in January 
1982. His contributions to the democratic civilian-military relations continued with his 
support for the far-reaching military reforms under the PSOE rule (Serra 2010: 157). 
 The February 23, 1981 coup attempt became a phenomenal event in the post-
Franco era of Spanish democratization. In Madrid, Colonel Antonio Tejero took over the 
Spanish parliament with about two hundred military officers at around 6.30pm. (Citation) 
While Tejero stormed the parliament, hardliner general Milans del Bosch ordered tanks 
into the streets and decreed a state of emergency in Valencia. The coup failed when Juan 
Carlos stood firm behind the democratic regime. In a few hours after Tejero’s attack on 
the parliament, the King contacted with major generals in different regions, and asked 
their support for the democratic order. The generals’ loyalty to the King led them not to 
have a position in favor of the coup attempt.59 Juan Carlos also created a new civilian 
cabinet while the Parliament was under attack.60 All these efforts demonstrated the 
King’s commitment to democracy. 
                                                          
58 Interview with Jose M. Fernandez. 
 
59 Interview with Ignocio Molina and  J.M. Fernandez. 
 
60 Interview with C. Powell. 
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 A Conceptual Discussion on the Civil-Military Relations in Spain 
 Narcis Serra, who served as a defense minister (1982-1991) in the critical period 
of consolidation process, proposes a three dimensional theory of democratic military 
reform and applies it to the transition and consolidation processes in his new book. The 
dimensions include: (i) conflict level axis-the degree to which civilians and military have 
conflict with each other, (ii) control of the military axis- ranging from full military 
control of politics to full civilian control of the military, and (iii) professionalism axis- 
the army as an institution or an occupation. Then, he argues that consolidated 
democracies are distinct by (i) low levels of conflict between civilians and the military, 
(ii) full civilian control of military, and (iii) high degree of professionalism (2010: 61-5).  
 According to him, one of the key distinctions between the transition and 
consolidation processes in the area of civilian military relations is that the military 
frequently intervenes in politics in the transition while the elected government creates and 
controls military and defense policies in the consolidation (Serra 2010: 77). This 
conceptualization goes in parallel with Felipe Aguero’s definition of civilian supremacy: 
“the ability of a civilian, democratically elected government to conduct general policy 
without interference from the military, to define the goals and general organization of 
national defense, to formulate defense policy, and to monitor the implementation of 
military policy” (Aguero 1995: 19). 
 Serra and Aguero’s works could be very helpful to assess when the Spanish 
democracy consolidated in the area of the civilian control of military. Serra’s ministerial 
position (Defense) in this period gives an important leverage to his conceptual analysis. 
He argued that “the civil powers did not control the armed forces in any real sense until 
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the mid-1980s” (Serra 2010: 141).  Then, he examines the military reforms made through 
the UCD and PSOE governments from 1976 to the late 1980s. Noting that the post-1986 
reforms mostly dealt with the army’s professionalization and NATO membership, Serra 
underlines the significance of pre-1986 reforms for the consolidation process. Without 
denying military reforms, which were undertook by Mellado and the UCD governments 
(1977-1982), he further reiterates the importance of the single power majority PSOE 
government (1982-86) for the increasing pace of reforms (Serra 2010: 148-152, 171).  
 The far-reaching reforms of the 1982-1986 period made significant contributions 
to the consolidation of Spanish democracy. In January 1984, the new defense law 
(LODNOM 84) assigned to the civilian authorities (prime minister and minister of 
defense) a leadership role in the making of defense and military policies. The new law 
has also made the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the National Defense Commission only an 
advisory body for the prime minister and the minister of defense. A few months later, the 
PSOE government initiated a massive program of military modernization (META). The 
modernization program planned to reduce the size of the army, to make it more 
professional, and to transform the promotion system from seniority to meritocracy. 
Furthermore, reforms in the military justice system in 1985 and 1986 resulted in the strict 
limitation of military jurisdiction to technical and professional matters. Of particular 
importance is that political crimes by the military and the crimes of rebellion were 
assigned for processing to the civilian courts (Share 1986b: 186-94, Serra 2010: 156-72). 
All these reforms increased the power of civilian authorities vis-à-vis the military, and 
contributed to the democratic control of armed forces. Reflecting the increasing level of 
civilian supremacy in this period, the PSOE government dismissed top level military 
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officers from their posts when they made public statements about political issues. 
Political statements by the military were so rare and nearly disappeared after 1987 (Serra 
2010: 196-7).   
 With regard to the third component of democratic consolidation -high prospects 
of regime survival/the civilian control of military- we can say that Spanish democracy 
was consolidated around the mid-1980s. Although a number of scholars pointed to the 
failed 23F or the October 1982 elections as the moments of consolidation, the October 
1982 and June 1985 coup plots were evidence of the need for further progress. The 
military reforms under PSOE rule paved the way for the full civilian control of the armed 
forces around the mid-1980s. 
 For this dimension of consolidation, European integration involved some 
contributions; however, Spain’s domestic dynamics were of primary importance. The 
King’s democratic credentials, demonstrated in the 23F and in his support to the military 
reforms, along with the civilian unity against a reactionary coup were significant 
elements. In addition, the strong PSOE government, which received 47% of votes in the 
October 1982 elections, was determined to realize the military reforms without 
antagonizing the Spanish military. 
 The European Community made an immediate response to the 23F in favor of the 
democratic regime. After the coup attempt, the vice-president of the EC Commission 
made a statement that non non-democratic country could join the EC. The Commission 
also reiterated the need to speed up the accession negotiations by underlining the EU’s 
responsibility for the maintenance of Spain’s democracy. Moreover, the European 
Parliament adopted a resolution that condemned the coup plot, and congratulated the 
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King and Spanish people in favor of democracy (Pridham 1991b: 235, MacLennan 2000: 
167). Therefore, the EC’s condemnation of the coup and endorsement of the King for his 
firm standing against the plotters enhanced the legitimacy of democratic regime in the 
country. Moreover, the 23F also generated different reactions in France and Germany. 
While France used it later to slow down the accession process, Germany considered the 
coup as major evidence requiring the acceleration of the accession process.61 In the 
aftermath of the 23F, the Spanish government speeded up its drive for the EC and the 
NATO membership for the sake of the consolidation of democracy (MacLennan 2000: 
167). 
 The 23F demonstrated that the European Community did not have any power to 
prevent the peril of military intervention. The EC’s democratic conditionality at that time 
lacked any specific rules regarding the civil-military relations. The EU set specific 
conditions regarding the civilian control of the military for the CEE enlargement 
countries and Turkey but not developed such conditions for the Southern enlargement 
countries. As a result, the EC accession process did not have any direct link with the 
military reforms made by the UCD and PSOE governments.  
 Spain’s entry to NATO (May 1982) provided several contributions to the civilian 
control of the military. Civilian bureaucracy and military officers received training about 
civilian control at NATO headquarters in Belgium (Bruneau 2000: 11). Juan Carlos 
favored the NATO membership by expecting that it would not only help Spain’s bid for 
the EC membership but also shift the army’s focus from domestic politics to external 
                                                          
61 Online communication with Charles Powell on October 16, 2011. The author  made  face-to-face 
interview with Professor Powell in Madrid on June 29, 2009. 
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security issues (Preston 2004: 443). During the author’s field study in Spain, several 
interviewees confirmed that the NATO membership helped moving away the military’s 
focus from domestic politics to security affairs.62 Moreover, technical modernization of 
the Spanish army in the aftermath of the NATO accession facilitated the PSOE 
government’s drive for military reforms favoring the civilian control of the military 
(Banon-Martinez 1991: 246-48, Serra 2010: 139). Despite these contributions, NATO’s 
democratic effects were limited to a certain extent. For the Spanish Socialists and 
Communists, NATO was not affiliated with democracy due to Franco’s military ties with 
the US.63 For the Spanish right, accession to NATO was mostly considered as a strategic 
issue, and the link between NATO membership and depoliticization of the military 
remained in the shadow of security considerations.64 As the former minister of defense 
Narcis Serra stated that Spain’s NATO membership would have been compatible even if 
“the Spanish transition had headed towards a semi-democracy” (Serra 2010: 139). 
 
4. Legitimacy, anti-system parties, stateness 
 
 The last component of democratic consolidation relates to the degree to which 
democracy as a political regime receives support from people and major groups within 
                                                          
62 Interviews with J. M. Fernandez, A. Gutierrez, and E. Curiel. 
 
63 Before the 1982 elections, PSOE took a clear position against Spain’s membership in NATO (1981). 
During the Socialist rule (1982-86), Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez made a u-turn in PSOE’s position, and 
campaigned for a Yes vote in the 1986 referendum for NATO membership. An important dynamic behind 
PSOE’s policy shift was Gonzalez’s pragmatical concern about the link between the EC and NATO 
membership. He considered that Spain’s withdrawal from NATO could have negative repercussions on her 
bid for the EC membership (Arango 1995: 288-91, Marks 1997: 43-75). In the referendum (March 12, 
1986), 53 percent of Spanish voters supported maintenance of the NATO membership while the 40 percent 
voted No for the question that “Do you think it advisable for Spain to remain in the Atlantic Alliance under 
the terms set down by the government?”. 
 
64 Interview with C. Powell 
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society. In consolidated democracies, people prefer democracy as the best type of regime. 
In addition, no politically significant political party/group works for an alternative 
political regime or seeks for secession. In this dimension of consolidation, the Spanish 
democracy did have a high level of progress in just a few years after the death of Franco; 
nevertheless, the Basque question continued to pose a serious challenge until the mid-
1980s.  
 The transition from the centralized authoritarian political regime to the 
decentralized parliamentary monarchy was swift.  The consensus and compromises 
between the Spanish right and left found an overwhelming support from the Spanish 
people as demonstrated in the June 1977 founding elections and in the December 1978 
constitutional referendum. The Spanish political parties and people also revealed their 
democratic credentials in the aftermath of the February 1981 coup attempt. Peaceful 
alternation of political power in the October 1982 elections for the first time in the post-
Franco period, was another key moment. Therefore, Spain’s domestic dynamics did have 
a primary role in the fourth component of democratic consolidation. The cause of 
European integration and the EC accession process also played important symbolic and 
practical roles. Spain’s bid for the EC membership received strong support from the 
Spanish people, political parties, the King, and the business. The membership symbolized 
democratic, modern and European Spain as a clear distinction from the authoritarian and 
isolated Francoist Spain. In addition, the prospective and actual EC membership 
enhanced the legitimacy of post-Franco Spain in the eyes of the Basque and Catalan 
nationalists. 
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 The following section will examine the major issues and dynamics in the realm of 
the fourth component of democratic consolidation. Then, it will assess the role of 
European integration. 
 
 Public Legitimacy 
 Although many studies have underlined the key role of elites in the Spanish 
transition, mass behavior should not be understated. Spaniards provided an overwhelming 
support to their democratic system in every key moment: the December 1976 Law for 
Political Reform referendum, the June 1977 elections, the 1978 constitutional 
referendum, the March 1979 elections, the failed coup of 23F, and the October 1982 
elections. The elections and referendums recorded high levels of turnout, except large 
abstention rates in the Basque region for the constitutional referendum. The table 3.3 
provides turnout rates in the referendums and elections from 1976 to 1986. 
 
     Table 3.3: Turnout Rates in Spanish Referendums and Elections (1976-1986) 
Referendums & Elections Turnout 
Referendum for the Law of Political Reform  
(December 1976)   
78%  (% 94 support) 
The June 1977 Parliamentary Elections  79% 
The Constitutional Referendum (December 1978)  67% (% 88 yes, % 8 no);  
the Basque turnout 46% 
The March 1979 Elections  68% 
The October 1982 Elections  80%  
The October 1986 Elections  70% 
      
     Source: The website of the Spanish Ministry of Interior  
     (http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/) 
 
 In regard to mass attitudes toward democracy, democratic system has enjoyed 
high levels of legitimacy since the early-1980s. In several survey studies, Spaniards were 
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asked whether democracy is the best political system for their country and whether an 
authoritarian regime, under some circumstances, is preferable to a democratic regime 
(Montero 1993: 146, Linz et al 1995: 97, Morlino and Montero 1995: 236). The surveys 
confirmed that an overwhelming majority of people preferred democracy over any other 
political regime. Moreover, seventy-six percent of the Spanish people viewed the 
democratic transition as a source of pride (only nine percent did not) according to a 
survey made in 1985 (Linz et al 1995: 96). Table 3.4 reports some of these results. 
 
Table 3.4: The Legitimacy of Democracy in Spain, 1980-1990 (in percentage) 
 
Survey Questions 1980 1984 1985 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Democracy is preferable to any other 
form of government   
 
49% 69% 70% 71% 72% 68% 90% 
Under some circumstances, an 
authoritarian regime, a dictatorship, 
is preferable to a democratic system 
 
10% 11% 10% 12% 10% 10% 7% 
For people, like me, one regime is 
the same as another 
 
8% 11% 9% 11% 10% 10% 8% 
Don’t Know, No Answer 33% 9% 11% 6% 8% 12% 5% 
  
 Source: CIS Survey, Madrid; cited in Montero 1993: 146 
 
 
 The process of European integration contributed to the legitimacy of the 
democratic regime in several ways. First, the European Community as a club of wealthy 
and democratic countries has received high levels of support from Spaniards. Particularly 
important, European integration was directly linked to modernization and economic 
development. All interviewees whom the author contacted in Madrid in summer 2009, 
without any exception, noted this link. Second, the prospective and actual EC 
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membership increased the legitimacy of Western style democracy, and served to 
delegitimize alternatives to democracy (Day et al 2000: 24) 65. Overall, the 
Europeanization and democratization processes converged to a large extent during the 
post-Franco era. European integration reinforced the legitimacy of the re-born democracy 
for the Spanish people. 
 
 Elite Consensus and Anti-System Parties 
 While mass attitudes were largely helpful for the consolidation of Spanish 
democracy, developments at the elite level were also quite favorable. In particular, the 
acceptance of the monarchy and the reformist mode of transition by the Socialist (PSOE) 
and Communist (PCE) parties not only resulted in a fast-track transition process but also 
made a substantial contribution to the consolidation of democracy. The extreme-right and 
the extreme-left forces made efforts to halt the transition process through the use of 
violence but they failed to attract a considerable mass support. The centrist/moderate 
character of the Spanish electorate, demonstrated in the 1977 and 1979 elections, also 
influenced to a great extent changes within the PSOE and PCE in favor of conciliatory 
policies. 
 The Socialists and the Communists, the losing sides in the Civil War, were 
clandestine forces during the Franco era. By the time of Franco’s death, they demanded a 
radical break from the past (ruptura), and stood against the monarchy. Yet, once Suarez 
steered the fast-track transition process with the help of Juan Carlos’s firm support, the 
leftists opted for the gradual change and recognized the monarchy. The Communists 
                                                          
65 J.C.Pereira, “From democratic transition to Spain's accession to the European Communities (1975-
1985)”, European Navigator (ENA) Paper. Available online at: 
http://www.ena.lu/democratic_transition_spain_accession_european_communities-2-38132 
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acknowledged the monarchy a few days after the PCE’s legalization in April 1977; the 
PSOE did the same following the 1978 constitutional referendum. (Powell 1996: 125) In 
addition, both parties gave their support to Suarez’s austerity program outlined in the 
Moncloa Pact (September 1977).   
 The Spanish left realized moderation in party ideology in the mid-to-late 1970s. 
The PCE broke up the Soviet connections, and followed “Eurocommunist” line (Bell 
1983: 63-77). From 1976 to 1979, the PSOE undertook a significant transformation. The 
social democratic wing in the party, led by Felipe Gonzalez, pushed the PSOE towards 
the center. For Gonzalez, PSOE’s moderation was necessary for the party to be able to 
run government in the critical period of political transformation. Otherwise, the Spanish 
political scene could have experienced a collapse of the democratic transition due to an 
intervention by the military.66 For the Socialists, the PSOE’s right-wing drift was 
necessary to strengthen Spain’s fragile democracy and to make it consolidated.67 The 
party made democratic consolidation, economic modernization, European integration and 
decentralization the priorities of its rule (1982-96). Although it undertook fundamental 
reforms in the area of civilian control of military, the PSOE leadership was very careful 
not to antagonize the army. As many observers of Spanish politics have agreed, the PSOE 
made substantial contribution to the consolidation of democracy with its prudent but 
                                                          
66 A top adviser to Felipe Gonzalez stated in 1986: “The PSOE has governed for almost four years with 
coherence and prudence, always preferring to be accused of excessive moderation rather than risking 
mistakes. Thanks to this, social tension that might favor a coup does not exist” (Share 1989: 142). 
 
67 In an interview, made in January 1982,  Javier Solana (PSOE Executive Committee member) stated: 
“Democracy and its consolidation come first, before our political programmes. These might take twenty or 
thirty years to put into practice. Why this order of priorities? Because the Spanish right has shown that it 
can live very well under both authoritarian and democratic regimes while the left can only survive within a 
democratic framework. We have a lot of pain suffering, and many years behind bars, to prove that” (Share 
1985: 92). 
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reformist policies (Nash 1983: 29-62, Gunther 1986: 10-25, Payne 1986: 185-95, Share 
1989: 35-95, Tusell 2007: 321-49). 
 With regard to the consolidation of democracy, the Popular Alliance’s (AP) role 
should also be noted. The Party’s leader, Manuel Fraga, served several years as Minister 
of Tourism (1962-69) during the Franco rule. Later, he became vice prime minister and 
minister of interior in Arias Navarro’s government. Although he was one the reformist 
members of the Francoist elite, Fraga followed a more nationalist and conservative line 
compared to Suarez/the UCD. Nevertheless, his conservatism did not amount to opposing 
the transition in general. He took part in the constitution-making process, and he 
participated in the marches of democracy after the failed 23F coup (Young 1983: 142-3, 
Bonime-Blanc 1987: 35-46, Morlino 1995: 364). After the dissolution of UCD (1979-82), 
Fraga moved to the center and attempted to gain support from the UCD voters in the 
October 1982 elections. In both the 1982 and 1986 elections, Fraga’s party gained 26 
percent falling short of the PSOE. Later on, the party was re-organized under the name 
Partido Popular and became a center-right party in Spanish politics. Therefore, the 
transformation of the Alliance Popular from a neo-Francoist party into a pro-democratic 
center-right party also made an important contribution to the consolidation. 
 The Spanish left and right received various types of support from European 
political parties during the consolidation process. While the Socialist International and 
the German SPD provided organizational, financial, and moral support to the PSOE, the 
Eurocommunist Italian Communist Party had close relations with the PCE. European 
conservative parties and the Christian Democratic International established links with the 
UCD and AP. These relations reinforced democratic commitments of the Spanish 
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political parties. Moreover, the cause of European integration and the EC accession also 
had democratizing effects on the part of Spanish parties. Having symbolized higher 
standards of democracy and human rights, accession to the EC found a cross party 
consensus in post-Franco Spain. For the left, European integration was intrinsically 
related to democratic consolidation (Tovias 1995: 103, Mujal-Leon 1986: 211). In 
addition, the Spanish left considered the integration as a key dynamic to accelerate 
eradication of the Francoist legacy. For instance, two members of the Spanish left, whom 
the author interviewed in Madrid, confirmed that European integration accelerated 
overcoming the Francoist legacy.68 For the right, economic modernization was a key 
component of EC membership. On the whole, European political party linkages and the 
EC accession process helped to reinforce the legitimacy of democracy among the Spanish 
political parties. 
 
 Stateness 
 Spain’s consolidation process has benefited from the democratic orientation of the 
Spanish people, the pro-democratic evolution of the Francoist elite (the UCD and AP) 
and the legalization of PCE in return for accepting the monarchy. The transformation of 
PSOE and its conciliatory but reformist character under the leadership of Felipe Gonzalez 
was also a great asset. Yet, Spain’s nascent democracy had to deal with a serious 
challenge: decentralization in general, and the Basque problem in particular. On the one 
hand, the question posed an additional burden for Spain’s democratization since a 
democratic regime in multi-national states requires inclusive policies satisfying different 
                                                          
68 Interviews with E.Curiel and J.M.Fernandez. 
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ethnic groups (Linz and Stepan 1996: 33-7). On the other hand, the military hardliners 
did have more justification for the coup plots when a key pillar of the Francoist order 
(strict centralism) was facing collapse. Moreover, the escalation of ETA terrorism against 
the security forces (military and police) and the civilians beginning in 1977, posed a 
severe threat for both the transition and the consolidation processes (Chislett 1975-78, 
McClellan 1978: 48-58, Carr and Fusi 1981, Share 1989: 51).69 
 During the Second Republic (1931-36), the Basque and Catalan regions earned 
the status of autonomy. After the Civil War, the Franco regime abolished this status and 
responded to the autonomy demands with repression. On the one side, the repression 
enabled international recognition of the Basque problem. On the other side, it contributed 
to the emergence of radical nationalist forces including the ETA. Beginning in the late 
1960s, the ETA executed several incidents of violence including the assassination of 
Prime Minister Carrero Blanco in December 1973. In the transition process, ETA’s 
fundamental goal was to halt the transition by launching a mass rebellion following a 
military coup. It planned to provocate the army through escalation of violence. In 
contrast, the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV), an important force in the Basque 
nationalism was open to the idea of decentralization within the democratic framework. 
The PNV’s position, as a moderate Christian democratic party, was distinct to a great 
extent from the secular-revolutionary ETA (Gunther 1986: 38-40, Ozcer 2006: 30-128, 
Lecours 2007: 62-97). 
                                                          
69 From 1976 to 1986, more than six hundred people became victims of terrorism in Spain, and the ETA 
was responsible for about 75% of these casualties. Particularly notable, the ETA targeted the police and the 
military; 90% of the killings by security forces (more than three hundred people) were made by the ETA 
(El Pais, May 4, 1986 cited in Aguero 1995: 143). In 1979 and 1980, the ETA killed nine generals 
(Vilanova 1983: 162). 
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 The Basque Nationalist Party took part in the constitution making process. It 
demonstrated the PNV’s willingness to find a solution to the Basque problem within the 
democratic system (Bonime-Blanc 1987: 88-9). But, the PNV did not find the degree of 
self-government in the 1978 constitution sufficient; hence, it called for abstention in the 
referendum. The other two Basque nationalist parties, Herri Batasuna (HB) and 
Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), supported the “no” vote. Consequently, a wide majority of the 
Basque people abstained (55%); support for the constitution in the Basque provinces was 
lower (ranging from 63% to 71%) than the national average (88%). The large abstentions 
in the Basque region posed a serious problem of legitimacy for the Spanish democracy. 
The approval of the Basque statute of autonomy (90% support, 60% turnout) in the 
October 1979 referendum helped to resolve the legitimacy question to a considerable 
extent. Both the PNV and the EE supported the statute while the HB (the closest party to 
ETA within the region’s nationalist parties) preferred abstention (Lecours 2007: 89-96). 
One year later, the first elections were held for the Basque government. The HB, an anti-
system party for many observers of Spanish politics70, received between 14 and 18 
percent of the vote in the four Basque elections from 1980 to 1990, while the PNV 
remained the leading party. The following table provides the results of these elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
70 For example; Morlino 1995b: 344 
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 Table 3.5: Basque election results, 1980 to 1990  
Parties 1980 1984 1986 1990 
PNV 38% (25) 42% (32) 23.7% (17) 28.4% (22) 
PSE-PSOE 14% (9) 23% (19) 22% (19) 19.9% (16) 
HB/EH/BAT 16.5% (11) 14.6% (11) 17.4% (13) 18.3% (13) 
EE 9.8% (6) 7.9% (6) 10.8% (9) 7.7% (6) 
PCE/IU 4% (1) 1.4% (0) 0.5% (0) 1.4% (0) 
AP/PP 4.8 % (2) 9.3% (7) 4.8% (2) 8.2% (6) 
UCD/CDS 8.5% (6) - 3.5% (2) 0.6% (0) 
EA - - 15.8% (13) 11.3% (9) 
Others 4% (0) 1.5% (0) 1.1% (0) 3.7% (3) 
 
 Note: Entries are % of votes, # of seats in parentheses.  
 Source: Lecours 2007: 96 
 
 As suggested earlier, the ETA aimed at halting the transition process and 
establishing an independent Basque state. For this purpose, it escalated the acts of 
violence beginning in 1977, and primarily targeted the military officers and the police 
forces. Nonetheless, the ETA terrorism fell short of posing a substantial legitimacy 
problem for Spanish democracy when the formula of autonomous community worked 
well in the Basque region. The ETA and its political supporters (the HB i.e.) remained 
mostly on the margins of Basque politics. In this regard, two key developments in the 
1980s were quite notable. First, following the 1984 Basque elections, the PNV formed a 
coalition government with the PSOE. The PSOE-PNV cooperation contributed to the 
isolation of ETA from the Basque political scene. In addition, assurances in the coalition 
agreement enhanced PNV’s loyalty to Spain’s democratic regime (Gunther 1992: 41-2, 
Ozcer 2006: 228-9). Second, the 1988 Pact of Ajuria-Enea, signed by all political parties 
except the Herri Batasuna, was a landmark development to strengthen the system of 
autonomous community and to deal with the ETA problem by democratic means. The 
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pact involved a condemnation of political violence and an appeal to ETA to give up the 
armed struggle. The overwhelming support for the Pact from all political parties in the 
region (except the HB) helped to build an unanimous consensus against violence (Ozcer 
2006: 249-61, Lecours 2007: 96, Guittet 2008: 267-75). The consensus enhanced the 
legitimacy of the 1978 autonomous communities formula, and contributed to the 
consolidation of Spanish democracy in the Basque region.  
  In contrast to the Basque region, the Catalans never posed a threat for Spain’s 
democratic transition and consolidation processes. They took part in the 1978 constitution 
making process, and approved the Catalan Statute of Autonomous Community in the 
1979 referendum (Bonime-Blanc 1987: 35-46, Guibernau 2004: 70-84). The system of 
autonomous community worked well in the region, and the Catalans became enthusiastic 
supporters of European integration. Particularly notable, the Catalans were highly proud 
of their multiple identities (Catalan, Spanish, and European), according to surveys made 
in the late 1980s (Linz and Stepan 1996: 102). 
 With regard to the last component of democratic consolidation (legitimacy, anti-
system parties, stateness), one can conclude that the Spanish democracy became 
consolidated by the mid-to-late 1980s. The Spanish people provided an overwhelming 
support to the transition from the Francoist regime to the democratic one. The marches 
for democracy by millions of Spaniards after the failed 23F coup attempt were a clear 
demonstration for this support. Survey studies made in the 1980s also confirmed the 
existence of a strong legitimacy for the democratic regime. At the national level, the re-
born democracy did not face an anti-system party. The reformist but prudent orientation 
of the Socialist and the Communist Parties, along with the pro-democratic evolution of 
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the right-wing Alliance Popular, facilitated the democratic transition and contributed to 
its consolidation. The Basque question posed a serious challenge. It had the capacity to 
reverse the transition process if the Spanish political elite, did not succeed keeping the 
army in the barracks. The Basque problem also complicated the process of democratic 
consolidation. However, the early creation of a system of autonomous communities and 
its successful implementation resulted in the political isolation of ETA in the mid-to-late 
1980s. The PSOE’s cooperation with the PNV and the building of a political consensus 
against terrorism strengthened the level of legitimacy for the democratic regime in the 
Basque region.  
 In the fourth component of democratic consolidation, Spain’s domestic dynamics 
did have a primary role. Yet, the prospective and actual EC membership also made 
significant contributions. The high degree of public support for the democratic regime 
along with democratic commitments of the Spanish left and right resulted in the fast track 
transition process, and they substantially accelerated the consolidation. The particular 
nature of Spain’s political history (the Civil War trauma and the longevity of Francoist 
regime, i.e.) was to a great extent responsible for the high level elite consensus on the 
democratic character of post-Franco Spain.71 As a result, domestic dynamics were of 
central importance but one cannot understate the significant role of European integration 
for reinforcement of the legitimacy of democratic regime. An overwhelming majority of 
the Spanish people and elite considered European integration as an essential part of the 
democratization process. Symbolically, the post-Franco process of political 
transformation could not be complete without accession to the European Community. 
                                                          
71 Interview with C. Powell. 
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Europeanization and democratization converged to a large extent, and they reinforced 
each other. 
 European integration also made an important contribution to Spain’s regional 
question. Certainly, domestic dynamics were most decisive in the process of transition 
from the centralized state structure to the decentralized one. The system of autonomous 
communities, which was launched in the 1978 constitution and the subsequent process of 
emerging consensus against violence were the key developments. Spain’s 
decentralization process was not set by the EC as a condition for the Community 
membership. Nonetheless, European integration played indirect and facilitating roles in 
this area. The Basque and Catalan people, who were strongly in favor of the integration 
felt more comfortable with overlapping identities; the Basque/Catalan, Spanish, and 
European. Moreover, European level relations decreased demands for independence on 
the part of regional nationalists (Llamazares and Marks 2006: 256-8). On the whole, 
Spain’s decentralization process and European integration went hand in hand, and it was 
very helpful for the consolidation of Spanish democracy.72 Furthermore, the Spanish 
military, which was obsessed with the unitary state structure, noticed that special 
treatment of regions in EC member states does not pose a threat for territorial integrity of 
the state. European integration assuaged to an important extent the anxiety of the army 
about decentralization in the post-Franco Spanish state (Garcia 1995: 129-39). 
                                                          
72  The Basque and Catalan political elite have been very proud of being part of the system of European 
regions. For example, Jordi Pujol who was the president of the Catalan autonomous community (1980-
2003) served as a president of the Assembly of European regions between 1992 and 1996 (Genieys 1998: 
180). 
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 Table 3.6 reveals the domestic and European dynamics of democratic 
consolidation in Spain by different components of the consolidation. In what follows, an 
overall analysis of the democratizing impact of European integration will take place. 
 
Table 3.6: European versus Domestic Dynamics of the Consolidation 
 
Components 
of Democratic 
Consolidation 
 
 
Major Events- 
Key Developments 
 
Domestic Dynamics 
 
European Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
1.Free, fair, 
and 
competitive 
elections 
 
 
-The Law of Political 
Reform (12/’76) 
 
-PCE Legalization (4/’77) 
 
-First Elections (6/’77) 
 
 
-King’s support for the swift 
transition 
 
-Suarez’s leadership skills 
 
-Suarez and PSOE-PCE 
cooperation 
 
 
-EC’s signal for 
democratic 
conditionality (DC) 
 
-European Parliament’s 
resolutions for the 
transition reforms 
 
-European political 
parties links 
 
-EC’s DC: anchor role 
 
 
 
 
2.The 
protection of 
basic rights 
and liberties 
 
 
-Amnesty (8/’77) 
 
-Moncloa Pact (9/’77) 
 
-’78 Constitution (Dec) 
 
-Elite consensus-
compromises (influenced by 
the memory of the Civil War 
and the longevity of the 
Franco Era) 
 
 
-E. Council Copenhagen 
Declaration  / April 78 
 
-Council of Europe 
conditionality 
 
-Europe as a model for 
the new constitution 
 
-EC’s DC: anchor role 
 
 
 
 
3.High 
prospects of 
regime 
survival and 
the civilian 
control of 
army 
 
  
- 6 Coup Plots (‘77-’85) 
 
- February 23, 1981 coup 
(23F) 
 
- Military Reforms 
 
-King’s commitment to the 
democracy 
 
-The civilian unity against 
coups 
 
-Public support for 
democracy & 23F  marches 
 
-UCD-Mellado reforms 
 
 
-EC; no power to prevent 
the breakdown of 
democracy (23F, i.e.) 
 
-EC’s immediate 
response in favor of 
democracy after the 23F 
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-PSOE reforms 
 
-23F  Trials 
 
 
-EC’s DC; not have any 
specific rules for the 
civilian-military 
relations 
 
-European integration; 
reinforcing role 
 
-NATO membership; 
help for focus change in 
the military 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 
Legitimacy 
 
 
-Elections (’77, ’79, ’82) 
 
-Referendums (’76, ’78) 
-23F 
 
-Public opinion surveys show 
strong support for democracy 
 
 
-European integration; 
reinforcing and symbolic 
role for the re-born 
democracy 
 
-High mass and elite 
support for the 
integration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Anti-
System 
Parties 
 
 
 
 
- PSOE-PCE acceptance 
of the monarchy 
 
-HB in the Basque Region 
 
-AP, pro-democratic 
evolution 
 
-PSOE ideological 
moderation 
 
-PCE ideological moderation 
 
-SPD-SI’s strong support 
for the PSOE 
 
-PCE and AP had links 
with European political 
parties 
 
-European integration 
had cross party 
consensus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Stateness 
 
 
 
-Referendum for ’78 
Constitution 
 
-’78-’83 Autonomy 
Statuses (17 regions) 
 
-’84 PSOE-PNV 
Coalition 
 
-’88 AE Pact 
 
-PNV dominance in the 
Basque politics 
 
-PSOE-PNV cooperation 
-Consensus for condemnation 
of violence (AE Pact) 
 
-Basque/Catalans had a 
high support for EC 
accession 
 
-European integration 
went hand in hand with 
regionalism 
 
-European level relations 
lessened demands for 
independence 
 
-Overlapping identities; 
regional, Spanish, 
European 
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 Spain’s domestic dynamics played a central role in both the transition and the 
consolidation processes. Yet, one also should acknowledge that the post-Franco political 
transformation was significantly affected by European factors, such as the European 
Community institutions, the EC accession process, and European political parties. The 
prospective and actual EC membership has anchored the Spanish democracy through the 
EC’s democratic conditionality. European integration was an intrinsic part of the post-
Franco transformation in three realms: democratization, modernization/economic 
development, and foreign policy change. The integration not only reinforced the 
legitimacy of democracy but also facilitated the decentralization process, launched 
through the formula of autonomous communities in the 1978 constitution. In sum, 
European dynamics played contributing, facilitating, and accelerating roles in the process 
of democratic consolidation. Without such a favorable European context, the Spanish 
democracy might have been consolidated in a longer period. Having acknowledged the 
significance of EC’s democratizing role, the Spanish political elite including Juan Carlos 
and Felipe Gonzalez clearly linked European integration with democratic consolidation 
(Tavias 1984: 163, Lieberman 1985: 43, Share 1989: 50-51, Huntington 1996: 191-3). 
 The EC accession process and other European dynamics helped the consolidation 
process of Spanish democracy, but one should also identify the limits of the European 
contribution. First of all, unless the Spanish masses and elites (political and business) had 
fully supported the cause of European integration, European actors could not have much 
democratizing impact in the post-Franco Spain. Neither the EC institutions nor European 
political parties did have any enforcing power over the Spanish state and political parties. 
Therefore, Europe’s democratizing help was highly contingent upon the pro-European 
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Spanish scene. Second, as demonstrated in the case of the February 1981 coup, the 
European Community did not have any leverage to prevent a severe risk of democratic 
breakdown. After the event, the EC responded immediately in favor of the democratic 
regime; yet, the domestic dynamics, including the King’s firm commitment to democracy 
and the civilian unity against the coup, were more decisive. Third, the EC’s democratic 
conditionality in the cases of Southern Enlargement including Spain was not very 
rigorous.73 As a result, the EC accession process did not have any direct role in the key 
military reforms handled under the UCD and PSOE governments in Spain.  
 The author’s interviews in Spain largely supported the view that European 
integration made significant contributions to the Spanish democracy.74 Except a current 
member of the Parliament from the center-right Partido Popular75, all interviewees 
confirmed that the EC accession process helped the Spanish democracy in several areas: 
the civilian control of military, political stability, and the removal of Francoist legacy. In 
addition, many of them underlined the importance of support given by European political 
parties to their counterparts in Spain.76 Some interviewees noted the significant role of 
European integration for the shaping of Spanish identity at the international level.77 
Moreover, without exception, all agreed on the crucial role of European integration for 
                                                          
73 While the European Union developed more specific democratic conditionality rules in the area of human 
rights and the civilian-military relations for the Central and Eastern European candidates, the democratic 
conditionality for the Southern European countries lacked such a specifity. 
 
74 See Appendix 2 for the list of interviewees in Spain. For the interview questions, see Appendix 1. In 
addition to the field study of June-July 2009 in Madrid, a few numbers of Spanish academicians have been 
contacted, mostly through electronic mail, before and after the field research. 
 
75 Interview with Antonio Gutierrez. 
 
76 Interviews with Antonio Gutierrez and Jose Manuel Fernandez.  
 
77 Interviews with Ignocio Molina, Enrique Curiel, and Antonio G. Terol.  
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the modernization of Spanish economy. When they were asked for the major problems of 
Spanish democracy during the EC accession process, many politicians and scholars 
indicated the military, the Franco legacy, the Basque problem and terrorism.78 For the 
timing of democratic consolidation, the mid-1980s received the broadest support.79 
 Distinct from the Greek and Portuguese cases, cross party consensus on European 
integration was confirmed by all interview participants. Affiliating with either the right or 
left of the political spectrum, the interviewees noted that all Spanish political parties 
except the extreme right and left supported the EC membership. Some participants 
suggested that the Spanish political parties did have some differences in the assessment 
of European integration (values, priorities i.e.) yet all desired for the EC membership.80 
When they were asked for their personal opinion about Spain’s accession to the EC, all 
interviewees expressed pro-EC views. Many participants suggested that European 
integration symbolized democracy, modernization, political stability, and economic 
development.81 Some participants, who are affiliated with the Spanish right emphasized 
more the economic benefits than the democratizing impact of EC accession.82 In addition, 
some interviewees suggested that Spain’s NATO membership contributed more than the 
                                                          
78 Interviews with Jose Manuel Fernandez, Jorge Verstrynge, William Chislett, Charles Powell, and an 
anonymous official from the Partido Popular. 
 
79 For instance; Enrique Curiel, Antonio Gutierrez, Charles Powell, and Ignocio Molina. J. M. Fernandez 
pointed to the 1996 elections as a point of consolidation by following Huntington’s two turnover test for the 
consolidation. 
 
80 For instance; Antonio Gonzalez and Jose Manuel Fernandez. 
 
81 For example; Jorge Verstrynge, Enrique Curiel and Jose M. Fernandez. 
 
82 For instance; Antonio G. Terol and Antonio Gutierrez. 
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EC membership to the civilian control of the military.83 Moreover, many participants 
underlined the significant role of the EC accession to overcome the isolationist foreign 
policy orientation of the Franco period and to endorse the European identity of 
Spaniards.84   
 Overall, the two-month field study in Madrid has been very helpful to gather 
observations from Spanish politicians and scholars. In general, the interviews have 
widely supported the idea that European integration made significant contributions to the 
Spanish democracy.  
 
 Conclusion 
 After the end of four decade long authoritarian era, the post-Franco Spain 
experienced a non-revolutionary but a speedy transition to democracy. The international 
context was certainly favorable while domestic factors were of primary importance in the 
course of such a swift democratic transition. Conditioned by structural changes in the late 
Franco period, consensus and compromises between the reformist right and the 
conciliatory left substantially shaped the transition. Spain’s domestic dynamics continued 
to be the key factor, while European integration as an interdependent and parallel process 
became an intrinsic part of the Spanish consolidation. Symbolically, the post-Franco 
political transformation could not be complete without accession into the EC for the 
majority of Spanish masses and elites. In practice, the EC accession process and 
                                                          
83 Ignocio Molina held this view. J M. Fernandez and Josefina Cuesta also noted the positive role of NATO 
membership for the civil-military relations. Charles Powell suggested that NATO membership was helpful 
for the military reforms made during PSOE rule but the reforms would have been done anyway even if 
Spain had not joined NATO. 
 
84 Interviews with Enrique Curiel, Ignocio Molina, and Antonio-Carlos Pereira. 
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European political parties enhanced different components of the consolidation. The 
Spanish people and political parties were overwhelmingly pro-European as they 
considered EC membership as essential for the democratization and the economic 
modernization of the country. In addition, European integration was deemed, particularly 
by the left, a key process to eradicate the legacy of the Franco period.  
 Europeanization and democratization went hand in hand, and they reinforced each 
other to a great extent. The convergence of two processes was certainly very helpful for 
the fledgling Spanish democracy. Faced with serious threats including coup plots, 
political violence, and Basque separatism, the reborn democracy benefited from the EC 
accession process and the help coming from European political parties. The EC’s 
democratic conditionality anchored the Spanish democracy. European integration 
reinforced the legitimacy of democracy, and facilitated the decentralization process. 
Nonetheless, neither the EC’s democratic conditionality nor European political parties 
had any leverage to prevent a serious risk of democratic breakdown as seen in the 
February 1981 coup attempt. Besides, the EC’s democratic conditionality at that time 
lacked a significant level of rigor in the realm of human rights and civilian-military 
relations. Despite these limitations, one can conclude that European integration 
accelerated to a great extent the consolidation of Spanish democracy. 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: 
THE CASE OF POST-COMMUNIST POLAND 
 
 
 One and a half decade after the collapse of the Communist regime, Poland joined 
the European Union (EU) on May 1, 2004. In an important way, the EU accession 
confirmed that Poland’s political and economic transformation towards liberal democracy 
and a market economy was a success story. With the cause of European integration 
finding an overwhelming support from both the political elite and the people, the EU 
membership process developed into a highly favorable external force behind the political 
and economic reform process of post-Communist Poland. In the wake of the Polish 
transition to democracy following the 1989 Round Table talks, the EU followed a very 
cautious line about remarkable developments in the country. Only after a few years later 
when the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries forcefully demanded full 
membership, did the EU launch the accession process at the historic Copenhagen meeting 
in June 1993. While the EU’s impact over Poland’s democratic transition (1989-1991) 
was not significant; the post-Copenhagen period of accession process involved the EU’s 
increasing leverage over the domestic political changes in the country. 
 With carrying out the first fully competitive parliamentary elections in October 
1991, Poland’s democratic transition was complete to a great extent. Yet, major 
challenges remained to overcome: the lack of a democratic constitution, frequent 
government changes, fragmented party politics, institutional uncertainties over the 
legislative-executive relations, particularly the presidential powers, occasional political 
crises in the realm of civilian control of the army, and public disenchantment over the 
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post-1989 changes owing to a painful market reform process. The April 1997 
constitution, a positive impact of the NATO accession process over the civilian control of 
the army, and a broad consensus among the elites on major political, economic, and 
foreign policy goals facilitated the consolidation of Polish democracy. Furthermore, the 
EU’s political conditionality and demands concerning the alignment of Poland’s legal, 
administrative and judicial structures with the EU acquis generated a significant incentive 
for the acceleration of the consolidation process. In general, the convergent and parallel 
tracks of Europeanization and democratization became major assets for the post-
Communist Polish democracy. Nevertheless, the EU’s democratizing impact also 
involved important limitations as will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 The chapter will examine the democratizing effects of the European integration 
process for the consolidation of Poland’s democracy. The integration process will be 
referred to as the period from the 1993 Copenhagen meeting until Poland’s accession to 
the EU in 2004. Before moving to the consolidation period, the chapter will briefly 
discuss key features of Poland’s transition to democracy ensuing the 1989 Round Table 
Agreements. Then, the dissertation’s four-part definition of democratic consolidation will 
be utilized to assess how much the integration process was helpful for democratic 
consolidation. Finally, the concluding section will analyze the limits of the EU’s 
democratizing power in the case of post-Communist Poland. 
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 The Polish Transition to Democracy: A Peaceful but Revolutionary Regime 
Change 
 
 Poland’s transition from a Soviet dominated communist political regime to a 
Western oriented democracy and market economy was an event with both domestic and 
international consequences. The rise of the Solidarity trade union, the failure of martial 
law, and the Round Table negotiations were key moments in the Polish political scene 
during the 1980s. The end of Soviet interventionism over the communist satellite 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe not only determined the pace and mode of the 
Polish transition but also paved the way for the end of the Cold War. 
 To a great extent, three major dynamics were responsible for the peaceful end of 
the communist regime in Poland: worsening economic conditions, the emergence and rise 
of the Solidarity movement, and non-interventionist policy of the Soviet Union. 
Following the declaration of martial law in December 1981, Western governments and 
organizations, particularly the United States, applied economic sanctions to the Polish 
communist regime. One could argue that although these pressures were not decisive as 
much as the three dynamics above, they had some accelerating effects on deterioration of 
the economic situation. On the other hand, the European Community did not have any 
considerable role in the collapse of the communist regime. The EC’s democratizing 
impact became visible in the early 1990s; however, it amounted to a significant level only 
after Poland’s accession process to the EU was set in motion following the 1993 
Copenhagen European Council meeting.  
 The peaceful end of the Polish communist regime in 1989 was revolutionary and 
unexpected. However, the origins of change dated back to the Solidarity led 1980-81 
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crisis. The labor strikes and subsequent Gdansk Agreement in August 1980 were a 
turning point. For the first time, the workers had the right to strike and to form a trade 
union independent from the Communist Party, which was considered a vanguard of 
workers in the socialist system. In addition, the Polish party state conceded to the 
expansion of basic rights and the relaxation of censorship (Pravda 1982: 167, Rachwald 
1990: 19, Goldman 1997: 219-22, Davies 2001: 15, Kemp-Welch 2008: 245-53, 
Paczowski et al 2009: 70-80). Major labor strikes before the summer of 1980 were not 
able to generate such concessions, although they resulted in important changes. The June 
1956 and December 1970 strikes led to the change of leadership in the Communist party- 
the Polish United Workers Party-PZPR- following a serious repression on the labor. 
Worsening economic conditions (food shortages, lower salaries, i.e.) were the key 
reasons behind the labor unrest. The 1956 strikes resulted in the end of ‘Polish Stalinism’ 
(1948-56), and paved the way for the period of ‘national communism’ under the 
Gomulka rule (1956-70). The 1970 strikes resulted in leadership change too: Edward 
Gierek replaced Wladyslaw Gomulka as first secretary of the Communist party (Bernhard 
1993: 152-60, Biskupski 2000: 124-46, Kemp-Welch 2008: 180-206). Particularly 
important, the Polish economy under the Gierek rule (1970-80) became highly dependent 
on Western credits.85  
 In contrast to the previous 1956 and 1970 strikes, the June 1976 strikes did not 
result in leadership change. However, the strikes and the subsequent repression generated 
a significant dynamic in the country: the emergence of a broad based opposition 
                                                          
85 As a result of massive Western money borrowing under the Gierek rule, Poland became one of the most 
indebted countries of the Central and Eastern Europe by 1980 with an amount of $23 billion (Gowan 1990: 
64, Rachwald 1990: 47, Roszkowski and Kaufman 2006: 375-78).  
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movement against the communist regime. In this regard, the establishment of the 
Workers’ Defence Committee (KOR) in September 1976 was a key development. 
Dissident intellectuals, formerly orthodox Marxists, became a key ally of the workers. In 
addition, the Catholic Church, if not explicitly, supported this alliance. The emerging 
opposition posed a serious threat to the legitimacy of the communist rule. The 
significance of such development became most visible in the outbreak of 1980-81 crisis. 
In the aftermath of the mid-August strikes and the Gdansk concessions, Polish politics 
witnessed the foundation of Solidarity and a change of Communist party leadership in 
September 1980. Stanislaw Kania replaced Gierek as Secretary General of the PZPR. 
However, Kania’s term ended short due to a deepening economic crisis an growing 
legitimacy problem of the Communist rule. General Wojciech Jaruzelski replaced Kania 
in October 1981, outlawed Solidarity, and declared martial law on December 13, 1981.  
 The 1980-81 crisis was definitely a watershed event for the fate of Polish 
communism. On the one hand, the Solidarity labor movement with about ten million 
membership base emerged as a powerful force against the communist party state. 
Although the martial law policy (December 1981- July 1983) outlawed Solidarity, the 
movement survived underground. On the other hand, the 1980-81 crisis substantially 
demoralized and paralyzed the Communist party (Kemp-Welch 2008: 281, Rothschild 
and Wingfield 2008: 160). However, the Soviet Union under the leadership of Leonid 
Brezhnev was keen on not to allow a fissure in the Soviet dominated Eastern European 
countries. As many observers of Polish politics agreed, the imminent threat of Soviet 
intervention played a central role in Jaruzelski’s decision to impose the martial law 
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(Rachwald 1990: 21, Wiatr 1991: 13, Colomer 2000: 92, Paczkowski et al 2009: 139). As 
a result, Poles had to wait a few more years to witness the transition to democracy. 
 The Solidarity led opposition, which was composed of different ideological 
orientations including social democrats, liberals, and Catholic nationalists, posed a 
serious challenge against the Communist party in the aftermath of 1980-81 crisis. 
Increasing economic problems and the Party’s failure to address them as well as a 
growing legitimacy question led the country to a severe stalemate. In this context, foreign 
policy change in Mikhail Gorbachev’s Soviet Union did have a decisive role for the 
shape of Poland’s future. On the one hand, the end of the interventionist Brezhnev 
Doctrine strengthened the reformist wing of the Polish Communist Party vis-à-vis the 
conservatives/hardliners (Colomer 2000: 92). On the other hand, the end of the Soviet 
veto approach made possible and substantially influenced the pace and mode of the 
Polish transition to democracy, which was set in motion at the Round Table Negotiations 
of February-April 1989 (Bernhard 1990: 130 and 322, Kaldor 1990: 27, Hyde-Price 
1996: 191, Goldman 1997: 228, Michnik 1998: 132). 
 The Polish transition has been identified as a ‘self-limiting revolution’, 
‘evolutionary revolution’, or ‘the Spanish way of transition’ (Staniszkis 1984: 17, Ash 
1984: 276, Michnick 1998: 124). These identifications underline two central features of 
the Polish path to democracy: (i) revolutionary but peaceful and gradual, and (ii) 
transition by agreement on the basis of mutual concessions. The Round Table talks, held 
between Solidarity and the Communist Party in the  spring of 1989, ended with the 
following terms of concessions: (i) the legalization of trade unions including Solidarity 
(ii) holding semi-competitive elections for the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish 
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Parliament) - 35% of seats were opened for full competition while 65% were reserved for 
the Communist Party- (iii) holding fully competitive elections for the Senate, and (iv) 
making the presidency a strong executive institution with an informal agreement for 
General Jaruzelski’s election to the post (Barany and Vinton 1990: 192, Goldman 1997: 
224, Friszke 2009: 132). 
 The Sejm and Senate elections in June 1989 resulted in a clear victory for the 
Solidarity led opposition while the Communist Party, which had had a monopoly of 
power in the past four decades, suffered a humiliating defeat. The Solidarity Civic 
Committee candidates won all the Sejm seats (161 out of 161), which were open for 
competition (35%). In the fully competitive Senate elections, the Civic Committee 
succeeded in winning 99 seats out of 100. The unexpected results certainly accelerated 
the pace of Polish transition to democracy. Following the elections, Jaruzelski was named 
president by the Sejm on July 19 in line with the Round Table concessions, while on 
August 24, Solidarity leader Tadeusz Mazowiecki became the first non-communist prime 
minister in Central and Eastern Europe after World War II (Barany and Vinton 1990: 
192-200, Friszke 2009: 144-78). In December 1989, the Sejm changed the name of the 
state (“Third Polish Republic” instead of “People’s Republic of Poland”) through a 
constitutional amendment. The amendment also eliminated the references to Poland 
being a socialist state. In the next month, the Communist Party (PZPR) dissolved itself. 
Solidarity leader Lech Walesa was elected as the first non-communist president of the 
country in November 1990. In the aftermath of these key steps in the transition to 
democracy, post-communist Poland held the first fully competitive parliamentary 
elections in October 1991. Following O’Donnell and Schmitter definition of democratic 
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transition, one could argue that the Polish transition was complete by the 1991 elections. 
As a result, the years 1989-1991, from the Round Table talks to the first fully competitive 
elections, can be identified as the period of democratic transition. 
 For the democratic transition, two dynamics played the most decisive role: the 
emergence and rise of the Solidarity led opposition movement and the end of Soviet 
military intervention in the Central and Eastern European countries. The Round Table 
negotiations generated mutual concessions between Solidarity and the Communist Party 
which resulted in a gradual transition. Although one can note the significant role of elite 
level cooperation between the moderate wing of Solidarity leaders and the reformist 
section of the Communist Party, the labor centered opposition movement at the mass 
level made this cooperation possible. This is also confirmed by a key Solidarity figure 
Jan Kuron (1990: 74, Ekiert and Kubic 1999: 46).86 For the emergence of Solidarity, the 
Communist Party’s failure in the economic realm was certainly important; however, the 
regime’s monopoly of power (political, economic, and social) and the violations of 
human rights (repression in the 1970 and 1976 labor strikes, i.e.) had also significant 
impact on the rise of the opposition. Therefore, the authority crisis of the Polish 
Communist Party involved both economic and political dimensions (Wiatr 1991: 19, 
Rothschild and Wingfield 2008: 160-84). 
 The domestic origins of the Polish transition were centered upon the labor 
movement. However, one cannot understate the level of support the workers received 
through training, organizational and moral support from dissident intellectuals and the 
                                                          
86 Jan Kuron, a key Solidarity figure, argued as follows: “…the roundtable talks marked a certain stage in 
the continuing struggle of the Polish people for democracy. But it became possible to reach this stage only 
after the enormous social activity in the legal days of Solidarity and the widespread clandestine resistance 
during the years of martial law” (Kuron 1990: 74). 
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Catholic Church. Symbolically, the emergence of a powerful labor movement 
independent from the communist rule signified a key turning point, which was set 
through the 1980-81 crisis. In addition, the imminent threat of Soviet interventionism 
during the crisis certainly retarded the timing of democratic transition. With the critical 
shift in Soviet foreign policy under Gorbachev, the Solidarity led opposition and the 
Communist party were able to set the terms of the democratic transition through the 
Round Table talks. 
 At the international level, the Helsinki process of the Conference on Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 1973-75) enhanced Polish opposition in arguing against 
human rights violations of the communist regime, which was in fact a signatory of the 
Helsinki Final Act. On the other hand, the Western governments, particularly, the United 
States, applied economic sanctions following the imposition of martial law in December 
1981, and these sanctions hampered to some extent the regime’s ability to handle the 
worsening economic situation in the country. Furthermore, Pope John Paul’s visits to 
Poland (1979, 1983, 1987) provided important moral support for the Solidarity 
movement. Although these international factors played some roles in helping the 
opposition against the Communist Party, they were not consequential as much as the shift 
in the USSR’s foreign policy. 
 The following table illustrates the key actors of the Polish transition at the 
individual, domestic, and international levels. 
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Table 4.1: Key Actors in the Polish Transition 
 
 
 
 
Authoritarian Status Quo
 
Support for the Transition
 
Individual 
 
 
Jaruzelski, during the 1980-81 crisis
 
Jaruzelski, during the 1988-89 
events 
 
Lech Walesa 
 
 
Domestic 
 
 
The Communist party (PZPR) during the 
1980-81 crisis 
 
Hardliners in the PZPR during the 88-89 
events
 
Solidarity/Workers 
 
Dissident Intellectuals 
 
The Catholic Church 
 
Moderates in the PZPR during the 
88-89 events 
 
International 
 
 
The Soviets in the 1980-81 crisis 
(interventionist policy)
 
The Soviets in the 1988-89 events 
(indirectly, with non-
interventionist policy) 
 
The United States 
 
 
 The European Community did not have any considerable role in the collapse of 
the communist regime in Poland. In June 1988, the Community established diplomatic 
relations with the COMECON countries including Poland. The overall response of the 
EC towards the 1989 events was slow. The Union was reluctant to give any prospect for 
EC membership, which was enthusiastically desired by the post-communist regimes to 
realize the strategic goal of “Return to Europe”. In the years 1989, 1990, and 1991, the 
EC focused more on economic transition of these countries and played a coordinating 
role in the aid efforts of Western governments and international organizations. In this 
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regard, one should note that the Western actors including the EC made economic aid to 
the post-communist countries conditional upon progress in economic reforms and the 
transition to a market economy (Ners 1993: 78-9, Smith 2001: 32-36). The democratic 
transition remained to a great extent in the shadow of the economic transition in the early 
1990s.  
 Although limited, the emerging Polish democracy benefited from its European 
neighborhood in three important ways during the transition period. First, the EU-Poland 
associate agreement (“Europe Agreement”) was set conditional upon five elements: the 
rule of law, human rights, multi-party system, free and fair elections, and market 
economy.87 Second, the EC’s aid programme (PHARE- initially for Poland and Hungary, 
later extended to other CEE countries) included some funds for the promotion of 
democracy. Third, the Council of Europe membership (November 1991) and the 
ratification of European Convention on Human Rights (January 1993) set a favorable 
external ground to improve human rights standards in the country. The Council 
membership was only possible after fulfillment of the first fully competitive 
parliamentary elections in October 1991. The EU’s democratizing role would become 
more visible in the aftermath of the June 1993 Copenhagen European Council meeting, as 
the latter launched the accession process for candidate countries that meet certain 
conditions, including political criteria. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
87 The associate agreement was signed on December 16, 1991; it came into force on February 1, 1994. 
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 The Consolidation Process and the Democratic Impact of European 
Integration 
 
 The completion of the democratic transition in a few years after the Round Table 
negotiations was an important step; however, the Polish democracy needed further 
progress in various realms in order to be consolidated. In the consolidation process, the 
European Union played accelerating, anchoring, and reinforcing roles through the policy 
of democratic conditionality. The EU explicitly set fulfilling the Copenhagen political 
criteria as a requirement to launch the accession negotiations. With the help of the 
Copenhagen conditionality, monitoring, and accession funds, the EU did have a 
substantial leverage over key economic and political reforms in Poland during the period 
of negotiations (1998-2002). 
 In assessing the democratic impact of the European Union for post-communist 
Poland, a few important remarks should be made. First, the EU’s influence was not 
uniform across three periods: 1989-1992, 1993-1997 (pre-negotiations), and 1998-2004 
(negotiations and ratifying the Accession Treaty). While the EU-Poland relations lacked 
the prospect for full membership in the early 1990s, the relations experienced a 
significant transformation in the pre-negotiation years (1993-1997), and particularly in 
the years of accession negotiations (1998-2002). Therefore, the EU’s democratizing 
impact evolved over the 1990s in parallel with the changing intensity of EU-Poland 
relations. Second, the EU’s democratizing impact was possible only when Poles and the 
Polish political parties provided an overwhelming support for the cause of EU 
membership. Third, the EU’s impact was not always positive. As the author’s interviews 
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with Polish political and intellectual elites confirm, the European integration process also 
generated some negative effects for the Polish democracy. 
 In the following section, the democratic impact of European integration will be 
examined in line with the four-part definition of democratic consolidation in the 
dissertation: (i) free, fair, competitive elections with universal suffrage, (ii) protection of 
fundamental rights and liberties including human and minority rights, (iii) high prospects 
of regime survival and civilian control of the military, and (iv) legitimacy, anti-system 
parties, stateness. After the examination of the EU’s impact on each of four components, 
the chapter will conclude with a discussion on the limits of the EU’s democratizing 
leverage. 
 
1. Free, fair, competitive elections with universal suffrage; no politically 
significant group should be excluded from electoral competition.  
 
 Except for the semi-competitive founding elections of June 1989, post-communist 
Poland fulfills the first component of democratic consolidation.88 The 1991, 1993, 1997, 
and 2001 parliamentary elections along with the 1990, 1995 and 2000 presidential 
elections were all free, fair and competitive. Particularly notable, incumbent political 
parties never won in parliamentary elections between 1991 and 2001, while Polish 
elections always witnessed peaceful transfer of power between the Solidarity/post-
Solidarity and the post-Communist political parties (Millard 1999: 77).   
 
                                                          
88 One also should note that the 1990 presidential elections, the first direct presidential elections in the 
history of Poland, resulted in the presidency of Solidarity leader Lech Walesa replacing the former 
communist, General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Therefore, the 1990 presidential elections should be considered 
as a turning point in the Polish transition. 
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 For the period of 1993-2004, the European Union accession process, particularly 
the Copenhagen political criteria played an anchor role for upholding free, fair, and 
competitive elections. Unlike the period of 1989-1992, the EU provided a clear prospect 
for membership to Poland after the June 1993 Copenhagen European Council meeting, 
and this prospect generated a powerful incentive for democratization. The European 
Commission’s Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership (1997) confirmed that 
Poland met the Copenhagen political criteria89, which had been set as an explicit 
condition for the accession negotiations to be launched. Later, the Commission’s annual 
progress reports from 1998 to 2003 monitored the Polish democracy, and were satisfied 
with Poland’s record in the area of the political criteria.90 As confirmed by the EU’s 
progress reports, Poland successfully upheld democratic elections. Neither the Polish 
democracy had any considerable problem nor did the EU exercise any specific, direct 
impact in this area, different from an anchor role in the accession process. The 2001, 
2002, and 2003 progress reports did have a brief evaluation on the amendment to the Act 
on Political Parties (adopted in April 2001). The amendment made state funding as the 
major component of the incomes of political parties (Szczerbiak 2007: 315-6). The EU 
expected positive consequences of the amendment for transparent working of the political 
system. Although the major drive behind the amendment was curbing corruption, it also 
helped equalizing parties’ access to the electoral process. As a result, the amended law 
also contributed to competitiveness of the democratic elections. 
                                                          
89 The political criteria: “membership requires that the candidate country has achieved stability of 
institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protecting of 
minorities” (The 1993 Copenhagen European Council). 
 
90 Full text of the annual progress reports are available in the website of the EU: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/enlargement_process/past_enlargements/eu10/poland_en.htm 
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 Among the interviewees whom the author talked to in Poland in September and 
October 2009, none of them discussed problems in the execution of democratic 
elections.91 A group of academicians from the Warsaw School of Economics expressed 
opinions that the EU monitoring on party financing was helpful. 
 
2. The protection of fundamental rights and liberties  
 
 The Solidarity-led Polish transition was about not only having political 
competition through democratic elections, but also eliminating the violation of basic 
rights and freedoms experienced during the 1981-83 martial law period. The Round 
Table agreements and the 1989-1990 amendments to the 1952 constitution provided 
guarantees for judicial independence, and made the constitution closer to a liberal 
democratic entity (Howard and Brzezinski 1998: 134). In 1991, Poland adopted the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), which was 
required by the Council of Europe for membership.92 At this time, Poland also accepted 
the legal powers of the European Court of Human Rights. As a reflection of progress in 
the realm of human rights, the OSCE opened the Office of Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights in Warsaw in 1992. With the clear prospect for EU membership, provided 
in June 1993 if Poland achieved “stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the 
rule of law, human rights, and respect for and protecting of minorities”, the second 
component of democratic consolidation found a more fertile ground.  
                                                          
91 For the list of interviewees, their affiliations, and the dates of interviews, see Appendix 3. In his field 
study in Poland, the author used same set of interview questions as those in Spain (Appendix 1). 
 
92 The ECHR entered into force in Poland in 1993. 
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 A significant missing element in this realm until October 1997 was the lack of a 
post-Communist democratic constitution providing guarantees for the protection of 
human and minority rights. Although the rulings of Polish Constitutional Tribunal, the 
ECHR, and the Office of Civil Rights Ombudsman had helped somewhat, the 1997 
constitution marked a fundamental step by providing such explicit guarantees (Zirk-
Sadowski 1998: 1999-200). The second chapter in the constitution (articles 30 through 
86) contains arrangements protecting personal freedoms and rights, political freedoms 
and rights as well as economic, social and cultural freedoms and rights.93 Articles 79 and 
80 give citizens the right to apply to the Commissioner for Citizens’ Rights and to the 
Constitutional Tribunal for assistance in protection of his/her freedoms and rights. Article 
35 secures the right of minorities to maintain their languages and cultures, and Article 85 
allows for conscientious objection. Finally, Article 91 guarantees the binding authority of 
international agreements in the Polish legal system. As a result, international human and 
minority agreements that Poland ratifies acquired constitutional protection. With all these 
features, the 1997 constitution marks a significant development for the second component 
of democratic consolidation. 
 Poland’s integration with European institutions in the post-Communist period set 
a favorable international environment for the protection of basic rights and freedoms, as 
well as for establishing better human and minority rights standards. As mentioned earlier, 
Poland adopted the European Convention on Human Rights to join the Council of Europe 
in November 1991, and ratified it in January 1993 (Danchin 2002: 172). In May 1993, 
                                                          
93 Full-text of the constitution is available at the website of the Polish Parliament (Sejm): 
http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/angielski/kon1.htm 
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Poland recognized the right of its citizens to apply individually to the European Court of 
Human Rights (Zirk-Sadowski 1997: 118). The Europe Agreement (signed in December 
1991), which established an associate relationship between Poland and the European 
Community, did have an explicit conditionality regarding respect for human rights (Smith 
2001: 38, Pinder 1997: 114).94 The Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, an European 
NGO based in Warsaw, helped Poland in its process of constitution-making.95 For 
instance, the Helsinki Foundation prepared Lech Walesa’s draft bill of basic rights for the 
constitution. In addition, the Council of Europe’s legal experts made a detailed review of 
all areas of Polish legislation to ensure congruence with the European Convention of 
Human Rights (Halmai 1995: 154-5, Kurczewski 1995: 133, Cwiek-Karpowicz and 
Kaczynski 2006: 37-39). 
 In sum, during 1993-2004, the European Union provided an increasing amount of 
assistance to the post-Communist Polish democracy as regards to the second component 
of democratic consolidation. In several ways, the EU contributed to the promotion of 
standards of human and minority rights. 
 First, the Copenhagen political criteria along with the clear prospect for full 
membership made human and minority rights an essential part of Poland’s preparations to 
join the EU. The European Union asked Poland to ratify the Council of Europe’s 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, European Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities, and the European Charter for Regional or 
                                                          
94 The agreement set five conditions for Poland: the rule of law, human rights, multi-party system, free and 
fair elections, and market economy. 
 
95 The website of the Helsinki Foundation: http://www.hfhrpol.waw.pl/en 
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Minority Languages. In addition, the EU required ratification of the ECHR and its 
additional protocols as a part of the EU acquis (article F.2 of the Maastricht Treaty).96 
Although the issue of death penalty was highly controversial among the Polish people 
and political parties, the ECHR’s Protocol 6 –abolition of death penalty in peacetime- 
was ratified on April 14, 2000 to align with the EU acquis (Vermeersch 2009: 174-7, 
Zirk-Sadowski 1997: 118, Fierro 2003: 140). 
 Second, the EU’s monitoring of democracy and human rights through the annual 
progress reports generated an important dynamic to move Poland closer to European 
standards of human and minority rights. Each progress report evaluated the degree to 
which Poland met the Copenhagen conditionality rules including the political criteria. In 
the section on the political criteria, the reports reviewed important developments in the 
past year in two areas: (i) democracy and the rule of law, and (ii) human rights and the 
protection of minorities. While the first area was composed of four sections (the 
parliament, the executive, the judicial system, and anti-corruption measures), the second 
area included three parts: (i) civil and political rights (ii) economic, social and cultural 
rights, and (iii) minority rights and the protection of minorities.97 In preparing the 
progress reports, the European Commission consulted not only with the EU institutions 
                                                          
96 Article F.2 in the Treaty of Maastricht: “The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 
November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as 
general principles of Community law”. Full-text of the treaty is available at: 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichteu.pdf. The EU’s annual progress reports (1998-2003) included an 
annex table to show whether the CEE candidate countries including Poland ratified the ECHR and its main 
protocols. For example, see p.155 in the 2002 report, which is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2002/pl_en.pdf 
 
97 For example, see pages 8-13 in the 1998 Report, “Regular Report from the Commission on Poland’s 
Progress Towards Accession”. It is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/1998/poland_en.pdf 
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including the Council and the Parliament but also with the Council of Europe, the OSCE, 
and the Polish government. In addition, the reports benefited from the views of 
international and Polish NGOs. 
 All annual progress reports from 1998 to 2003 along with the 1997 Commission 
Opinion on Poland’s Application for Membership of the European Union98 found that 
Poland met the political criteria, which was the requirement for the accession 
negotiations to be launched. In spite of the overall tone of satisfaction, the reports also 
brought several criticisms and set several tasks to be handled in regard to basic rights and 
freedoms, human rights and minority rights. As discussed earlier, ratification of the 
ECHR and its main protocols was set as a prerequisite for EU membership. In addition, 
the reports monitored whether Poland ratified the following international conventions: 
European Convention for the Prevention of Torture, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), Convention against Torture (CAT), Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), and Convention 
on the Rights of the Child (CRC). Moreover, the reports pointed to several problems in 
order for Poland to improve its record before the accession. These problems included 
freedom of press, prison conditions, death penalty, detention period, custody conditions, 
discrimination against Roma people, fight against corruption, and the efficiency of 
judiciary. Although Poland’s efforts to deal with these problems did have domestic 
                                                          
98 Brussels,  7.15.1997. The Commission Opinion is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/opinions/poland/po-op_en.pdf 
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origins, the EU accession process, particularly the Copenhagen conditionality, provided a 
significant incentive for further improvement.99  
 Third, the EU accession process, particularly the Copenhagen conditionality 
enhanced the hand of Polish civil society in favor of human and minority groups 
(Vermeersch 2009: 177). As the former Prime Minister Josef Oleksy stated in his 
response to the author’s interview questions, the accession process empowered the 
society vis-à-vis the state, and it made the state more responsive to citizens’ rights.100 
Many other interviewees whom the author contacted in Poland in September and October 
2009 discussed the ways in which the EU accession process contributed to Polish 
democracy in regard to the second component of democratic consolidation.101 For the 
basic rights and freedoms, many interviewees from Polish universities, the bureaucracy, 
and think tanks, confirmed that the EU accession process was very helpful.102 The 
Warsaw University professor Cezary Zoledowski argued that the EU accession process 
helped the institutionalization of minority rights. In addition, he stated that the death 
penalty was prohibited under direct pressures from the EU while the majority of Polish 
society was in favor of death penalty. Pawel Poncyljusz (Member of Parliament from the 
                                                          
99 The EU also set the pre-accession financil assistance (PHARE, ISPA, and SAPARD funds) to the CEE 
candidate countries including Poland conditional upon satisfying the Copenhagen criteria. For example, see 
Accession Partnership 1999: Poland. (It is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/dwn/ap_02_00/ap_pl_99_en.pdf) In regard to the EU’s human 
rights conditionality for the candidate countries, see Fierro 2003: 135-55.  
 
100 The author’s interview with J. Oleksy in Warsaw on October 24, 2009. Oleksy served as Prime Minister 
from 1995 to 1996. 
 
101 For the list of interviewees, see Appendix 3.  
 
102 For example, interviews with Mieczyslaw Szostak (Warsaw School of Economics), Ageta Dziewlska 
(University of Warsaw), Leszek Jesien (Polish Institute of International Affairs), an anonymous official 
from the Polish Information and Foreign Investment, Franciszek Golembski (University of Warsaw), and 
Rafael Dymek (Schuman Foundation). 
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right wing Law and Justice Party-PiS) agreed that the EU accession process enhanced the 
voices of minorities in the country. Maciej Duszczyk, Warsaw University professor and 
member of the Polish team for the EU accession negotiations, underlined the EU’s 
positive role for the rights of sexual minorities (gays, lesbians i.e) and women. 
Malgorzata Mizerska, professor of international relations at the Warsaw University, 
agreed with Duszczyk, and added the rights of handicapped people to the EU’s positive 
effects. Klaus Bachmann from the Warsaw based Stefan Batory Foundation argued that 
the EU accession process improved minority and consumer rights.  
 Several interviewees noted that the Council of Europe’s European Court of 
Human Rights played more important role than the EU accession process in regard to 
human rights. M.Mizerska, K.Bachmann and Marek Ostrowski (foreign affairs editor of 
the weekly Polityka Magazine) expressed this view. L. Jesien, F. Golembski, and K. 
Bobinski (the Unia & Polska Foundation) argued that the issue of minority rights was not 
a problem area during the EU accession. According to an anonymous official from the 
Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE), basic rights and freedoms in 
Poland were already present before the beginning of the accession process.  
  
3.  High prospects of regime survival & civilian control of the military 
 
 In contrast to the democratic transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe, 
the civilian control of the military never posed a serious threat for the consolidation of 
Polish democracy due to distinctive nature of the post-Communist transitions.103 
Although the civilian control of the army was not a fundamental challenge for 
                                                          
103 For a theoretical and conceptual discussion on the civil-military relations in the post-Communist 
countries, see  Barany 1993: 425-41, Cottey et al 2002: 1-17, Edmunds et al 2003: 1-22, Yaniszewski 2004: 
19-38. 
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consolidation, post-Communist Poland had to handle several problems in this realm 
during and after the transition period (1989-1991). Particularly notable, the country faced 
two important crises in this area in 1992 and 1994. The enactment of the Ministry of 
Defense Act, and Aleksander Kwasniewski’s election to the Presidency (both in 
December 1995), the 1997 constitution, and the NATO accession process (1994-99) 
represented milestone developments for Poland’s alignment with European standards for 
democratic control of the armed forces. By the time of the EU-Poland accession 
negotiations (1998-2002), the Polish democracy met the third component of democratic 
consolidation to a great extent. As a result, civilian control of the army never became a 
problem during the period of accession negotiations. Yet, the EU’s democratic 
conditionality, which requires the civilian control of the military for both the EU 
candidate and the member states, played an anchor role. 
 This part of the chapter will first examine the civil-military relations before and 
during the period of Poland’s democratic transition. Then, it will discuss key military 
reforms undertaken in the first two years of the transition (1989-90). Next, the 1992 and 
1994 crises of civil-military relations will be analyzed in the context of further reform 
efforts in this area. After that, the section will evaluate the relative significance of 
Poland’s bid for NATO membership for the civilian control of the army vis-à-vis the role 
of the EU accession process. In assessing the comparative salience of the NATO and EU 
accession processes, the section will also benefit from the author’s field study in Poland. 
 During the Soviet dominated communist Poland (1945-1989), two major 
dynamics shaped the civil-military relations. First, the Warsaw Pact under the leadership 
of the Soviet Union limited to great extent the autonomy of the Polish military. As 
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demonstrated in General Jaruzelski’s decisions to declare martial law in 1981 and to 
launch the Round Table agreements in 1989, the Soviet Union played a central role in 
Polish politics. Hence, the civil-military relations in this period could only be analyzed in 
the context of the Communist alliance system.  
 Second, the Communist regime required total subordination of the military to the 
Communist Party (Gogolewska 1996: 62, Oliveira 1998: 17, Michta 2002: 168).104 The 
Party exercised its control over the military through several ways: (i) the head of the 
Party was also commander in chief (ii) the Party directly controlled the Main Political 
Administration in the army (iii) Communist Party membership was set for military 
officers as a prerequisite for professional development; hence, eighty percent of 
professional cadres were member of the Communist Party (iv) Marxist-Leninist 
indoctrination in all levels of the military education system, and (v) a Communist youth 
organization in the military (Johnson et al 1980: 40-44, Barany 1993: 426-30). The 
subordination of the military to the civilians during the communist period set a favorable 
context for Poland’s democratic transition and consolidation processes.  
 After acknowledging the two major dynamics of civil-military relations during the 
communist era, one can expect no fundamental threat from the military when the 
transition to democracy was set in motion. The gradual character of the Polish transition, 
as shaped by the Round Table agreements, shaped the military’s response to the post-
Communist period. The agreements postponed major decisions in relation to the civil-
military relations and national security strategy, except the following concessions by the 
                                                          
104 General Jaruzelski’s declaration of martial law in December 1981 was not against the Communist 
regime; rather, it was done to save the Communist rule in the country. Therefore, the martial law 
imposition was not a coup d’etat in the sense that it happens in authoritarian regimes (Michta 1990: 15-16, 
Kaminski 1993: 79, Davies 2001: 317). 
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Solidarity: the presidency and four key ministries including the defense and the interior 
remained in communist hands while the presidency did get the central role in regard to 
military and foreign affairs (Asmus and Szayna 1991: 2). Moreover, General’s 
Jaruzelski’s election to the post of the presidency, and his close cooperation with the 
Solidarity Prime Minister Mazowiecki, made the military’s support to the democratic 
transition much easier. As a result, the military did not pose a serious challenge against 
the transition process, and it remained under civilian control (Oliveira 1998: 25-28, 
Gogolewska 1996: 67).  
 In 1990, significant changes happened in the area of civil-military relations. In 
January, all Communist party cells were abolished in the military. In the spring, two 
Solidarity figures were appointed as civilian deputy defense ministers while the 
commander of the Polish General Staff Academy invited Solidarity intellectuals for a 
debate about military and security issues. From July to November, massive replacements 
of military personnel occurred after retirement of many older generals.105 The Main 
Political Administration was transformed from a Communist ideological unit to 
educational and psychological counseling body. The Ministry of Defense accepted the 
legislation prohibiting all political activities in the military. In addition, increasing 
numbers of civilians began to occupy positions in the military and the defense ministry. 
Moreover, the establishment of the Parliamentary (Sejm) and Senate Commissions of 
National Defense helped to generate an open debate about the military’s budget. Finally, 
the military’s name became the Polish army like in the interwar years, instead of the 
Polish People’s Army (Szayna 1991: 16-36, Kurylowicz 1993: 82-4, Oliveira 1998: 31, 
                                                          
105 More than 22,000 military officers including 57 generals and 1,300 colonels left the army between 1989 
and 1994 (Gazeta Wyborcza April 21, 1994 cited in Michta 1997: 85). 
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Latawski 2002: 21-3). In spite of all these important changes, the Ministry of Defense 
remained under the leadership of a military general until Lech Walesa appointed the first 
civilian minister of defense after the October 1991 elections.106   
 For establishing civilian control of the Polish military, the period of 1989-1992 
was critical not only for deindoctrination of the Communist ideology and depoliticization 
of the military, but also for fundamental shifts in Poland’s security doctrine and foreign 
policy. In Defense Doctrine of the Republic of Poland (dated July 21, 1990), Poland’s 
national security was still linked with the Warsaw Pact although the Polish military 
officials were eager for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the country. The Polish 
government announced in January 1991 that Poland would withdraw from the Warsaw 
Pact by July 1991. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in July 1991 and the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops from Poland by the end of 1992 facilitated the move of Poland’s security 
and foreign policy in an Euro-Atlantic direction. As a result, memberships in the NATO 
and EU were set as “Poland’s strategic goal” in Principles of Poland’s Security Policy 
and Defence Strategy (dated November 2, 1992).107 Particularly notable, the emerging 
consensus on pro-Western foreign and security policy orientation among Solidarity, the 
former Communists, and the military in this period made the civilian control much easier.   
 The communist legacy of the civilian control of the military, the gradual character 
of the democratic transition, and the emerging consensus on a pro-Western foreign and 
security orientation played major roles for the fact that the Polish military did not pose a 
                                                          
106 The Communist control of four key ministries including the defense and the interior ended after the 
October 1991 elections. 
 
107 Appendix section in Kuzniar 2001 provides key official documents concerning Poland’s security and 
foreign policy in the 1990s (pp.539-590). 
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considerable challenge to the post-Communist Polish democracy. The country never 
experienced a risk of a military coup in the critical period of early 1990s. Nonetheless, 
there were some occasional problems in the area of the civil-military relations until the 
enactment of the Ministry of Defense Act by then the newly elected president Aleksander 
Kwasniewski in December 1995. Particularly notable, the country witnessed two major 
crises concerning the civilian control of the military in 1992 and 1994.  
 In the so-called Parys affair, the conflict between President Walesa and Jan Parys 
(Poland’s first civilian defense minister) for control over the army resulted in 
parliamentary inquiry that finally led to Parys’s resignation from his post in May 1992. In 
response to the minister’s “decommunizing” efforts in the military (through dismissal of 
senior officers), Walesa sided with the General Staff. The Walesa-Parys conflict was also 
related to the fight between Walesa and the Olszewski government in regard to defense 
ministry and the armed forces. Uncertainty in the legislative-executive relations, 
stemming from the lack of clear constitutional rules, played a major role in the outbreak 
of this crisis. Although the constitutional amendment in October 1992 (“the Little 
Constitution”) clarified some ambiguities in the legislative-executive relations, Poland 
continued to have some troubles in the area of civilian control of the military for a few 
more years (Vinton 1995: 44-55, Gogolewska 1996: 68, Michta 1997: 81-85, 2002: 170). 
 In the September 1994 Drawsko crisis, the Chief of Staff Tadeusz Wilecki 
(appointed by Walesa after Parys’s resignation) and a number of generals declared a vote 
of no confidence in the defense minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk when they were at a dinner 
with President Walesa and the defense minister at the army’s Drawsko ground in 
Warsaw. Later, the parliamentary inquiry found the military generals responsible, and 
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asked the president to reprimand them. However, Walesa dismissed the defense minister, 
and avoided taking any disciplinary action against the Drawsko generals; hence, the 
president worked against the parliament’s recommendation for affirming the civilian 
control of the military. According to former deputy defense minister (1990-93) and 
current President Bronislaw Komorowski, the Drawsko affair not “assumed the nature of 
a military coup, but this does not mean its seriousness should be underestimated” (Simon 
2004: 38). Later, Walesa asserted in the parliament in January 1995 that he would support 
any legislative effort to enhance the authority of Chief of Staff vis-à-vis the defense 
minister. In June 1995, Walesa vetoed the Ministry of Defense draft law, which required 
a complete subordination of the Chief of Staff to the civilian defense minister (Oliveira 
1998: 33, Michta 1997: 91-3, 2002: 170, Latawski 2002: 28-30, Dutkiewicz 2004: 84-5).  
 The Parys and Drawsko affairs did not pose a threat to Poland’s democracy to the 
extent of a military coup; however, they demonstrated the need for reform in the realm of 
democratic pattern of civil-military relations. President Walesa’s taking side with the 
military against the government and the parliament was definitely related to the existing 
legislative gap in relation to the civilian control of the military. Walesa’s personal 
ambitions for power played an important role in the outbreak of these crises. The 
ratification of the Ministry of Defense (MoD) Act in December 1995 by President 
Aleksander Kwasniewski represented a milestone development for the increasing civilian 
control over the military. The MoD Act defined twenty-three prerogatives of the defense 
minister, and made the Chief of Staff directly responsible to the minister. As a result, the 
Act eliminated any possibility that the president may claim a special prerogative over the 
senior military (Michta 2002: 170-71, Dutkiewicz 2004: 87-9). Furthermore, the 
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constitution of Poland (adopted in October 1997) explicitly states that the defense 
minister does have a right of command over the military in times of peace (article 134). 
As a result, the 1995 MoD Law and the 1997 constitution clarified the previous legal 
ambiguities in the area of civil-military relations, and enhanced the civilian control of the 
military. Poland’s increasing contacts with NATO since 1994, and the subsequent 
accession process accelerated the country’s alignment with the Western norms of civil-
military relations. The following section examines NATO’s contribution, and then 
assesses the EU’s role in this area. 
 
 Poland’s NATO and EU Accession Processes and the Civilian Control of the 
Military 
 
 Although the first non-Communist government aimed at shifting the country’s 
external direction towards Euro-Atlantic structures, Poland’s foreign and security policy 
remained to a great extent highly sensitive to changes in the Soviet Union in the period of 
democratic transition (1989-91). Only after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 and 
the withdrawal of Soviet military troops by the end of 1992, post-communist Poland 
began to follow an independent course in its foreign and security policy. As a  reflection 
of this change, NATO and EU memberships were set as Poland’s strategic goals for the 
first time in November 1992.108 By the autumn of 1993, the country’s political and 
military elite reached an overwhelming consensus on Poland’s integration to NATO and 
EU (Vinton 1995: 23-24, Balcerowicz 2001: 448, Zawistowska 2001: 554, Kuzniar 2009: 
9). 
                                                          
108 Principles of Poland’s Security Policy and Defence Strategy (November 2, 1992). 
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 Poland’s participation in NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1994 
was a turning point for the bilateral relations. On the one hand, the PfP program was 
highly effective to prepare the Polish army for NATO membership in several areas, such 
as command and control defense planning, standardization, infrastructure, and training. 
The military officers including senior generals did have ever-increasing contacts with 
their counterparts in NATO states (Balcerowicz 2001: 451, Cwiek-Karpowicz et al 2006: 
45). On the other hand, Poland’s increasing contacts with NATO through the PfP and the 
subsequent accession process required Poland’s alignment with NATO’s conditionality 
regarding democratic control of the military. In this regard, NATO set four explicit 
conditions for membership: (1) a clear division of authority between the president and 
government (prime minister and defense/interior minister), (2) parliamentary oversight of 
the military through control of the defense budget, (3) peacetime government oversight of 
general staffs and commanders through civilian defense ministries, and (4) restoration of 
military prestige, trustworthiness, accountability, and operational effectiveness (Simon 
2000: 39-40). When Lech Walesa vetoed the MoD draft law, which required the 
subordination of the general staff to the civilian defense minister, in June 1995, NATO 
sent a strong message that Walesa’s approach to the civil-military relations weakened 
Poland’s prospect for membership (Michta 2002: 170-72). In spite of NATO’s push, the 
ratification of the MoD Law was possible only after Walesa lost against Kwasniewski in 
the November 1995 presidential elections. The NATO accession process (1994-99), 
particularly the accession talks (September to November 1997) not only moved the Polish 
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military towards NATO standards of operations and training but also resulted in Poland’s 
further alignment with the democratic control of the armed forces.109  
 Although post-Communist Poland experienced some problems in the area of civil-
military relations until the end of 1995, the enactment of the MoD Law by then the newly 
elected president Kwasniewski in December 1995 and the 1997 constitution reduced the 
previous uncertainties in relation to the civilian authority over the military. Poland’s bid 
for NATO membership, which received an overwhelming support from all major political 
forces including the military, became an integral part of the reform efforts regarding 
civilian control (Michta 2002: 175-6). As a result, the NATO accession process 
accelerated the reform effort. Later, Poland’s NATO membership (since March 1999) 
played a reinforcing role in maintaining the democratic control of the armed forces. 
 At the time when the EU-Poland accession negotiations were launched (March 
1998), Poland did not have any considerable problem regarding the civil-military 
relations. As confirmed by the Commission Opinion on Poland’s Application in July 
1997, Poland met the Copenhagen political criteria, which also required the civilian 
control of the army. In the annual progress reports (1998-2003), the Commission 
continued to hold this assessment, and it did not have any discussion on the area of civil-
military relations; rather, the reports only covered issues concerning Poland’s 
participation in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (chapter 27 of the EU 
acquis).110 Therefore, the EU accession process did not have any direct impact on the 
                                                          
109 For the NATO accession process, see NATO Handbook, “Chapter 3: The Opening Up of the Alliance: 
The Process of NATO Enlargement”.  
(It is available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb030102.htm) 
 
110 For example, see the 2001 report, pages 96-98 (The report is available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2001/pl_en.pdf) 
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Polish civil-military relations. Yet, the EU’s democratic conditionality, which was 
required for both the candidate and the member states, played a favorable anchor role for 
the effective implementation of the civilian control before and after membership.  
 The author’s field study in Poland generated three major conclusions for the third 
component of democratic consolidation: (i) the civil-military relations did not pose a 
considerable challenge against the post-communist Polish democracy, (ii) the NATO 
accession process made more direct contributions than the EU accession process to 
solidifying civilian control of the Polish military, and (ii) the Polish democracy has not 
experienced any risk of democratic breakdown or authoritarian retreat initiated by the 
military. The first view was expressed by several people including Professor Golembski 
(Warsaw University), R. Dymek (the Schuman Foundation), Professor Malgorzata 
Mizerska (Warsaw University), Professor K. Bachmann (the Stefan Batory Foundation), 
a group of academicians from the Warsaw School of Economics, and an anonymous 
official from the European Integration Committee (UKIE). The second conclusion was 
conveyed in the interviews with L. Jesien (Polish Institute of International Affairs), 
Professor M. Szostak  (Warsaw School of Economics), Pawel Poncyljusz (the Member of 
Parliament), Marek Ostrowski (foreign affairs editor of the Polityka Magazine), Professor 
Duszczyk (Warsaw University), and K. Bobinski (Unia and Polska Foundation). The 
third conclusion was confirmed by many interviewees including the former Prime 
Minister Josef Oleksy, Professor Bachmann, Professor Golembski, M. Ostrowski, P. 
Poncyljusz, Professor M. Szostak, Professor Mizerska, R. Dymek, Professor Duszczyk, 
Professor E. Lyskowska (Warsaw School of Economist), Professor C. Zoledowski 
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(Warsaw University), the anonymous official from the UKIE, and a group of 
academicians from the Warsaw School of Economics.  
 
4. Legitimacy, anti-system parties, stateness  
  
 The fourth component of democratic consolidation in this dissertation is related to 
the degree to which democratic regime receives support from people and the political 
elite. In consolidated democracies, democracy is considered as the most preferable type 
of political regime by the majority of people. In addition, no politically significant group 
or political party works for an alternative regime or seeks secession. Therefore, anti-
system parties or separatist groups which draw a strong public support pose a severe 
challenge against the consolidation. 
 In this area of democratic consolidation, the Polish democracy did not suffer 
serious challenges in the period after the transition. The initial massive socio-economic 
costs of the shock therapy driven market reforms resulted in disappointments among 
people. This paved the way for some ambiguity about satisfaction with the development 
of democracy until the mid-1990s. Low trust in political institutions and low turnout rates 
in the elections also questioned the level of support that the post-Communist democracy 
received from the Polish people. Nevertheless, the majority of Polish people opted for 
multi-party democracy, and never looked for an alternative political regime. On the elite 
level, a wide consensus between the Solidarity and the post-Communist elites on 
democratization, market reforms, and pro-Western foreign policy orientation played an 
important role for the democratic consolidation. Finally, ethnic separatism was never a 
problem for the Polish democracy. 
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 European integration, which received an overwhelming support from the Polish 
people and political elite, made several contributions as regards the fourth component of 
the consolidation. First of all, the cause of European integration became a key part of the 
consensus among the Polish political elite. Second, the EU’s push for administrative 
reforms in the pre-accession period enhanced the quality of Polish democracy in many 
areas, and it indirectly resulted in higher public support for the democratic regime. 
Finally, the EU’s demands regarding human rights and de-centralization created more 
favorable environment for ethnic minorities in the country. 
 In this section of the chapter, the democratizing impact of European integration 
will be assessed in regard to the fourth component of democratic consolidation. In doing 
so, the section will also examine the degree to which the Polish democracy had problems 
regarding public legitimacy, elite consensus, anti-system parties, and stateness in the 
period of pre-accession (1993-2004). Overall, the attitudinal and behavioral support basis 
of the post-Communist Polish democracy will be examined in line with the EU accession 
process. In this regard, the section will also benefit from the author’s field study in 
Poland. 
 
 Public Legitimacy 
 In the aftermath of the collapse of the communist regime, the Polish people 
provided a high level of commitment to democracy as a political regime. According to 
the New Democracies Barometer (1991-98), neither monarchy nor military rule as an 
alternative to democracy attracted any considerable support from Poles.111 For the years 
                                                          
111 The New Democracies Barometer (NDB) was conducted by Christian W. Haerpfer in the twelve post-
communist countries. The NDB’s longitudinal large scale and cross-national survey included 62,000 face to 
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1994, 1996, and 1998, the military regime option found 11, 4, and 6 percent support 
among the people while support for the monarchy was at the level of 6 and 4 percent for 
1994 and 1998 respectively. With regard to the question of approval for suspension of 
parliament and abolishment of parties, the polls showed about 70 percent disapproval 
rate.112 Responding to the question of whether restoring the former communist regime 
would be better, only 18, 8, and 14 percent provided support for the communist 
restoration in the years 1994, 1996, and 1998 respectively (Haerpfer 2002: 18-38). To 
complement the NDB poll results, the Warsaw-based CBOS poll showed approving-
opposing democracy rates in the abstract of 61-17 in 1995, 71-12 in 1996, and 67-12 in 
1997 (Sanford 2002: 64). 
 Although there was no search for non-democratic regime by the majority, the 
Polish people rated quite favorably the performance of the former communist regime 
until the mid-1990s.113 In parallel with considerable level of nostalgia for the communist 
past, more than half of Poles were dissatisfied with the functioning of post-Communist 
Polish democracy between 1991 and 1994.114 In these years, there was also a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
face interviews; 10,000 interviews per year in 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998. (Haerpfer 2002: viii-x, 1-
5) 
 
112 For the years 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998, disapproving the suspension was at 67, 57, 71, 68, and 
81 percent respectively. (Haerpfer 2002: 30) 
 
113 For the NDB poll question, “Here is a scale for ranking how the government works. The top, +100, is 
the best; at the bottom, -100, is the worst. Where on this scale would you put the former communist 
regime”, the Polish people rated as follow: 34%(1991), 42% (1992), 38%(1994), 25%(1996), 30% (1998) 
(Haerpfer 2002: 12). 
 
114 According to the Central and Eastern European Barometer (CEEB), the level of satisfaction with the 
development or the functioning of democracy for the years from 1990 to 1997 is as follow:  very 
satisfied/fairly satisfied versus not very satisfied/not at al satisfied: 38-37 (1990), 27-50 (1991), 32-65 
(1992), 35-49 (1993), 23-63 (1994), 50-38 (1995), 43-45 (1996), 57-33 (1997). The poll question: “On the 
whole, are you satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy is 
developing in your country?” (Plasser et al 1998: 87). 
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considerable negative public perception about respect for human rights in the country.115 
Nevertheless, more than sixty-percent of Poles provided their support (in 1994) for the 
systemic changes after 1989.116 As many observers of Polish politics suggested, a 
combination of a democratic transition and painful market reforms contributed to high 
levels of nostalgia for the communist past and also to wide dissatisfaction with the 
functioning of the post-communist democracy in the first half of the 1990s (Taras 1995: 
194, Plasser et al 1998: 96, 117, Rose et al 1998: 115-9, Sanford 2002: 66-7). In addition, 
the Polish political parties and institutions acquired a very low level of public trust. Yet, 
the majority of Polish people opted for multi-party democracy, and maintained a high 
level of commitment to democracy as a political regime. 
  How did European integration have an impact on public legitimacy of the Polish 
democracy? First of all, one should note that Poles did have higher levels of trust in the 
EU institutions and democracy than in the Polish democracy and its institutions during 
the EU accession process. According to the 2003 CBOS poll, the Polish people perceived 
the EU institutions as more efficient, more honest, less corrupt and serving much better to 
public interests than the Polish institutions.117 In addition, the Polish people were more 
                                                          
115 The difference between respect and non-respect answers in the polls for 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1994: -4, 
-17, -19, and -30. The CEEB poll question: “How much respect is there for individual human rights 
nowadays in your country? Do you feel there is a lot of respect for individual human rights, some respect, 
not much respect, or no respect at all?”  
 
116 According to the Warsaw based CBOS poll: “In hindsight, was it worth changing the system in Poland 
X years ago?”: percentages of yes for the years 1994, 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2001 was 62, 75, 70, 63, and 
56 percent respectively  (Gorniak et al 2004: 158). The October 1994 poll of Business Central Europe also 
showed a similar result: 69 percent approved the democratic regime while 38 percent approved the former 
communist regime (Taras 1995: 212). 
 
117 Public attitudes about Polish and EU institutions (CBOS 2003):  “they are efficient” (7 versus 50 
percent), “they are generally honest” (8 vs 51), “they are mostly corrupt” (78 versus 18), “they above all 
look after the interests of common people” (4 versus 39) (Gorniak et al 2004: 161). 
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satisfied with the functioning of the EU democracy than their own.118 As a result, there 
was an overwhelmingly positive image of European integration among Poles in regard to 
democracy. Second, the European integration process indirectly affected Poles’ attitudes 
towards democracy in their country. The EU’s insistence on fighting corruption, and 
judiciary and public administration reforms during the accession negotiations pushed the 
Polish government to take faster action in these areas. For example, the Polish 
government launched an "anti-corruption’ strategy in 2002, and these efforts were closely 
monitored through the EU progress reports.119 Moreover, modernizing aspect of the EU 
accession process set an important opportunity to enhance the economic performance of 
the country. On the one hand, the EU provided plenty of funds for modernization of 
infrastructure, development of the poorer regions, and civil society. On the other hand, 
Poland as a candidate country for EU membership was able to attract more foreign direct 
investment and to develop favorable environment for better economic performance. As a 
result, the prospective EU membership indirectly contributed to public perceptions of 
democracy, and made an authoritarian retreat a far more distant possibility. 
 The indirect contributions of the EU accession process in regard to public 
legitimacy were also observed in the author’s field study in Poland. Several interviewees 
underscored the EU’s help for transparency in public administration and fighting 
                                                          
118 In Eurobarometer survey (February 2004) in Poland, satisfaction with Polish democracy was at 16 
percent while EU democracy satisfied 45 percent of the respondents. 
 
119  The European Union considered fighting against corruption as a part of the EU acquis in the realm of 
justice and home affairs. The EU’s annual progress reports examined corruption under the acquis chapter of 
justice and home affairs (Chapter 24). For example, see the 2003 Report, pages 52-55. It is available online 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/pdf/key_documents/2003/cmr_pl_final_en.pdf 
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corruption.120 The majority of interviewees noted that the EU made substantial assistance 
for the modernization of Polish infrastructure in particular, and for economic 
development in general.121 Some people argued that the EU accession process set limits 
for populist politicians as the process required extensive political and economic reforms 
to meet with the EU’s membership conditionality. Then, the process helped political 
stability in the country.122 In addition, NGOs-civil society development and political 
participation were considered by some interviewees as important positive effects of the 
EU accession process.123 
 
 Elite Consensus and Anti-System Parties 
 Extreme fragmentation of party politics and institutional uncertainties over the 
legislative-executive relations posed important challenges for political stability in the first 
years of post-Communist Polish democracy. After the October 1991 elections, twenty-
nine parties acquired seats in the parliament while each of the first two parties obtained 
only twelve percent of votes. After changes in the electoral law, such an extreme political 
fragmentation ceased to exist in the 1993, 1997, and 2001 elections. However, high elite 
turnover and coalition governments remained key features of Polish politics from 1989 to 
                                                          
120 Interviews with M. Szostak, K. Starzyk, and A.Dziewlska 
 
121 Interviews with J.Oleksy, P.Poncyljusz, M. Ostrowski, M.Duszczyk, C.Zoledowski, F. Golembski, 
R.Dymek, M.Mizerska, D.Karwoth, E.Lyskowska, L. Jesien, two anonymous officials from the Office of 
the Committee for European Integration and the Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency 
 
122 Interviews with C.Zoledowski, J. Oleksy, M.Szostak, and an anonymous official from the Polish 
Information and Foreign Investment Agency 
 
123 Interviews with K.Starzyk, K.Zakrzewska, J.Wiatrowska, and an anonymous official from the Polish 
Information and Foreign Investment Agency 
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2004. In this period, incumbent political parties never achieved to maintain their power at 
the next elections, while coalition governments set the political scene. The communist 
successor parties won in the 1993 parliamentary elections; Lech Walesa lost the 1995 
presidential elections to a former communist, Alexander Kwasniewski. In the 1997 and 
2001 parliamentary elections, the Polish political scene again witnessed shifts in power 
between the right and the left. The electoral performance of political parties can be seen 
in Table 4.2. A list of Polish governments from 1991 to 2004 is provided in Table 4.3. 
 
Table 4.2: Polish Parliamentary Elections (1991, 1993, 1997, 2001): Percentages of 
votes and number of seats in the Sejm. 
 
 
PARTIES 1991 1993 1997 2001 
Democratic Union-UD 12.3% (62) 10.6% (74) - - 
Democratic Left/SLD 12% (60) 20.4% (171) 27.1% (164) - 
Democratic Left Alliance: SLD + 
UP 
- - - 41% (216) 
(i) 
Union of Labor-UP 2.1% (4) 7.3% (41) 4.7% (0) - 
Freedom Union- (UW) - - 13.4% (60) 3.1% (0) 
Solidarity 5.1% (27) 4.9% (0) -(ii) - 
Solidarity Electoral Action-AWS - - 33.8% 
(201)(ii) 
5.6% (0) 
Christian National Union-ZChN 8.7% (49) 6.4% (0) - (ii) - 
Centre Alliance-PC 8.7% (44) 4.4% (0) - (ii) - 
Christian Democracy-ChDSP 2.4% (5) - - (ii) - 
Non-Party Reform Bloc-BBWR - 5.4% (16) - (ii) - 
Movement for the Republic-RdR - 2.7% (0) - (ii)  - 
Polish Peasant Party-PSL 8.7% (48) 15.4% (132) 7.3% (27) 9% (42) 
Confederation Independent 
Poland-KPN 
7.5% (46) 5.8% (22) - - 
Liberal-Democratic Congress-
KLD 
7.5% (37) 4% (0) - - 
Peasant Alliance-PL 5.5% (28) 2.4% (0) - - 
Polish Beer-Lovers’ Party-PPPP 3.3% (16) 0.1% (0) - - 
German Minority- MNSO 1.2% (7) 0.4% (4) 0.4% (2) 0.4% (2) 
Movement for Autonomy of 
Silesia 
0.4% (2) 0.2% (0) - - 
Christian Democratic Party-PChD 1.1% (4) - - - 
Movement Reconstruction of 
Poland-ROP 
- - 5.6% (6) - 
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Samoobrona: Self-Defence - 2.8% (0) 0.1% (0) 10.2% (53) 
Citizens’ Platform-PO - - - 12.7% (65) 
Law and Justice (PiS) - - - 9.5% (44) 
League of Polish Families-LPR - - - 7.9% (38) 
Party X 0.5% (3) 2.7 (0) - - 
Realpolitik Union-UPR  2.3% (3) 3.2% (0) 2% (0) - 
Others        (15)       (0)      (0)       (0) 
Total 460 460 460 460 
Turnout 41% 51% 48% 46% 
 
Notes: i: Includes SLD (200) and UP (16) seats; ii: Member of the Solidarity Electoral 
Action (AWS); iii. Electoral threshold was five percent for parties (except minority 
parties), and eight percent for coalitions in the 1993, 1997, and 2001 elections. 
 
Source: Rose and Munro 2009: 191-209, Castle and Taras 2002: 98-103 
 
 
Table 4.3: Governments in Poland (1991-2004) 
 
Prime Minister Period 
Served 
 
Nature of 
Government 
Leaning of 
Government 
Reason for Change 
Jan Olszewski 1991-92 Minority coalition Right No confidence 
Hanna Suchocka 1992-93 Minority coalition Centre-right No confidence 
Waldemar 
Pawlak 
1993-95 Minority coalition Centre-right Resignation of PM 
Josef Oleksy 1995-96 Minority coalition Centre-left Resignation of PM 
Włodzimierz  
Cimoszewicz 
1996-97 Minority coalition Centre-left Election 
Jerzy Buzek 1997-00 Majority coalition Centre-right Break-up of 
coalition 
Jerzy Buzek 2000-01 Minority coalition Right Election 
Leszek Miller 2001-03 Majority coalition Centre-left Break-up  of 
coalition 
Leszek Miller 2003-04 Minority coalition Centre-left Resignation of PM 
 
Source: Millard 2007: 41 
 
 
 In spite of fragmented party politics, frequent government changes, short-run 
coalition governments (especially until 1997), and the delay in the making of the first 
post-Communist constitution (April 1997), broad elite consensus between Solidarity and 
the communist successor parties on political and economic reforms made a significant 
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contribution to the consolidation of Polish democracy. The political elite on the right and 
left spectrum of Polish politics also shared an overarching agreement on pro-Western 
foreign policy orientation in which the EU and the NATO memberships were set as 
bipartisan strategic goals. According to a 1996 study, which was based on interviews 
with 286 politicians including 215 parliamentary deputies from four major parties, both 
Solidarity and the communist successor parties considered democratic and market 
reforms as a necessity. Besides, they were quite similar in regard to conceptions of 
politics and attributions of democracy (Mark and Wesolowski 2000: 88-96). Although 
there were differences about the limits of presidential powers, the extent of welfare 
rights, and state-church relations, consensus on major goals created a highly favorable 
domestic dynamic for the consolidation of Polish democracy (Wasilewski 1998: 172, 
Higley and Lengyel 2000: 14). Particularly notable, the rapid transformation of the old 
communist elite was a great asset for a faster process of democratic consolidation in the 
country. 
 Only four years after the collapse of communist regime following the Round 
Table talks, the communist successor parties came into power in the fall of 1993. 
Although there were some concerns about their performance in power, the Pawlak (1993-
95), Oleksy (1995-96), and Cimoszewicz (1996-97) governments did not deviate from 
the path of political and economic reforms launched in the previous Solidarity 
governments. In addition, they continued to work for joining the EU and the NATO. 
Walesa’s loss against the former communist, A. Kwasniewski in the 1995 presidential 
elections, Kwasniewski’s re-election in 2000, and the 2001 parliamentary elections 
reinforced the position of the post-Communist left in the country. In addition, Poland’s 
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first post-communist constitution was enacted when the former communists dominated 
both the legislative and executive offices. Nevertheless, the return of former communist 
elite did not hinder the democratic consolidation; rather, it facilitated it to a great extent 
as they followed a moderate and pragmatic path. The SLD/ SdRP, the major communist 
successor party, rapidly adapted itself to the European-style social democratic parties 
(Lewis and Millard 2001: 186-7, Castle and Taras 2002: 118-29, Curry 2003: 20, 
Vachudova 2008: 868). 
 From the left to the right, the Polish political scene includes the communist 
successor (SLD, UP), the centrist, liberal-democratic (UD, UW, PO), the post-
Solidarity/centre-right (Solidarity, BBWR, PC, ChDSP, AWS), and the Catholic 
nationalist (ZcHN, ROP, LPR, PiS) parties. In addition, populist (Samoobrana) and 
minority/regional (German Minority and Movement for Autonomy of Silesia) parties 
succeeded in retaining seats in the parliament. Two major cleavages shaped party 
politics: (i) state interventionist/welfare state versus liberal economic policies, and (ii) the 
secular versus Catholic social divide (Wesolowski 1996: 244, Lewis and Millard 2001: 
186-90, Szczerbiak 2006: 100-4)124. Reflecting high level of public commitment to 
democratic regime and wide elite consensus on major political, economic, and foreign 
policy issues, the post-Communist Polish democracy has never involved an anti-system 
party. No doubt, the rapid evolution of communist successor parties in line with social 
democratic parties in Europe played an important role for the lack of anti-system parties 
in the country. 
                                                          
124 Interview with Maciej Duszczyk 
 145 
 
 The cause of European integration and the EU accession process found strong 
support among the Polish political parties. Membership to the EU was an important 
element of the cross-party consensus in the aftermath of the 1989 changes. Both the 
1993-97/2001-04 left and the 1997-2001 right governments took clear positions in favor 
of EU membership. On the eve of the 2001 elections, four major parties in parliament 
(AWS, UW, SLD, and PO), either governing or the opposition, signed a pact in favor 
European integration on August 22 (Yearbook of Polish European Studies 2001: 205-6). 
Before the EU referendum of June 7-8, 2003 (77.5 percent of Poles voted for YES125), the 
SLD, UP and PO vigorously pursued pro-EU campaigns while the PSL and PiS also 
followed a pro-EU position. Among Poland’s weak Euro-skeptic parties, only the LPR 
pursued a NO campaign (Szczerbiak 2004: 265-6).126 Furthermore, the EU accession 
process, particularly the 1993 Copenhagen political and economic criteria, played 
reinforcing and accelerating roles for the post-1989 reforms in the country.127 Finally, the 
accession process helped the transformation of the communist successor parties in line 
                                                          
125 “Poles says big Yes to EU”, BBC News, June 9, 2003 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2973738.stm) 
 
126 An overwhelming majority of interviewees in the author’s field study confirmed the cross-party 
consensus on the EU membership and the weakness of Euro-skeptical parties. When asked for comparing 
the Buzek (AWS, 1997-2000, 2000-01) and the Miller (SLD, 2001-2003, 2003-4) coalition governments in 
regard to the EU accession process, some interviewees noted that the Catholic-nationalist members of the 
Buzek governments posed a challenge but they were not able to change the pro-EU position of the 
governments (Interviews with M. Ostrowski, F. Golembski, K. Bobinski, and L. Jesien). 
 
127 Poland’s National Strategy for Integration (1997) was a key step to prepare the country for the 
accession negotiations. The document underlined that the cause of European integration was a strategic 
objective for all Polish governments since 1989 as it was aspired by the majority of Polish society. In 
addition, it stated that post-1989 Polish governments and Poles considered the integration critically 
important for the stability of democracy and modernization of the economy and the legal system. Hence, 
the EU membership was deemed as an integral part of the political and economic transformation of the 
post-Communist Poland. “National Strategy for Integration: The Committee for European Integration” in 
Yearbook of Polish European Studies, Volume 1, 1997, pages: 180-233. When the accession negotiations 
were launched on March 31, 1998, the Polish government stated as follow: “…the EU membership of our 
country, in combination with membership in NATO, will be conducive to the consolidation of the 
democratic order and security in this part of the continent”. “Statement on Opening of Poland’s Negotiation 
on Membership in the EU” in Yearbook of Polish European Studies, Volume 2, 1998, pages: 295-304. 
 146 
 
with European social democratic parties. Their technocratic expertise gave them an 
important advantage over the post-Solidarity parties to handle the accession related 
reforms (Vachudova 2008: 868-9). 
 
 Stateness 
 As one of the most ethnically homogeneous country in the world, Poland has been 
free from any problem concerning stateness. Therefore, it has never posed a challenge for 
the consolidation of post-Communist Polish democracy. According to the 2002 nation-
wide census, there are nine national (Germans, Ukrainians, Belorussians, Lithuanians, 
Slovaks, Russians, Jews, Armenians and Checks) and four ethnic (Roms, Tartars, 
Lemkos, and Karaites) minorities in the country. The most populous minorities are 
Germans (0.40%), Belorussians (0.12%), Ukrainians (0.07%), and Roma people 
(0.03%).128  
 Although the ethnic composition of the population makes any claim for ethnic 
separatism unlikely, domestic and European dynamics also have helped Poland remain 
aloof from the stateness problem.  
 First of all, Poland’s tiny size of minorities is not concentrated across the country 
except Opole region’s German minorities, which are also strongly integrated with Poles. 
In Opole region, the German minorities make fifty percent of the population in thirty-four 
communes and eight towns. The relatively easy access for ethnic and national minorities 
to local governments also facilitates their successful integration to the Polish society 
                                                          
128 The Polish Ministry of Interior and Administrator, “Characteristics of ethnic and national minorities in 
Poland”- http://www2.mswia.gov.pl/portal.php?serwis=en&dzial=10&id=56 
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(Okraszewska and Kwiatkowski 2002: 192, Zaucha 1999: 69-70, Vermeersch 2009: 177). 
 Second, the lack of constitutional guarantees for the protection of minority rights 
until 1997 was compensated to some extent through the rulings of the Constitutional 
Court and Poland’s commitment to the European Court of Human Rights in line with her 
membership in the Council of Europe. Later, the April 1997 constitution has provided 
constitutional guarantees for national or ethnic minorities to maintain and develop their 
own language, customs, traditions, culture as well as to establish educational and cultural 
institutions (Article 35). In addition, the constitution’s inclusion of rules on local self-
government (Chapter 7) has made the enjoyment of rights of the ethnic and national 
minorities easier (Kerlin 2005: 3-21).  
 Moreover, Poland’s electoral system facilitated representation of 
minority/regional parties in the parliament. While the 1993 electoral law put electoral 
threshold for individual parties (5%) and electoral coalition (8%), minority/regional 
parties have been exempted from any electoral threshold. For example, the German 
minority party succeeded to have seats in the parliament in all parliamentary elections 
from 1991 to 2001 (7 seats in 1991, 4 seats in 1993, 2 seats in 1997, and 2 seats in 2001). 
Finally, Poland’s first and second round of local government reforms (in early and late 
1990s) worked favorably for the country’s ethnic and national minorities, particularly for 
the Opole region’s German minorities (Kerlin 2005: 3-21, Ferry 2003: 1104). An 
important dynamic behind the local government reforms was that Solidarity governments 
worked more vigorously than the former communists (Kowalczyk 2000: 222, Ferry 2003: 
1107). 
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 The EU accession process reinforced and expanded the rights and opportunities 
for Poland’s tiny ethnic minorities in three major ways: (i) monitoring on minority rights 
through the annual progress reports, (ii) requiring the ratification of European 
conventions on minority rights as a part of the EU acquis, and (iii) asking Poland’s 
alignment with the EU’s regional policy, particularly by allocating funds for local 
governments (Kirchner 1999: 209-10, Zaucha 1999: 76-78, Swianiewicz and Herbst 
2002: 231). Particularly notable, Poland’s second round of local government reforms 
(1998) converged with the EU accession process. The EU’s requirement for Poland’s 
alignment with EU’s regional classifications (NUTS) accelerated the drive for 
decentralization in the country. The EU all annual progress reports (1998 to 2003) noted 
that Poland fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, which also involves the protection 
of minorities. In addition, the 1998 report suggested that Poland’s local government 
reform (1998) will enhance the representativeness of Opole region’s German minorities. 
 Overall, post-communist Polish democracy did not involve any problem 
concerning stateness. Poland’s favorable domestic dynamics were most helpful for the 
country’s tiny size of ethnic and national minorities. The EU accession process helped the 
protection of minority rights, and accelerated Poland’s second round of decentralization 
reforms. 
 Table 4.4 summarizes the domestic and European dynamics of democratic 
consolidation by each of the four components. 
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Table 4.4: European versus Domestic Dynamics of the Consolidation 
 
 
Components 
of Democratic 
Consolidation 
 
 
Major Events- 
Key Developments 
 
Domestic Dynamics 
 
European Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Free, fair, 
and 
competitive 
elections 
 
 
-The Round Table Talks 
(Feb-April 1989) 
 
-Semi-competitive 
parliamentary elections 
(June 1989) 
 
-First fully competitive 
parliamentary elections 
(October 1991) 
 
 
-Peaceful transfer of power 
between the Solidarity and the 
communist successor parties 
 
-Holding parliamentary, 
presidential, and local 
elections without any 
considerable problem 
 
 
-Poland-EU 
Association 
Agreement (1991) set 
holding democratic 
elections as a 
condition  
 
-The EU’s democratic 
conditionality (the 
Copenhagen political 
criteria) anchored the 
maintenance of 
democratic elections 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. The 
protection of 
basic rights 
and liberties, 
human and 
minority 
rights 
 
 
-1989-90 constitutional 
amendments 
 
-April 1997 constitution 
 
- The rulings of Polish 
Constitutional Tribunal in 
favor of European human 
rights conventions 
 
The Office of Civil Rights 
Ombudsman  
 
-The Council of 
Europe membership 
and adoption of the 
ECHR (1991) 
 
-The EU set the 
ratification of 
international 
covenants on  human 
and minority rights as 
a part of the EU acquis 
 
- Death penalty 
abolished (April 2000) 
to align with the EU 
acquis 
 
- The Commission 
reports (1998-2003) 
monitored 
developments in this 
area. 
 
- EU’s help to human 
rights NGOs and 
minorities 
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3. High 
prospects of 
regime 
survival and 
civilian 
control of the 
military 
 
    
- 1989-90 military reforms 
 
- First civilian defense 
minister appointed 
(December 1991) 
 
- Poland’s withdrawal from 
the Warsaw Pact (July 
1991) 
 
-The withdrawal of Soviet 
military troops (1991-93) 
 
 
- The Parys affair (Spring 
1992) 
The Drowsko affair  (Fall 
1994) 
 
 
 
 
- The legislative-executive 
clash over control of the 
military (1992-1995) 
 
- Memberships in the NATO 
and the EU were officially set 
as ‘strategic goals’ (November 
1992) 
 
- Ratification of the Ministry 
of Defense Act by A. 
Kwasniewski (December 
1995) 
 
 
- April 1997 constitution 
confirms the subordination of 
the General Staff to the 
civilian defense minister. 
 
 
-Poland’s participation 
in NATO’s PfP since 
1994 helped military 
reforms 
 
-NATO set the civilian 
control of the army as 
a condition for the 
membership; NATO 
accession process 
(1994-99) accelerated 
efforts for the civilian 
control 
 
-NATO membership 
(1999) anchored 
maintenance of the 
civilian control 
 
-EU accession process 
did not have any direct 
impact but it 
safeguarded the 
civilian control of the 
army 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 
Legitimacy 
 
 
 
-Parliamentary (1991,’93, 
’97, 2001) and Presidential 
(1995, 2000) Elections 
 
-Constitutional 
Referendum (May 1997) 
 
 
 
-Polls showed that Poles had a 
high level of commitment to 
democratic regime although 
there was unease about the 
performance of post-
Communist governments, 
particularly until the mid-
1990s. 
 
 
 
-European integration; 
reinforcing and 
symbolic role for the 
post-Communist 
democracy 
 
- The EU accession 
process made indirect 
contributions through 
modernizing 
infrastructure/public 
administration and 
requiring fight against 
corruption 
 
-High mass and elite 
support for the EU 
membership  
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4.2 Anti-
System 
Parties 
 
 
 
 
- No anti-system party 
 
 
 
-High level of  elite consensus 
on democratic  reforms, 
market transition, and Western 
foreign policy orientation 
 
-The SLD/SdRP; the major 
communist successor parties 
followed pragmatic and 
moderate line; they rapidly 
adapted into European social 
democracy 
 
 
-The cause of 
European integration 
was a key part of the 
elite consensus 
 
-The SLD and the UP 
became members of 
the Socialist 
International (1996) 
 
-The UW joined the 
Christian Democratic 
International (1996) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 4.3 Stateness 
 
 
 
-Poland is one of the most 
ethnically homogenous 
country in the world 
 
-The lack of any separatist 
group or party. 
 
-The lack of Soviet 
dominance was critical for 
sovereignty of the post-
Communist Polish 
democracy 
 
 
-Local government reforms in 
the early 1990s. 
 
-1997 constitution provides 
guarantees for minority rights 
 
 
 
 
-The Council of 
Europe/ECHR help in 
regard to minority 
rights 
 
-The EU’s 
conditionality required 
adoption of 
international 
conventions on 
minority rights as a 
part of the acquis. 
 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 The European integration process and the EU‘s democratic conditionality 
contributed to democratic consolidation of post-Communist Poland in several ways. In 
this chapter, the EU’s democratizing effects have been examined in line with the four-
part definition of consolidation. Since the fully competitive parliamentary elections in 
October 1991, the Polish democracy has successfully maintained the first component of 
the consolidation. Neither a risk of democratic breakdown and/or authoritarian retreat nor 
ethnic separatism has posed a challenge for the consolidation process. Particularly 
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important, broad consensus between Solidarity and the post-Communist elite on the 
political and economic reforms facilitated the course of democratic consolidation. 
 Although European actors did not play a decisive role for the democratic 
transition as compared to the non-interventionist policy of the Soviet Union, they were 
quite helpful during the consolidation period. The Council of Europe membership and the 
adoption of the European Convention of Human Rights helped to improve human rights 
standards in the country. The NATO membership process (1994-99), particularly 
NATO’s conditionality for the democratic control of the armed forces, accelerated the 
reforms concerning the civil-military relations. Later, Poland’s accession to NATO 
provided a significant anchor role to uphold democratic control. Finally, the European 
integration process generated most comprehensive democratizing effects for the 
consolidation of Polish democracy. The integration process set a favorable international 
context for the acceleration of post-1989 political and economic reforms. As discussed 
above, the EU accession process through the democratic conditionality clause made 
various contributions to the four components of the consolidation. To a great extent, 
Europeanization and democratization turned out to be convergent and parallel processes 
for post-Communist Poland. In an important symbolic way, Poland’s accession to the EU 
in May 2004 confirmed that the consolidation process reached an unprecedented level of 
progress. Nevertheless, the European integration process and the EU’s democratic 
conditionality also involved several limitations. 
 First of all, the EU did not develop a clear conception of democratic consolidation 
for the CEE candidate countries including Poland. The Copenhagen political criteria 
required ‘stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights, 
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and respect for protecting of minorities’; however, the EU lacked clear definitions for 
democracy and democratic consolidation. This ambiguity posed an important limitation 
for the EU’s impact on democratic consolidation (Andrezejewicz 2004: 289, Pridham 
2006: 381, Grabbe 2007: 117). Second, the period of accession negotiations (1998-2002) 
was driven by the EU’s focus on harmonization of the Polish legislation with the EU 
acquis. Although the legislative alignment and the acquis related reforms (public 
administration, judiciary, and fighting against corruption i.e.) were indirectly related to 
consolidation, the technical nature of the accession negotiations also limited the EU’s 
leverage for the democratic consolidation. Third, the top-down, elite-centered nature of 
the accession negotiations paved the way for excessive bureaucratization. Besides, 
Europeanization or EUization of the Polish legislation during the accession negotiations 
enhanced the political power of the executive vis-à-vis parliament and local governments 
(Pridham 2002: 955). As a result, the accession process also involved some negative 
effects for participatory democracy. Several interviewees in the author’s field study 
shared their concerns in line with these negative aspects of the EU accession process.129  
 What factors were conditioned the EU’s democratizing impact in Poland’s 
accession process? In this regard, two dynamics played the most important roles: (i) the 
EU’s credible commitment to the prospect of Poland’s membership if the Copenhagen 
conditions were fulfilled, and (2) cross-party consensus and high level of public support 
for accession to the EU. In other words, the EU’s contributions to various aspects of the 
democratic consolidation occurred when these two elements were present (Pridham 2002: 
963, Grabbe 2007: 120-1). 
                                                          
129 Interviews with F. Golembski, K. Bachmann, D.Karwoth, and P.Poncyljusz. 
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 Moreover, the EU’s help to post-Communist Polish democracy involved two 
notable variations. First, the EU’s democratizing impact was at low profile before the 
June 1993 Copenhagen European Council meeting in which the CEE countries including 
Poland were provided a clear prospect of full-membership. Thereafter, the EU did have 
an increasing level of leverage on domestic political changes in relation to democratic 
consolidation. Particularly, the period of accession negotiations (1998-2002) involved the 
highest level of EU monitoring and harmonization of the Polish legislation.  Second, the 
EU’s democratizing effects were more successful at the level of institutional/legislative 
changes vis-a-vis societal changes and the implementation of those legislative changes 
(Pridham 2006: 395-8). 
 Keeping all these limitations and variations in mind, the European integration 
process was a significant international dynamic for the consolidation of Polish 
democracy. This process accelerated the country’s systemic transformation after 1989 
towards an European style liberal democracy and a market economy. In addition, it 
helped overcome the authoritarian legacy of the Communist era. The EU accession in 
May 2004 was to a great extent a confirmation of the Polish success story. Moreover, the 
EU’s democratic conditionality anchored the Polish democracy in regard to human and 
minority rights as well as the civilian control of the armed forces. Although the Council 
of Europe and NATO also played important roles in these areas, the EU’s anchor role for 
the candidate and the member countries should not be overlooked. Finally, the EU acquis 
related reforms in the areas of public administration, the judiciary, and the fight against 
corruption enhanced the quality of Polish democracy, and made indirect contributions to 
the consolidation process. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION: 
THE CASE OF TURKEY 
 
 
 Having a secular state (since 1923), multi-party democracy (since 1950) and a 
predominantly Muslim population, Turkey is a unique example in world politics. The 
ongoing accession negotiations with the European Union are a culmination of the 
country’s two century long process of Westernization. Nevertheless, Turkey has not yet 
consolidated democracy, as defined by the four components in this dissertation. As seen 
through the 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 interventions, the military has frequently taken 
part in politics, and maintained extensive prerogatives in the constitutional system. The 
1982 constitution (adopted after the 1980 military coup) has put extensive restrictions on 
fundamental rights and liberties while prioritizing order, security, and the state over 
liberties, society and individual. Moreover, the 1984-1999 armed conflict with the 
separatist Kurdish organization (PKK) in particular and the Kurdish question in general 
are other major challenges for the consolidation of democracy in the country. The strict 
secularist and nationalist policies followed since the foundation of the Republic have 
failed to overcome the Islamist and Kurdish opposition. Ideational transformation of the 
political Islamists in the aftermath of the 1997 military intervention has made significant 
contribution to the democratic consolidation, while the Kurdish question still remains a 
major challenge. Furthermore, the accession process with the European Union (1999-
present) has generated an unprecedented level of political reforms, which are central for 
making progress on various dimensions of democratic consolidation. 
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 The EU accession related political reforms were most decisive in the period of 
2001-2004 when Turkey realized impressive legislative and constitutional changes to 
fulfill the prerequisite of launching accession negotiations-, the Copenhagen political 
criteria. The most notable reforms in this period were mainly related to the second and 
third component of democratic consolidation: protection of fundamental rights and 
liberties including human and minority rights, and democratic control of the armed 
forces. The 2001-04 period involved a ‘silent revolution’ in the country’s history, 
according to both domestic and international observers of Turkish politics. Later, the 
momentum for reforms noticeably faded with the declining prospect of EU membership. 
The partial suspension of the accession negotiations and the deadlock in the Turkey-EU 
relations lessened the EU’s leverage over democratization and human rights reforms in 
the country. 
 This chapter will first briefly examine the key dynamics behind Turkey’s 
transition to a multi-party democracy (1946-1950) in the context of the late Ottoman and 
the early Republican periods. Then, it will assess the consolidation process of Turkish 
democracy in line with the four components. In doing so, this section will also analyze 
the extent to which the EU accession process has contributed to realizing progress on 
each component. 
 
 Earlier is Not Always Better: Turkey’s Transition to Democracy (1946-50)  
 
 Compared to the democratic transitions in Spain (1975-77) and Poland (1989-91), 
Turkey’s transition to democracy occurred earlier with the holding of free, fair and 
competitive elections first time in May 1950. The establishment of the Democratic Party 
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(Demokrat Parti, DP) and its participation in the July 1946 elections could be set as the 
beginning of the transition process.130 In the historic 1950 elections, the DP ended the 
Republican People’s Party’s (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) twenty-seven year long 
one-party rule, and the country experienced transition to a multi-party democracy.131 A 
brief historical background of the late Ottoman and the early Republican periods could be 
essential to understand the timing and dynamics of Turkey’s democratic transition. 
 In response to numerous signs of decline, the Ottoman rulers launched 
modernization reforms first in the military realm beginning in the late 18th century. In the 
early to mid-1850s, the reform efforts expanded into the legal and administrative spheres. 
The 1839 Tanzimat (‘Reorganization’) and the 1856 Islahat (‘Reform’) Edicts enhanced 
the state’s commitment to the rule of law, paved the way for a new (more secular) penal 
code, and  expanded the rights of non-Muslim people. The Tanzimat Period (1839-76) 
also witnessed the establishment of secular educational institutions and the creation of 
efficient centralized bureaucracy (Findley 1980: 112-50, Ahmad 1993: 15-30, Kia 2008: 
115-36). As a result of these changes, the old religious class of scholars (‘Ulema’) began 
to lose their leverage while a new class of political and cultural elite gained more 
influence in the late 19th century. The new elite (‘the Young Ottomans’), who were well 
familiar with secular and Western political ideas, demanded curbing the authority of the 
                                                          
130 The 1946 elections did not meet the fairness criteria of the democratic elections as they were held under 
the supervision of the governing Republican People’s Party (CHP) instead of a partial electoral authority. 
Open voting and secret counting in the elections were also other major deficiencies in regard to the 
fairness. The CHP did have 85 percent of the votes (395 MPs) while the Democratic Party (DP) acquired 
the 13 percent (66 MPs). 
 
131 In the 1950 elections, the DP succeeded to beat the CHP with 53% of the votes (408 MPs) while the 
CHP was able to have only 69 seats in the parliament with 40 percent of the votes. (Sayari and Esmer 2002: 
189-90). 
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Ottoman Sultan in order to establish a regime of constitutional monarchy (Shaw and 
Shaw 1977: 18-33). In 1876, the Sultan Abdulhamit II declared the constitution (‘Kanun-i 
Esasi’) and accepted the creation of a parliament.  
 The First Constitutional era was short-lived as the Sultan dissolved the parliament 
one year later, justifying his decision with the outbreak of a war with Russia (1877-78). 
The restoration of the Constitutional Monarchy became possible only about thirty-years 
later (1908) as a result of a coup ran by the Committee of Union and Progress (Ittihat ve 
Terakki, CUP). The CUP, which was composed of military and civilian members 
(including the founder of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk) encompassed 
diverse groups (Ottomanists, Turkish nationalists, Westernists, Islamists i.e.) with an 
overarching goal of restoring the Constitutional Monarchy. The Second Constitutional 
Monarchy era (1908-18) under the CUP rule witnessed multi-party elections (1908 and 
1912) even though they were held with widespread fraud and no female suffrage (Kayali 
1995: 273-82). The CUP criticized Sultan Abdulhamit II for his autocratic rule; 
ironically, the CUP followed a highly authoritarian and (Turkish) nationalist pattern of 
politics under its rule (Karpat 1959: 3-31, Dodd 1965: 3-19, Ahmad 1993: 31-51). 
Nevertheless, the 1908-18 period is an important era to understand the extent to which 
the foundation of the Republic (1923) represented change and continuity in the country’s 
political history. 
 Following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after the First World War, the 
War of Independence paved the way for the foundation of the Turkish Republic under the 
leadership of a charismatic leader, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. He ruled the country until his 
death in 1938. The Ataturk era witnessed radical changes in the political and cultural 
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landscape: abolition of the Ottoman dynasty (1922) and the Caliphate (1924), the 
proclamation of the Republic (1923), enactment of a new constitution (1924), 
introduction of new penal (Italian) and civil (Swiss) codes (1926), adoption of the Latin 
alphabet (1928), the introduction of full political rights to women (1934), and inclusion 
of the principle of secularism in the constitution (1937) (Dodd 1969: 20-51, Karpat 1959: 
32-76). To some extent, Ataturk’s reforms were culmination, with acceleration, of the 
late Ottoman period of changes in favor of secularization, 
Europeanization/Westernization, and Turkish nationalism. However, these reforms did 
not generate a multi-party democracy in the country. Following two failed attempts to 
allow the operation of opposition parties in 1924 and 1930, ‘state-dominant monoparty 
authoritarianism’ survived until the May 1950 elections (Sunar and Sayari 1986: 168, 
Ahmad 2008: 17-19). Despite undertaking radical changes, the Republican period was 
remarkably similar to the late Ottoman era: state-led, top-down process of modernization 
under authoritarian rule in which the urban, bureaucratic ‘center’ dominated over the 
‘periphery’ of rural people and local notables (Mardin 1973: 181-84, Sunar and Sayari 
1986: 169-71). In other words, both the late Ottoman and the early Republican periods of 
state-led modernization occurred without generating major progress in the realm of 
democratization (Keyman and Onis 2007: 12-15). 
 A combination of several domestic and external dynamics was responsible for the 
transition to a multi-party democracy (1946-50). First of all, the death of charismatic 
founder Kemal Ataturk (1938) made easier the rise of political opposition against the 
CHP’s one-party rule. Moreover, the party’s statist economic policies and the practices of 
strict secularism created a backlash among the liberal economic groups and the 
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conservative countryside. In addition, the Capital Levy (1942) and the Land Reform Bill 
(1945) resulted in discontent among the landowners. As a result, the CHP’s social basis 
(the bureaucracy, the landlords, and the private sector) began to lose its coherence in the 
early-to-mid 1940s (Karpat 1959: 137-45, Dodd 1965: 23-4, Ahmad 1993: 102-3). 
Furthermore, the victory of Western powers in the Second World War and Turkey’s 
security orientation in favor of the West/the United States against the Soviet Union 
played an important role in three areas: (i) divisions in the ruling CHP (the reformists 
versus the hardliners), (ii) President Ismet Inenu’s (former CHP leader) decision to move 
to a multi-party democracy, and (iii) the Democrat Party’s employment of liberal ideas in 
favor of multi-party democracy. To a great extent, the international context after the War 
and Turkey’s preference to join the US-led Western world shaped the timing of Turkey’s 
transition to democracy (Karpat 1959: 141-43, Shaw and Shaw 1977: 400-404, 
Huntington 1991: 40, Ahmad 2008: 127-130). Finally, the Westernizing thrust of 
Ataturk’s reforms/the Kemalist ideology required the transition eventually, and this 
facilitated Inenu’s decision for the transition (Sunar and Sayari 1986: 172, Ozbudun 
2000: 16-24, Karpat 1959: 138). The transition process did not involve any radical break; 
rather, it occurred in a reform mode of democratic transition. Instead of pressures from 
societal groups or classes, the transition to democracy was mostly an outcome of Inenu’s 
decision and the cooperation between the CHP’s reformist wing and the moderate DP, 
which was founded by former CHP members.  
 The overall nature of the transition as ‘democratization from above’ later will set 
the fragility of Turkish democracy as seen in the 1960, 1971, and 1980 military coup 
d’etats (Sunar and Sayari 1986: 172-74) Although the Turkish military restored 
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democracy within a few years after each intervention, the bureaucratic-military center 
remained dominant vis-à-vis the political parties and the civil society from the inception 
of the transition to the late 1980s.132 As will be detailed later in this chapter, the coup 
d’etats gradually enhanced the military tutelage in the political landscape. As a result, the 
Turkish politics experienced a cyclical pattern alternating between military regimes and 
populist democratic governments in the period of 1960-1980 (Huntington 1991: 41). In 
addition to the military’s guardianship, the low degree of cooperation among political 
party leaders and the high level of political violence played crucial roles in the outbreak 
of the 1980 coup. Nevertheless, the increasing levels of urbanization and political 
participation in the three decades after the transition (1950-80) paved the way for the rise 
of civil society and the proliferation of non-state political actors in the post-1980 period 
(Sunar and Sayari 1986: 174-82, Birtek 1994: 226-7). 
 The September 12, 1980 military coup and the enactment of the military-led 1982 
constitution severely restricted the scope of political life: the military gained further 
prerogatives in the constitutional system, political parties were dissolved and their leaders 
were banned from politics until 1987, only three new parties were allowed to take part in 
the 1983 parliamentary elections, a 10% national threshold was set for the elections, and 
the exercise of fundamental rights and liberties faced serious restrictions in the new 
constitution (Ozbudun 2000: 57-60, Kalaycioglu 2005: 125, Ahmad 2008: 185-89). In 
addition, General Kenan Evren, who headed the coup, served as the President until 
                                                          
132 Two major reasons can be noted for the fact that the military restored democracy quickly: (i) the 
Westernizing drive of the Kemalist ideology could not allow long periods of military rule, and (ii) the 
military’s commitment to pro-Western foreign and security policy (NATO membership since 1952 i.e.) 
made it more responsive to Western criticisms of regime problems (Karaosmanoglu 1994: 126, Ozbudun 
2000: 22).  
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November 1989. Moreover, the coup resulted in worsening of Turkey’s relations with the 
European Community: the EC suspended the relations after the intervention, and rejected 
Turkey’s application for full-membership (1987) in December 1989 on the basis of 
economic and political concerns (Karaosmanoglu 1994: 129).133  
 In spite of all these negative consequences of the coup, Turkish politics also 
witnessed some positive developments in the 1980s and 1990s. The highly 
statist/nationalist Kemalist ideology experienced transformation towards a more liberal 
interpretation, which made possible the expansion of the civilian-political sphere. The 
first civilian president since the foundation of the Republic got elected (Turgut Ozal, 
1989-1993). The statist economic policies were replaced by market friendly policies. In 
addition, Turkey’s political landscape witnessed the increasing influence of civil society, 
public opinion and media (Ahmad 1993: 213-17, Heper 1994a: 20; 1994b: 233, Caha 
2005: 20-26). As the 1997 military intervention demonstrated, the five-decade old 
Turkish democracy was still far away from consolidation on the eve of the December 
1999 Helsinki European Council meeting, which launched the Turkey-EU accession 
process.  
 
 The Consolidation of Turkish democracy and the EU Accession Process 
 The following section will assess the democratizing impact of EU accession 
process on the consolidation of Turkish democracy in line with the four-part definition of 
consolidation in this dissertation: (i) free, fair, and competitive elections with universal 
suffrage, (ii) protection of fundamental rights and liberties as well as human and minority 
                                                          
133 Turkey applied first for the EC membership in July 1959, and the EC responded to the application with 
the establishment of the Associate Agreement on September 12, 1963.  
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rights, (iii) high prospects of regime survival and civilian control of the military, and (iv) 
legitimacy, anti-system parties, and stateness.  
 
1.  Free, fair, competitive elections with universal suffrage; no politically 
significant group should be excluded from electoral competition. 
 
  
 Since the transition to multi-party democracy in 1950, sixteen parliamentary 
elections have been held up to present time134. With the exception of three military 
interregnums (1960-61, 1971-73, 1980-83), the country has been ruled by democratically 
elected governments. The first elections following the 1960, 1971, and 1983 military 
interventions were not fully competitive as the military regimes either banned major 
political parties or prevented them from participating in the elections. The 1957 elections 
involved serious problems of vote counting (Sayari 2002b: 179-84, Kalaycioglu 2002: 
55-71). In the rest of the elections (12), the free and fair components of democratic 
elections were fulfilled without any considerable problem. However, the frequent cases 
of party closures have posed a major challenge for the execution of fully competitive 
electoral process while the communist, Kurdish and Islamist political parties have been 
frequently closed in the country.135 The Political Parties Law (1983) prohibits the use of 
‘Communist’ for a title of a political party. In 1993, the Constitutional Court closed the 
Socialist Party of Turkey (STP) on the basis of a ruling that the party demanded 
establishing a federal state structure in the country (Ozbudun 2002: 20-22). In addition, 
several Islamist parties were dissolved due to their alleged ‘anti-secular activities’, 
                                                          
134 For the list of the elections, see Table 5.1 
 
135 Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic, fifty-seven political parties were closed; 19 in 1924-80, 
17 in 1981, and 21 in 1983-2009 (Coskun 2008: 147-48, Kaptikacti et al 2008: 36-39). 
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despite the fact that their activities were free from violence (core criteria of the Council 
of Europe’s Venice Commission in regard to party closures).  
 The bans on political parties and their presidents by the September 1980-83 
military regime were eliminated with the 1987 constitutional referendum. Later, the 1995 
constitutional amendment removed serious restrictions concerning the organization of 
political parties; the opening of youth and woman branches was allowed in addition to the 
legalization of links with labor unions and associations. In the past decade, the 2001 
constitutional amendment and two EU harmonization law packages (2002-2003) made it 
difficult to dissolve political parties. This was done in three major ways: (i) by asking far 
high level substantive evidence to initiate the closure investigation, (ii) by bringing in 
alternative penalties (depriving of state funding i.e,) in addition to closure, and (iii) by 
requiring a 3/5 majority instead of a simple majority for a closure decision by the 
Constitutional Court136 (Ozbudun and Genckaya 2009: 58, The EU Harmonization Law 
Packages 2007: 6-13).  
 Despite these positive changes, further reforms in this realm are necessary as 
suggested by the European Union and the Venice Commission. The recent cases of party 
closure including the governing JDP (2008, not closed) and the Kurdish DTP (2009, 
closed) have shown that these practices diverge from the European standards. The latter 
allow rare cases of party closure in line with the wide range of freedoms of expression 
and association.137 Several rulings by the European Court of Human Rights concerning 
                                                          
136 A practical consequence of this change was visible in the closure case of the governing JDP.  Six judges 
in the 11-member Constitutional Court voted for dissolving the party, falling only one vote short of the 
necessary majority of 7. As a result, the 3/5 majority rule saved the governing party from the closure. 
 
137 An opinion by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission (‘European Commission for Democracy 
through Law’) found three major differences between Turkey and ‘the common European practice’ as 
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the closure of political parties concluded that Turkey violated the 10th (freedom of 
expression) and 11th (freedom of association) articles of the ECHR (Yazici 2009: 19-59). 
The ECtHR rulings also show that fully competitive elections could only be possible if 
they are supported by the second component of consolidation: the protection of 
fundamental rights and liberties.  
 Another major issue for Turkish democracy related to competitive elections is that 
the 10 percent national threshold (since 1983) in the elections is too high and this works 
against the representation of major political groups in the parliament. Particularly 
notable, the pro-Kurdish political party failed to take in the parliament in the 1995, 1999, 
and 2002 elections while they received 4, 4.75, and 6 percent of the votes respectively. In 
this regard, the EU progress reports have pointed out that the 10% threshold limits 
representativeness in parliament but did not consider its correction as a requirement for 
fulfillment of the Copenhagen political criteria.138 An ECtHR ruling on this issue (2007) 
concluded that the 10 percent threshold does not violate the ECHR as it is up to the 
countries to decide on the level of the threshold (Yazici 2009: 69).  
 In regard to the fulfillment of the free, fair, and competitive elections criterion, the 
European integration process (1999-present) has been most helpful for introducing the 
2001-2003 legal changes which made the prohibition of political parties more difficult. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
regards the prohibition of political parties. In Turkey, (i) there is a long list of substantive criteria for 
political parties to conform with the constitution, (ii) to initiate closing political parties is more arbitrary 
and less subject to democratic control (Chief Public Prosecutor initiates the process), and (iii) dissolving 
political parties occurs frequently as it is not regarded as ‘an extraordinary measure, but as a structural and 
operative part of the constitution’. Opinion on the Constitutional and Legal Provisions Relevant to the 
Prohibition of Political Parties in Turkey. Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 78th Plenary Session, 
Venice, 13-14 March 2009, 24 pages (It is available online at: http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2009/CDL-
AD(2009)006-e.pdf).  
 
138 For example, see the 1999 and 2006 EU Regular Reports on Turkey. 
 
 166 
 
The EU’s regular reports on Turkey have not recorded any considerable problem 
concerning the 1999, 2002, and 2007 parliamentary elections.139 The 2009 and 2010 EU 
reports asked Turkey to align further its legislation on the closure of political parties with 
the Venice Commission standards. The governing JDP attempted to make dissolving 
political parties more difficult through a constitutional amendment. However, the 
proposed article did not receive enough support in the parliament, and did not take place 
in the 2010 constitutional referendum. The article intended to make initiating a closure 
case subject to parliamentary control, in line with the recommendation of the Venice 
Commission. Currently, the Chief Public Prosecutor does have the sole authority to 
initiate the closure process.  
 During the author’s field study in Turkey, none of the interviewees found any 
considerable problem as regards the free and fair character of the democratic elections.140 
Yet, the competitiveness aspect of the elections received a few numbers of criticisms. 
Mustafa Kaya, who is a party official from the Felicity Party (pro-Islamic/conservative), 
suggested that the closure of political parties is one of the major problems of Turkish 
democracy. Professor Senem Aydin from Bilgi University considered the 10% electoral 
threshold an important democracy problem. Moreover, several interviewees contended 
                                                          
139 The OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) too confirmed that 
Turkey’s parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2007 were free and fair. OSCE/ODIHR’s Election 
Assessment Mission Reports. The reports are available online at: 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/16346 (2002), and 
http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/turkey/29181 (2007).  The reports found that the elections were 
satisfactory in term of the free and fairness criteria but also identified three problems concerning the 
competitiveness quality of the elections: (i) the 10% electoral threshold is very high, (ii) the Political 
Parties Law has certain restrictions in regard to the prohibition and organization of political parties, and (iii) 
the use of Kurdish language in the election campaigns faces severe restrictions. 
 
140 For the list of interviewees, their affiliations, and the dates of interviews, see Appendix 4. The author 
used same set of interview questions as those in Spain and Poland (Appendix 1). 
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that Turkey’s Political Parties Law involves a wide range of restrictions, and needs a 
major democratic overhaul.141  
 
2. Protection of fundamental rights and liberties including human and minority 
rights 
  
 In contrast to the first component of democratic consolidation, Turkish democracy 
has experienced severe challenges in this realm despite the fact the transition from one-
party rule to multi-party democratic system took place in 1950. Except the three periods 
of military rule (1960-61, 1971-73, and 1980-83), Turkey has maintained free, fair, and 
competitive elections. However, neither fundamental rights and liberties nor human and 
minority rights reached the levels that consolidated democracies uphold.142 In the recent 
past, the 1980-83 military regime created a constitutional order that put extensive 
restrictions over fundamental rights and freedoms. The state-centric and nationalist nature 
of the 1982 constitution has also hindered the provision of necessary protections for 
human and minority rights. Moreover, the armed conflict with the Kurdish separatist 
PKK (1984-99), which caused the death of more than thirty-thousand people in the 
South-East Turkey, resulted in serious violations of human rights.  
 Despite the gloomy picture of the 1980s and 1990s, Turkish democracy has 
achieved unprecedented level of progress in the past decade in the realm of the second 
component of democratic consolidation. In doing so, the EU accession process, 
particularly the EU’s democratic conditionality principle has played a significant role. 
                                                          
141 Interviews with Ziya Muezzinoglu, Yilmaz Ensaroglu, Senem Aydin, Seyfi Tashan, Huseyin Pazarci, 
Ali Resul Usul, and anonymous law professor from Yeditepe University. 
 
142 Turkish democracy has never been identified as “Free” in the Freedom House’s Civil Liberties and 
Political Rights Index, which has been maintained since 1973. 
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The EU’s democratizing impact was most visible for the period of 2001-2004 when 
Turkey vigorously worked for fulfilling the Copenhagen political criteria, required for 
launching the accession negotiations. In the following period (2005-present), the 
declining prospect of Turkey’s EU membership limited the EU’s democratizing impact to 
a great extent.  
 The following section will examine the role of the EU accession process for the 
second component of democratic consolidation. In this regard, the EU’s contribution will 
be assessed for the periods before and after the Helsinki European Council meeting 
(December 1999), in which the European Union set Turkey as a candidate country for the 
EU membership. 
 In the pre-1999 period, the EU did have a very limited impact on Turkey in regard 
to democracy and human rights. In 1989, the EU rejected Turkey’s application for full-
membership (1987) by citing both economic and political reasons. In the early-to-mid 
1990s, the EU, especially the European Parliament, frequently criticized Turkey for the 
increasing amount of human rights violations in the country. The armed conflict with the 
PKK played a major role in this regard. However, the EU’s criticisms did not help much 
improving Turkey’s human rights practices as any prospect of EU membership was 
lacking. In the pre-Helsinki period, the most notable democratizing impact occurred on 
the eve of signing the Customs Union agreement with the EU (entered into force in 
January 1996). At that time, Turkey made some changes in the Anti-Terror Law, the 
Code on Criminal Law, and the Association Law to expand the freedom of expression. 
These changes were to a great extent response to the EU’s criticisms, as confirmed by 
then Turkish Prime Minister (Usul 2011: 96).  
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 One of the most important European contributions to human rights in Turkey in 
the pre-1999 period was made through the European Convention of Human Rights 
(ECHR). Turkey ratified the ECHR in 1954 as a member of the Council of Europe 
(1949); however, it accepted the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) only in 1990. In addition, Turkey allowed its citizens to make individual 
application to the ECtHR in 1987 (Turkmen 2007: 254-7, Smith 2007: 262-3). Turkey’s 
acceptance of the ECtHR rulings helped to a great extent for increasing the salience of 
human rights issues in the country. Yet, the Court’s convictions of Turkey’s human rights 
violations were far from making substantial changes in the country’s human rights 
performance. 
 The Helsinki European Council of December 1999 set a major turning point in the 
history of Turkey-EU relations. As stated in the conclusion of the Council meeting, 
Turkey became a “candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same 
criteria as applied to the other candidate States”.143 Like other candidate countries, 
Turkey’s membership was set conditional upon compliance with the Copenhagen 
criteria.144 Particularly, the Council set fulfillment of the political criteria as a pre-
requisite for the opening of accession negotiations. Thereafter, the EU built a pre-
accession strategy for Turkey on the basis of three major components: (i) the Accession 
                                                          
143 The Helsinki European Council, 10-11 December 1999, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 12. (It is 
available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/hel1_en.htm) 
 
144“Membership requires that a candidate country achieve stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, 
the rule of law, human rights, respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market 
economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. 
Membership presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of membership including 
adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union.” The Copenhagen European Council, 21-
22 June 1993, Presidency Conclusions, paragraph 7. It is available online at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/copenhagen/co_en.pdf  
 
 170 
 
Partnership that set short and medium-term reforms to prepare Turkey fulfilling the 
Copenhagen criteria, (ii) monitoring Turkey’s progress in meeting the criteria through 
annual progress reports, and (iii) the provision of financial assistance to handle the pre-
accession tasks that require satisfying the political criteria and aligning Turkey’s 
legislation with the EU acquis. 
 Turkey has responded to the EU’s pre-accession strategy through the National 
Programmes for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA; 2001, 2003, and 2008), the EU 
Harmonization Law Packages (or the EU reform packages), and the constitutional 
amendments. The eight EU reform packages from 2002 to 2004 involved a total of 490 
laws, which were adopted or amended by the Turkish Parliament in order to fulfill the 
Copenhagen political criteria, and then to launch the accession talks. As a result, Turkey 
realized an unprecedented level of political reforms in the years of 2001-04. For many 
domestic and international observers of Turkish politics, the pace of reforms in these 
years represented a “silent revolution” in the country.145 In contrast to the pre-1999 
period, the European Union executed a great leverage on Turkey’s domestic politics in 
the aftermath of the historic Helsinki decision, which provided a credible prospect for EU 
membership. Through the pre-accession strategy, the EU played a significant role in the 
making of extraordinary legal and constitutional reforms that also involved changes 
concerning the protection of fundamental rights and liberties, human rights, and minority 
rights. 
                                                          
145 For example, “Turkey's ‘silent revolution' paves way for accession talks”, Martti Ahtisaari, European 
Voice, September 2 2004. Available online at:  http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/turkey-s-
silent-revolution-paves-way-for-accession-talks/50538.aspx 
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 As stated earlier, the 1982 constitution and its statist/nationalist character put 
serious restrictions on fundamental rights and liberties. Article 13 in the constitution gave 
priority to the state over the individual, and set a wide restrictive clause against the full 
enjoyment of fundamental rights. As a result, the 1982 constitutional order left a very 
limited scope for fundamental rights, including the freedoms of thought, expression, 
association, assembly, demonstration, and the press. The scope of freedoms was further 
restricted in the South-East provinces, which remained under state of emergency from 
1987 to 2002 due to the armed conflict with the PKK.  
 Through eight EU reform packages (2002-2004), two constitutional amendments 
(2001, 2004), and the adoption of new Civil and Penal Codes (2001, 2004), the protection 
of fundamental rights and liberties has become increasingly aligned with the EU norms 
and practices. The EU reform packages involved changes in major laws (the Penal Code, 
the Civil Code, the Anti-Terror Law, the Associations Law, the Press Law, the Political 
Parties Law, the Code on Criminal Procedure, and the Code on Civil Procedure etc.), and 
expanded the scope of fundamental rights and liberties. The 2001 Constitutional 
Amendment, which involved changes in more than one fifth of the 1982 constitution, 
transformed Article 13 from an excessively restrictive clause to a protective one for the 
protection of fundamental rights and liberties. The 2004 Constitutional Amendment 
included a change to Article 90 which states that international agreements shall take 
precedence in a case of a conflict between domestic laws and the international 
agreements concerning fundamental rights and liberties. The fifth and seventh EU reform 
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packages (January and June 2003) provided re-trial rights for the civil, criminal, and 
administrative law cases in line with the ECHR rulings.146  
 In contrast to the discouraging previous (1998, 1999, and 2000) reports, the 
European Commission acknowledged Turkey’s reforms in the area of fundamental rights 
in 2001, 2002, and 2003. Nevertheless, the Commission did not find Turkey fulfilling the 
political criteria until the October 2004 report. In particular, the 2002 and 2003 reports 
underlined that Turkey’s legal reforms in this area need further improvements along with 
the effective implementation. Thereafter, the Turkish government paid more attention to 
implementation, and established a Reform Monitoring Group in October 2003.147 The 
Copenhagen European Council of December 2004 decided in favor of beginning 
accession negotiations on the basis of an assessment that Turkey fulfilled the political 
criteria. The Commission’s judgment confirmed that Turkey had realized substantial 
progress concerning the protection of fundamental rights and liberties. In parallel with the 
Commission’s view, the Freedom House upgraded Turkey’s civil liberties scale to 3 in 
2005 while it was 5 for the years of 1995-2002, and 4 for 2003-2004 (1 to 7 scale; 1 most 
free, 7 least free).  
 The EU’s pre-accession strategy following the Helsinki candidacy decision also 
resulted in important progress in the realm of human rights. The EU’s monitoring on 
Turkey’s human rights performance pushed Turkey to realize substantial reforms. The 
Commission’s annual progress reports (1998-2003) listed numerous human rights 
                                                          
146 The European Union set compliance with the ECHR rulings as a material condition for the EU 
membership. 
 
147 The Reform Monitoring Group (RMG) is composed of key ministers including the justice, interior, 
foreign, and the EU affairs. 
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problems in Turkey: pervasive cases of torture, prison conditions, persistent human rights 
violations, extra-judicial executions, the State Security Courts (SSCs), the death penalty, 
ill-treatment in custody, detention procedures, and non-compliance with the ECtHR 
rulings. Following the announcement of the NPAA (National Programme for the 
Adoption of the Acquis) in March 2001, Turkey undertook several important reforms in 
the period of 2001-2004 to meet the EU’s conditionality: the state security courts and the 
death penalty were abolished, a “zero-tolerance policy” against torture was launched, the 
security officers received extensive human rights training, pre-trial custody conditions 
were improved, the security officers were removed from local human rights councils, 
new institutions were established at the legislative and executive level to strengthen 
investigation of human rights violations, re-trial rights were provided for the cases where 
the ECtHR convicts Turkey, and legislative/constitutional changes were made in favor of 
gender equality.148 In addition, Turkey ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights-ICCPR (2004), the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women-CEDAW (2003), and the ECHR’s Protocols 6 and 13 (on death penalty; 
2003-04). Turkey’s progress in the realm of human rights through these changes played 
an important role for EU reaching a decision to launch accession talks. 
 The post-Helsinki period of accelerated political reforms also had positive 
repercussions in the realm of minority rights. The reforms in the realm of fundamental 
rights and human rights were beneficial for Turkey’s ethnic and religious minorities. In 
                                                          
148  The EU’s annual progress reports from 1998 to 2003  noted several deficiencies in the realm of 
women’s rights in Turkey: domestic violence in family, honor killings, legal discriminations between men 
and women,  low percentage of women labor force (around 25%),  and low ratio of women MPs in the 
Turkish Parliament. The 2003 and 2004 regular reports confirmed Turkey’s achievement in undertaking 
several reforms in this area, particularly with the 2001 constitutional amendment, the renewed Civil Code 
(2002), and changes in the Penal Code. 
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this regard, the expanded scope of fundamental rights and liberties, the elimination of 
State Security Courts, re-trial rights in line with the ECtHR rulings, and zero-tolerance 
policy against torture were important changes for Turkey’s Kurdish and non-Muslim 
minorities. In addition, the EU reform packages and the constitutional elements (2001-
04) involved significant reforms specific to minority rights. Particularly notable, 
broadcasting in non-Turkish languages, including Kurdish (a taboo item, especially for 
the Turkish military), was legalized to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria. For most 
domestic and international observers of the Turkish politics, the Kurdish broadcasting 
could have been hardly possible without the clear EU conditionality set through the 
Accession Partnership documents (2001, 2003). In combination with the reforms 
concerning the expansion of freedoms of thought, expression, assembly, and 
demonstration, the right to broadcast in non-Turkish languages has been an important 
step for the official recognition of Kurdish identity in the country. Despite these 
improvements, Turkey has not yet ratified the Council of Europe’s Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCPNM), as insisted by the EU 
(since 2002).  
Moreover, the EU related political reforms have extended the property rights of 
non-Muslim community foundations to a great extent. In addition, the reforms made the 
establishment of worship places in private buildings possible for the non-Muslim 
minorities. Apart from these limited changes, the EU accession process linked by the 
Copenhagen political criteria has created a favorable milieu for better protection of the 
rights of ethnic and religious minorities in the country.  
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 The 1999-2004 and the 2005-present periods involve a major variation in terms of 
the EU’s contribution in the realm of fundamental rights and liberties. In the first period, 
the EU made a substantial impact on Turkey’s political reforms, which were mainly 
undertaken to meet the Copenhagen political criteria. Particularly, the 2001-2004 years 
witnessed an exceptional momentum of reforms in the history of Turkish democracy. 
Some domestic observers of Turkish politics have found these reforms as important as 
the Europeanization reforms of the early Republican period. The 1999-2004 period 
involved a critical shift in the Turkey-EU relations: the EU’s credible commitment to 
Turkey’s membership generated major legislative and constitutional reforms. These 
moved Turkish democracy closer to the European standards of fundamental rights and 
liberties as well as of human and minority rights. Since Turkey was required to fulfill the 
Copenhagen political criteria in order to launch the accession talks (precise conditionality 
supplemented with the EU’s credible commitment), the EU’s leverage on Turkey’s 
democratization reforms was most visible in this period.  
 The subsequent period of accession negotiations (2005-present), in contrast, 
witnessed a declining prospect for EU membership and a slowdown of the political 
reforms. Therefore, the 1999-2004 and the 2005-present periods show a remarkable 
variation in the impact of EU on Turkey’s democratization reforms. After the 
Copenhagen decision of launching accession talks, the European Union continued to 
monitor Turkish democracy in line with the political criteria; but the EU’s requests for 
deeper legislative reforms and better implementation failed to generate the previous level 
of impact.  
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 As outlined in the Turkey-EU Negotiation Framework document (October 2005), 
the EU put extra conditions for Turkey as compared to the previous CEE candidates. The 
document explicitly stated that the accession talks with Turkey will be open-ended. In 
addition, it made possible the permanent derogations on free movement of Turkish 
people and on European assistance to Turkey from the EU’s regional funds. These extra 
conditions blurred Turkey’s prospect of the EU membership. In December 2006, the 
European Union partially suspended the accession talks (put hold on eight chapters) with 
a reason that Turkey had not yet implemented the Ankara Protocol (signed in June 2005), 
for opening of its ports and airports to trade from Cyprus.149 In addition, France and 
Cyprus put hold on the negotiation of additional eleven chapters.  
 As a result, the Turkey-EU accession negotiations experienced a serious deadlock, 
with nineteen chapters blocked from opening for negotiatiations. The declining prospect 
for membership considerably limited the EU’s democratizing leverage in the 2005-
present period. Several fundamental crises in Turkey’s domestic politics in 2007 and 
2008 also led to the slowdown of democratization reforms. The presidential election 
crisis (2007), which involved the military’s intervention in the election process through 
an online memorandum, and the closure case of the governing Justice and Development 
Party (2008) retarded the EU promoted political reforms. 
 Despite the slowed down pace of political reforms after 2005, the post-Helsinki 
period of democratization has not experienced a reversal. In this period, Turkey has made 
some improvements in regard to the protection of fundamental rights and liberties along 
                                                          
149 The suspended eight chapters include Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to 
Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Development, Fisheries, Transport Policy, 
Customs Union and External Relations. 
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with establishing better standards of human and minority rights. Although the accession 
talks with the EU experienced a partial suspension, the EU’s pre-accession mechanisms 
still pushed for reforms. The European Union continued to monitor democracy and 
human rights in Turkey in line with the political criteria, and asked for further changes as 
outlined in the revised Accession Partnership (AP) documents and the annual progress 
reports (2005-2011).150 The 2006 and 2008 AP documents set out several reforms to be 
undertaken.151 The regular reports in this period maintained a view that Turkey had 
fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria but also provided major criticisms in the 
following areas: freedom of expression, ethnic and religious minority rights, and 
compliance with the ECHR and the ECtHR case law. In the years after 2005, Turkey 
undertook some reforms but at a slower pace as compared to 2001-2004.152 
 The author’s field study in Turkey (November 2009 through January 2010) 
generated several helpful observations. In regard to the impact of the EU accession 
process for Turkish democracy, some interviewees discussed the EU’s ‘catalyst’, 
                                                          
150 The Accession Partnership documents and the Regular Reports are available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/key-documents/index_en.htm 
 
151 These reforms included as follow: training of judges and prosecutors in line with the ECHR and the 
ECtHR case law, human rights training of law enforcement officials, better observance of international 
human rights law through the ratification of ICCPR and the ECHR additional protocols, establishment of 
an independent human rights institution to monitor human rights cases, effective implementation of zero-
tolerance policy against torture, adoption of legal changes addressing non-Muslim religious minorities, and 
guaranteeing the right to broadcast in non-Turkish languages. 
 
152 Major reforms that Turkey realized in this period included the amendment to the penal code (article 301) 
in favor of a broader scope of freedom of expression, the human rights training of law enforcement 
officials, the training of prosecutors and judges for the ECHR and the ECtHR case law, growing public 
attention to women’s rights, positive discrimination measures for women (the 2010 constitutional 
amendment), and the constitutional right to apply to the Turkish Constitutional Court concerning 
fundamental rights and liberties. In addition, the Reform Monitoring Group of the Turkish government has 
continued to work to maintain the effective implementation of the democratization and human rights 
reforms. 
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‘accelerating’, and ‘transforming’ role for the 1999-2004 reforms.153 An anonymous 
diplomat from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the EU accession process is 
extraordinarily helpful for Turkey’s democratization reforms. Professor Cengiz Aktar 
from Bahcesehir University argued that the Helsinki candidacy decision resulted in the 
acceleration of Turkey’s transformation, and that the post-2001 reforms are important as 
much as the early Republican reforms of the Ataturk era (1923-38). Professor Aktar 
contended that Turkey could not have realized these reforms without the EU drive. 
Professor Atilla Eralp from the Middle East Technical University also agreed with this 
view. In a similar vein, Professor Ziya Onis from Koc University argued that undertaking 
these reforms could have taken a far longer time without a push from the EU.  
 Professor Ali Carkoglu from Sabanci University considered the EU accession 
process as the most important project for Turkey as the EU has a system transforming 
power. Murat Mercan (Member of Parliament from the Justice and Development Party-
JDP) and Ersin Kalaycioglu (Professor of Political Science at Sabanci University) argued 
for the complementary and parallel nature of the two processes: European integration and 
democratization. Ufuk Uras, a social democratic member of the parliament, contended 
that the EU accession process has been helping Turkey to move from the military tutelage 
of the September 12 (1982) regime. Professor Ziya Onis and Lutfi Elvan (Member of 
Parliament from the JDP) noted the critical importance of the EU’s drive for the reforms 
as regards the contention between the reformist and the status quo sections of the political 
landscape. Ege Erkocak from the Secretariat General for EU affairs, Professor Ziya Onis, 
and Professor Atilla Eralp argued that the EU accession process has expanded the scope 
                                                          
153 The interviews with Ege Erkocak, Seyfi Tashan, Cengiz Aktar, Ziya Onis, Murat Mercan, and Muhittin 
Ataman 
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of public debate on the formerly taboo issues such as the Kurdish question and the 
political behavior of the Turkish military.  
 Moreover, many interviewees underlined the significant role of EU reform 
packages and the constitutional amendments (2001-04), and they noted the following 
areas as key EU contributions: protection of fundamental rights and liberties (particularly 
the freedoms of thought, expression, and assembly), fight against the use of torture, the 
rule of law, the superiority of international agreements over domestic law, the human 
rights training of security officials, the ECtHR training of prosecutors, re-trial rights, pre-
trial detention conditions, human rights, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, 
tolerance to ethnic, cultural, and religious differences, and the elimination of 
discriminations among citizens.154 In addition, several interviewees argued that Turkey’s 
involvement in the structure of the European Court of Human Rights has been very 
helpful for the protection of fundamental rights, liberties, and human rights.155 
 Although the interviewees agreed that the EU’s impact has been significant, they 
also shared concerns about its limitations. The anonymous diplomat, Professors Carkoglu 
and Aydin suggested that Turkey’s domestic dynamics of democratization have also been 
important despite the fact that they agreed on the EU’s positive contributions. Seyfi 
Tashan from the Ankara based Foreign Policy Institute, Professor Onis, Professor Ali 
Karaosmanoglu from Bilkent University, Professor Ali Resul Usul from Bahcesehir 
University, Ufuk Uras, Ahmet Kenan Tanrikulu (Member of Parliament from the 
                                                          
154 The interviews with Ege Erkocak, Seyfi Tashan, Ali Carkoglu, Senem Aydin, Ali Resul Usul, Saban 
Disli, Ufuk Uras, Lutfi Elvan, Burhan Kuzu, Huseyin Pazarci, Akin Ozcer, Berdal Aral, Muhittin Ataman, 
and an anonymous diplomat from the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
 
155 The interviews with Yilmaz Ensaroglu, Seyfi Tashan, Burhan Kuzu, and Huseyin Pazarci. 
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Nationalist Action Party), Ziya Muezzinoglu (a former Minister of Finance), and 
Professor Hakan Yilmaz from Bogazici University suggested that the EU’s democratizing 
impact has currently been very limited as compared to the 1999-2004 period. In this 
regard, Turkey’s declining prospect for membership and the EU’s unfair policies towards 
Turkey were raised as the major reasons behind the weakening of EU’s democratizing 
leverage in the post-2005 period.156  
 Several interviewees raised criticisms in regard to the top-down nature of the EU 
driven reforms in particular and the EU’s democratic conditionality in general.157 Yilmaz 
Ensaroglu from the Ankara based think tank SETAV argued that the EU reforms 
packages involved serious deficiencies, as some legislative changes were not substantial. 
He provided an example that the High Criminal Courts replaced the State Security Courts 
due to EU pressure but the new Courts continued to work with the same staff and 
function.  Professor Hakan Yilmaz contended that the EU excessively relegated 
democracy into formality as it has failed to generate consistent and comprehensive 
criteria in assessing democracy and human rights in the candidate countries. For example, 
the EU regular reports have covered problems of some minority groups in Turkey while 
leaving out others in an inconsistent manner. In addition, Professor Yilmaz  raised that 
the excessive reliance on the EU accession process for democratization reforms is highly 
risky, as failure in the accession process may also impede democratization to a great 
extent.  
                                                          
156 Professor Ridvan Karluk from Anadolu University, who is an expert on the Turkey-EU relations and a 
pro-EU person, argued that the EU’s unfair and discriminatory policies towards Turkey have made even 
2023 as an unrealistic date for Turkey’s EU membership. Mustafa Kaya from the Saadet Party too 
criticized the EU for her unfair policies towards Turkey.  
 
157 For example; Mustafa Kaya, Ziya Onis, and Hakan Yilmaz. 
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3. High prospects of regime survival and civilian control of the military 
 
 Although Turkey experienced several democratic elections and maintained a 
parliamentary democratic system for most of the past six decades, both domestic and 
international observers of Turkish politics agree that the country has not consolidated 
democracy yet. A major problem in this regard has been the lack of civilian control of the 
military in line with democratic standards. The 1960, 1971, and 1980 direct military 
interventions, the 1997 and 2007 indirect interventions, and other forms of military 
involvement in politics made Turkish democracy highly vulnerable in terms of the third 
component of democratic consolidation. In the past decade, Turkey has achieved several 
legislative and constitutional reforms to realize democratic civil-military relations. These 
reforms have been possible to an important extent because of Turkey’s efforts to fulfill 
the EU’s Copenhagen political criteria. Despite these reforms, Turkish democracy still 
needs to take further steps to realize the civilian control of the military as suggested by 
the EU’s annual progress report (November 2010)158. The ongoing Ergenekon 
investigation on several coup plots prepared in the years 2002-2004 demonstrates that the 
survival of Turkey’s democratic regime was at serious risk even when the country was 
undertaking wide-ranging democratic reforms for the opening of accession negotiations 
with the EU. 
 The politicization of the Turkish military is not a recent phenomenon as it has 
long historical antecedents. In this regard, one has to examine the political role of the 
military during the late Ottoman and the early Republican periods. In the 18th and 19th 
centuries, military modernization constituted the initial components of the state-centered 
                                                          
158 The European Commission, Turkey 2010 Progress Report, p.10-12. It is available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/key_documents/2010/package/tr_rapport_2010_en.pdf) 
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Europeanization/Westernization efforts. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the 
military officers who got their education in the newly designed military academies, took 
an active part in politics. In the declaration of the first constitution (1876) and its 
reactivation in 1908, an influential cadre of military officers played a decisive role (Hale 
1994: 161, Biltekin 2007: 83-91). The politicization of the military was most visible in 
the 1908 military revolt against Sultan Abdulhamit II, which paved the way for the 
Second Constitutional Monarchy and the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) rule 
(1908-18). In the last decade of the Ottoman State, three military generals in the CUP 
(Enver, Talat, and Cemal Pashas) became the most influential political figures in 
domestic politics and foreign policy. As a result, the late Ottoman period was an era of 
high level of politicization of the military. 
 The War of Independence following the collapse of the Ottoman State provided a 
large amount of respect to the military among both secular and conservative sections of 
Turkish society (Biltekin 2007: 91). The military remained in firm civilian control during 
the Ataturk period (1923-38). Deriving lessons from the late Ottoman years in which 
military’s involvement in politics resulted in failures in the Balkan Wars and the First 
World War, Ataturk was convinced that the military had to be kept apart from politics. In 
addition, many scholars argue that Ataturk’s insistence on civilian control during his term 
also had important pragmatic concerns. Ataturk prevented his rival military generals 
(Kazim Karabekir, Ali Fuat Cebesoy, Rauf Orbay, Refet Bele, i.e.) to challenge his 
leadership through two basic means: (i) the military officers were not allowed to engage 
in politics, and (ii) even if the military officers got involved in politics after relinquishing 
their army posts, the one party rule would not allow the survival of oppositional parties 
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(Rustow 1959: 547-9, Ahmad 1993: 56-64; 2008:105-7, Hale 1994: 75-6).159 These two 
strategies, along with Ataturk’s charismatic leadership, made the military a central actor 
for the protection of the Ataturkist/Kemalist principles- republicanism, progressiveness, 
populism, secularism, nationalism, and statism. In the aftermath of Ataturk’s death, the 
army’s ‘guardianship mission’ set the stage for a military’s frequent involvement in 
politics in the future (Guney and Karatekelioglu 2005: 441-43, Narli 2005: 230-32). 
 While this brief historical overview provides some clues about the origins of the 
politicization of the Turkish military, an analysis of the legal prerogatives gained through 
the 1960, 1971, and 1980 military interventions are also essential to understand why 
civilian control of the military was a missing component of Turkish democracy in 1960-
2000. This analysis will also be helpful to see the significance of recent civil-military 
relations reforms, which were made to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria. 
 While the 1960 and 1980 military interventions resulted in the making of new 
constitutions, the 1971 intervention paved the way for a major constitutional amendment. 
In the 1961 constitution, the National Security Council (NSC) was established to 
‘communicate the requisite fundamental recommendations to the Council of Ministers 
with the purpose of assisting in the making of decisions related to national security and 
coordination’ (Article 111). The NSC was arranged to meet monthly. Particularly 
important, the NSC provided constitutional justification for the military’s involvement in 
domestic political matters through a broad conception of ‘national security’ (de Castro 
2010: 49). The 1961 Internal Service Law of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) set the 
duty of the TAF as ‘to protect and preserve the Turkish homeland and the Turkish 
                                                          
159 Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Firkasi (the Progressive Republican Party) was established by these 
prominent generals in November 1924; however, it was closed down in June 1925. 
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republic as defined in the constitution’ (Article 35). According to the Internal Service 
Regulations of the TAF (Article 85/1), the military ‘shall defend the country against the 
internal and external threats, if necessary by force’ (Heper and Guney 2000: 637).160 The 
1961 constitution also made the Chief of General Staff directly responsible to the prime 
minister instead of to the minister of defense (Article 110). The currently active 
arrangement has enhanced the political autonomy of the TAF, and made the civilian 
control more difficult (Bayramoglu 2009: 82-87, Yazici 2009: 83-4). Moreover, the 1960 
military intervention resulted in the establishment of the Armed Forces Pension Fund 
(OYAK) to improve the economic and social status of the military officers.161 The Fund 
has later become a key instrument of the military’s extensive involvement in the 
economic realm as a reflection of its political autonomy (Cizre 2002: 175 cited in Akca 
2009: 263). 
 The 1971 intervention, which ousted the government through a memorandum, 
enhanced further the institutional and political autonomy of the TAF. Amendment to the 
NSC law provided the Council more important role in the shaping of security policies. 
The amendment also made the Land, Air, and Naval Commanders the NSC members (de 
Castro 2010: 10-14, 49, Bayramoglu 2009: 80). Two legal changes in this period made 
the Chief of General Staff more autonomous entity from the ministry of defense. The 
                                                          
160 The full-texts (in Turkish) of the Internal Service Law and the Internal Service Regulations of the TAF 
are available online at the websites of the Justice Ministry and the Office of Prime Minister: 
http://www.mevzuat.adalet.gov.tr/html/1044.html and 
http://mevzuat.basbakanlik.gov.tr/Metin.Aspx?MevzuatKod=7.5.5905&MevzuatIliski=0&sourceXmlSearc
h=T%C3%9CRK%20S%C4%B0LAHLI%20KUVVETLER%C4%B0%20%C4%B0%C3%87%20H%C4
%B0ZMET%20Y%C3%96NETMEL%C4%B0%C4%9E%C4%B0. 
 
161 Through extensive tax privileges and other exclusive rights, the economic volume of the Fund has 
expanded to an extent that it has become one of the top economic entities in the Turkish economy.The 
OYAK involves multiple enterprises including supermarkets, real estate, shares, insurance, and automotive 
industry. Taha Parla considers the OYAK enterprise as a case for ‘mercantalist militarism’ (Parla 2009: 
201-24, Akca 2009: 225-69, Ahmad 2008: 152-3, de Castro 2010: 7). 
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Chief of Staff was set as the major holder of determining defense policy, military budget, 
intelligence gathering, internal security, procurement of arms, and military appointments 
(Cizre 1999: 72-3, 1997: 159). Moreover, the 1971 intervention resulted in the creation of 
the High Military Administrative Court (AYIM), which replaced the Council of State to 
prosecute civilians who offend military personnel. The military courts gained legal 
authority to try civilians for non-military crimes. As a result, the TAF did have further 
privileges in the judicial system at the expense of the civilian courts. In addition, the 1971 
intervention resulted in the creation of the State Security Courts, which included both the 
civilian and military judges/prosecutors to deal with crimes against state security. Finally, 
an amendment to the constitution exempted the TAF from the supervision of the Court of 
Audits (Yazici 2009: 88-92, Bayramoglu 2009: 79-82).  
 The September 12, 1980 military coup even further expanded the political 
autonomy of the Turkish military, and made it a central actor in the Turkish politics. The 
1982 constitution made during the 1980-83 military rule substantially limited the scope of 
fundamental rights and liberties as compared to the 1961 constitution (Cizre 1997: 156, 
Narli 2005: 239, Bayramoglu 2009: 82-4).162 The constitution increased prerogatives of 
the National Security Council.163 Later, the Council took decisions in a broad range of 
                                                          
162 The Chief of General Staff Kenan Evren, who headed the coup in cooperation with the four service 
commanders, later became the president for seven years (1982-89). As a reflection of the army’s central 
role in the history of Turkish politics, the country witnessed the first civilian president (Turgut Ozal, 1989-
93) only sixty-six years after the foundation of the Republic. All the former seven presidents including the 
founder Kemal Ataturk were military generals. 
 
163 The Council of Ministers was required to ‘give priority consideration to the decisions of National 
Security Council’ (Article 118). The revised NSC law defined national security in broad terms, and 
authorized the NSC to monitor and evaluate a wide spectrum of policies. In addition, the revised law 
changed the civilian-military ratio (4 to 5) of NSC members in favor of the military side. The NSC 
Secretary has been appointed only from the military officers until 2004 while the Secretariat has been 
predominantly composed of the military personnel. The NSC Secretariat has acquired a unique leverage to 
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military issues including school curriculum/education, tv broadcasting rights, 
bureaucratic appointments in the state ministries, political party alignments before the 
elections, foreign trade, development of energy sector, economic plans, and agricultural 
development projects (Cizre 1997: 157-8, Biltekin 2007: 64).164 Furthermore, the military 
has continued to remain outside of the supervision of the Court of Audits. The 
constitution exempted the Supreme Military Council (YAS) decisions from the judicial 
review (Yazici 2009: 94-8). As a result of all these changes, the Turkish military has 
found a more favorable constitutional basis not only to maintain its institutional and 
political autonomy but also to interfere in politics. In the February 28 (1997) process, the 
Turkish military ousted the Welfare-True Path coalition government without making a 
coup; rather, it used constitutional institution of the National Security Council for this 
purpose.165 
 The area of civil-military relations posed a major challenge for Turkey’s bid for 
EU membership in the post-Helsinki period. The EU’s Copenhagen political criteria 
required that Turkey should align its civil-military relations with the practices in the EU 
member states. To fulfill the political criteria, Turkey undertook several reforms in this 
area since 2001. Although these reforms have not yet paved the way for civilian control 
of the magnitude in consolidated democracies, the EU’s push resulted in significant 
                                                                                                                                                                             
gather intelligence and information from the civilian state institutions (Heper and Guney 2000: 637, de 
Castro 2010: 49, Bayramoglu 2009: 84-97). 
 
164 The 1982 constitution also authorized the Chief of Staff to appoint a member for the newly established 
Higher Education Council, which is responsible for the supervision of universities in the country. 
 
165 In the February 28, 1997 NSC meeting, the military generals including the Chief of Staff and the four 
service commanders forced the civilian government to implement eighteen decrees to protect the secular 
character of the regime. In addition, the military headed a political campaign in cooperation with the press, 
business, and civil society. The head of the government, pro-Islamic Necmettin Erbakan, resigned on June 
18, 1997. On the February 28 process, see Cizre and Cinar 2003, Bayramoglu 2009: 97-105, Taspinar 
2004, Heper and Guney 2000, Dagi 2001, and Insel 2003. 
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improvements. The EU’s impact was most visible in 2001-04, while the subsequent 
period of slowdown in the Turkey-EU relations has limited the EU’s leverage. 
Nevertheless, the ongoing Turkey-EU accession negotiations have been helpful to some 
extent for the civilian government’s reform efforts in most recent years. 
 In line with the EU’s conditionality, Turkey undertook several important civil-
military relations reforms in the 2001-04 period. The October 2001 constitutional 
amendment increased the civilian members of the NSC; then, the numbers of civilian 
members exceeded the military ones. The sixth EU harmonization law package (July 
2003) removed the military member of the High Audio-Visual Board (RTUK), which 
monitors tv and radio broadcasts in the country. The seventh EU reform package (August 
2003) included substantial changes concerning the duties and functioning of the National 
Security Council: the NSC discretion on which languages to be taught in schools 
eliminated, the frequency of NSC meetings reduced from monthly to bi-monthly 
intervals, the prerogative of the Chief of Staff to convene a NSC meeting removed, 
appointment of a civilian NSC Secretary made possible, and the right of the NSC to have 
an access to information from all public and private legal persons abrogated. All these 
changes have helped the transformation of the NSC from playing a dual executive role to 
an advisory body as required by the EU.  
 The seventh reform package included two other important changes in the realm of 
civil-military relations: the Court of Audits, on behalf of the parliament, got the authority 
to oversight the military expenditures, and the civilian courts instead of the military 
courts acquired the right to try civilian persons concerning offenses against soldiers or the 
military. The eighth EU harmonization law package (July 2004) involved a change in the 
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higher education law that removed the right of the General Staff to appoint a member for 
the Higher Education Council (YOK).166 Moreover, the May 2004 constitutional 
amendment abrogated the State Security Courts (SSCs), which included the military 
judges and prosecutors until 1999. The SSCs had been severely criticized by the EU as 
they had several trials in conflict with the ECHR and the ECtHR rulings. In addition, the 
2004 constitutional amendment strengthened the earlier changes concerning the removal 
of a military member in the YOK, and the supervision of the military expenses through 
the Court of Audits. 
 The 2001-2004 civil-military relations reforms, made to a great extent to satisfy 
the Copenhagen political criteria, represent a turning moment for the consolidation of 
Turkish democracy. Undertaking such unprecedented changes was certainly not easy. 
According to the diaries of the former Navy commander, the hardliner service 
commanders (the Air, Navy and Gendarmerie) organized several coup plots to overthrow 
the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government, which came into power after the 
November 2002 elections.167 The diaries show that the JDP’s pro-Islamic/conservative 
identity, the groundbreaking approach to the Cyprus conflict, and the civil-military 
relations reforms created a backlash among the hardliner officers who have ultra-
nationalist and anti-EU profiles. Nevertheless, as the diaries confirm, the Chief of Staff 
                                                          
166 For the adoption date and the content of the EU Harmonization Law packages, see Political Reforms in 
Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey (Ankara, 2007), and ‘Appendix 2: Laws Adopted 
by the EU Harmonization Packages’ in Ozbudun and Genckaya 2009: 128-134.  
 
167 The diaries were first published in the Nokta Magazine on March 29, 2007. After the publication, the 
Nokta Magazine was closed down immediately with pressures from the military as noted by a report on the 
press freedom prepared by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, ‘The Protection of 
Journalists’ Sources’,  December 1, 2010 
(http://assembly.coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc10/edoc12443.htm) 
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(Hilmi Ozkok, 2002-06) stood against the coup attempts. For many observers of Turkish 
politics, Ozkok’s pro-EU, democratic, and gradualist profile considerably facilitated 
undertaking these civil-military relations reforms.168  
 Although the 2001-04 civil military relations reforms were comprehensive, they 
have not been sufficient to prevent the military’s intervention in politics. In the following 
years, the Turkish General Staff continued to make political statements concerning issues 
such as secularism, education, the Kurdish question, political elections, and foreign 
policy. Particularly notable, the General Staff issued an electronic memorandum on the 
eve of presidential elections in April 27, 2007. Expressing concerns with the JDP’s 
decision to nominate then-Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul, whose wife wears a headscarf, 
the e-memo hinted that the military could intervene the electoral process as ‘a legal duty 
of the Turkish Armed Forces’ (referring to the TAF Internal Service Law, article 35) to 
protect the secular character of the regime. After the statement, the JDP government 
stood against the military, withdrew Gul’s nomination, and called for early parliamentary 
elections to be held on July 22. Favored by a strong public reaction to the e-memo, the 
JDP increased its votes from 34 percent (in 2002) to the historic 47 percent, and the 
JDP’s nominee (Abdullah Gul) was elected by the parliament as the new president on 
August 28, 2007. As a result, the military failed in its attempt to intervene the presidential 
elections while the April 27 e-memo became a turning point in the realm of civil-military 
relations. For the first time, the civilian government was able to stand against the military 
                                                          
168 The former Prime Minister Mesut Yilmaz, who came into power after the military ousted the Erbakan 
government through the February 28 process, argued that the JDP could not have handled the civil-military 
relations reforms if Hilmi Ozkok was not serving as the Chief of Staff in this period. The interview with 
Mesut Yilmaz on HaberTurk TV, ‘Refah-Yol Hukumeti Dik Durabilseydi…’, January 27, 2011 
(http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/595697-refah-yol-hukumeti-dik-durabilseydi). 
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with the help of a large section of the Turkish people and elite, including secular 
intellectuals.169 
 Like the failed April 27 e-memo, the opening of Ergenekon investigation has been 
one of the key developments concerning the civilianization of Turkish politics in the 
recent years.170 The investigation started in June 2007 with the findings of 27 hand 
grenades stored in a house in Istanbul that linked to the bombings of Cumhuriyet 
newspaper in May 2006. Later, an army major, retired and active-duty military officers 
(including the former Gendarmerie commander and the NSC secretary), police officers, 
mafia leaders, journalists, academicians, businessmen, and ultra-nationalist political 
figures were arrested. The first indictment of Ergenekon, which was prepared by the 
Istanbul Prosecutor’s Office (July 2008) charged 86 suspects with several allegations: 
membership in an armed terrorist organization, attempting to overthrow the civilian 
government by use of violence and coercion, inciting rebellion among people against the 
government, inciting disobedience in the military, acquiring illegally top secret official 
documents, and stocking/using explosive materials to commit crimes (Aydinli 2011: 227-
39, Unver 2009: 10).171 Although the Ergenekon trial process has been frequently 
                                                          
169 A group of five hundred (mostly secular) intellectuals (academicians, journalists, lawyers, artists etc.) 
issued a statement against the e-memo. The statement suggested that the TAF’s intervention through the e-
memo is a legal crime, and that it is a clear threat against Turkish democracy. The statement also called for 
the enactment of a new constitution as the 1980 coup product of the 1982 constitution was considered as a 
major reason for the military’s frequent involvement in the political sphere. ‘500 aydından Genelkurmay 
muhtırasına karşı bildiri’ (‘500 intellectuals issued a counter statement to the General Staff’s 
memortandum’), Radikal, May 14, 2007 (http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?haberno=221188) 
 
170 Ergenekon is the name of an alleged clandestine, ultra-nationalist terrorist network. 
171 The Istanbul Prosecutor’s Office opened the second and third indictments of the Ergenekon 
investigation in March and July 2009. The second indictment targets 56 suspects while the third one is 
concerned with 52 suspects. ‘Ergenekon'da 2. İddianame açıklandı’, Hurriyet, March 26, 2009 
(http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/11286391.asp), ‘Ergenekon’da 3. Iddianeme’, July 21, 2009 
(http://www.haberturk.com/gundem/haber/160029-ergenekonda-3-iddianame). Several major crimes in the 
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criticized in regard to long detention periods and other trial procedures, a majority of the 
Turkish people agree that the Ergenekon is a terrorist organization (68 to 32 percent).172 
Also, the event offered a great opportunity to eliminate Turkey’s ‘deep state’, which 
poses a serious threat against the consolidation of Turkish democracy.  
 The EU’s  2009 regular report on Turkey considered the Ergenekon trial as a ‘first 
case to probe into a coup attempt and the most extensive investigation on an alleged 
criminal network aiming at destabilizing the democratic institutions’, and as ‘an 
opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of its 
democratic institutions and the rule of law’ (p.6-7).  
 In July 2010, the Istanbul Prosecutor’s Office accepted an indictment in regard to 
the Balyoz (Sledgehammer) coup plot, which was allegedly prepared in 2003 in the First 
Army (Istanbul). The Balyoz indictment charges 196 suspects including 19 retired and 28 
active-duty generals for attempting to overthrow the government and the constitutional 
order. Among the suspects, the former air force and navy commanders along with the 
commander of the First Army also take place while 162 of 196 suspects have been 
arrested.173 The Balyoz coup plot includes actions such as the bombing of two major 
                                                                                                                                                                             
country’s recent past were attributed to the Ergenekon terror network: the assasinations of the Turkish 
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, the Italian Bishop Santoro, and the armed assault on the Council of State 
(a senior judge was killed). ‘Will Turkey Benefit from Ergenekon’, Le Monde Diplomatique, November 
2009 (http://mondediplo.com/blogs/will-turkey-benefit-from-ergenekon). 
 
172 GENAR Poll, November 2008. When asked about the nature of the Ergenekon trial, the respondents’ 
views were as follow: The Ergenekon trial is “essentially political case” (65% no, 35% yes); the Ergenekon 
network ‘protects the regime’ (75% no, 25% yes); the Ergenekon is an ‘interest oriented criminal group’ 
(61% yes, 39% no);  it aims at initiating a military coup (58% yes, 42% no). GENAR poll, July 2008 
(Unver 2009: 21). 
 
173 On May 30 2011, the Commander of the Military Academies (General Bilgin Balanli) was arrested in 
connection with the Balyoz coup plot. General Balanli has been expected to be promoted to the 
Commander of Air Force in August 2011. For the first time in the country, an active-duty full general was 
arrested with an allegation of coup plotter.  
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historical mosques in Istanbul, the toppling of a Turkish jet over Aegean to provoke a war 
with Greece, the realization of events to declare a martial law, and the formation of a 
military-directed cabinet of ministers (the names listed).174 In addition to the 2003 Balyoz 
coup plot, another one (Kafes-Cage, dated March 2009) was seized by the Ergenekon 
trial investigators in November 2009. The Navy based Kafes coup plot is alleged to 
overthrow the government through destabilizing actions including the assassination of 
prominent non-Muslim citizens in the country.175 
 The 2001-04 civil-military relations reforms, initiated to fulfill the Copenhagen 
political criteria, represented a significant change in the Turkish politics in favor of a 
civilian control of the military. Moving the NSC from dual executive institution to an 
advisory body, opening the process of parliamentary oversight over the military 
expenditures, and limiting the sphere of military courts in favor of the civilian courts 
were unprecedented changes. Particularly notable, the investigation of the alleged coup 
plots by the civilian courts- first time in the country-, was possible to a large extent 
because of the 2001-04 reforms. The EU accession process played a decisive role in 
undertaking these reforms.  
 Later, the slowdown in the Turkey-EU relations due to the partial suspension of 
the accession negotiations limited the EU’s leverage in the realization of further progress 
in this area. Although annual reports by the European Commission (2005-10) and the 
European Parliament (2006-11) closely monitored Turkey, and demanded further reforms 
                                                          
174 The allegations in the Balyoz indictment are based on 5000-page documents, which were published in 
the liberal daily Taraf on January 20, 2010. ‘Darbenin adi Balyoz-The Name of Coup: Sledgehammer’ 
(http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/darbenin-adi-balyoz.htm). See also, ‘The Turkish Army: Coups Away’, The 
Economist, February 11, 2010 (http://www.economist.com/node/15505946?story_id=15505946) 
 
175 ‘Kod adi Kafes- The Code Name: Kafes’, Taraf,  November 19, 2009 
(http://www.taraf.com.tr/haber/kod-adi-kafes.htm)  
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in the realm of the civil-military relations, the EU’s impact remained very limited as 
compared to the 2001-2004 period. As included in the 2006 and 2008 revised Accession 
Partnership documents, the EU had four major requests from Turkey in this area: (i) 
further alignment of the civilian control of the army in line with the practices in the EU 
member states (ensure that the military does not interfere in political affairs), (ii) 
increasing transparency and accountability in the conduct of security affairs, (iii) 
establishment of full parliamentary oversight of military and defense policies, and  (iv) 
abolishing any remaining competence of military courts to try civilians.176 In the EU’s 
progress reports, several criticisms have been directed: the unchanged article (35) of the 
TAF’s Internal Service Law, which provides a legal justification for the army’s 
interference in political affairs (2005-10 reports), the army’s large influence in the 
political sphere (2005-09 reports), the broad definition of national security in the NSC 
law (2005-07 reports), the lack of progress in parliamentary oversight over military 
expenditures (2006-10 reports), and the existence of the 1997 EMASYA covert security 
protocol177, which enables the army to exercise military operations without the consent of 
civilian authorities (2007-09 reports). In contrast to the 2005-2008 reports, the 2009 and 
2010 reports noted some positive developments: the ongoing process of the Ergenekon 
trial, the June 2009 legal change that allows civilian courts to try military officers 
                                                          
176 The 2006 and 2008 Turkey-EU Accession Partnership documents are avilable online in the website of 
the EU: http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/key-documents/index_en.htm 
 
177 The EMASYA protocol was signed in the aftermath of the 28 February 1997 military intervention 
between the Turkish General Staff and the Interior Ministry . The protocol has been criticized particularly 
because of its potential to provide a legal framework for a future coup. The EMASYA protocol was 
annulled on February 4, 2010. “The Turkish Army: Coups away”, The Economist, February 11, 2010. 
(http://www.economist.com/node/15505946).  
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concerning coup plots178, the removal of the EMASYA protocol, and the September 2010 
constitutional amendment, which restricted the jurisdiction of military courts and enabled 
civilian courts to try military officers as regards coup attempts.179 
 During the author’s field study, the interviewees expressed their views concerning 
the recent civil-military relations reforms, the EU’s contributions in this area, possibility 
of a military coup in the country, and the need for further progress to maintain the 
democratic control of the armed forces. First of all, several interviewees noted that the 
realm of civil-military relations is one of the most deficient areas in terms of the 
consolidation of Turkish democracy.180 Many interviewees argued that the risk of 
democratic breakdown through a military coup still exists despite the fact that several 
civil-military relations reforms were made in the recent years.181 Seyfi Tashan underlined 
the significance of strong civilian leadership and civilian expertise in security affairs to 
uphold the civilian control of the military. Former diplomat Akin Ozcer argued that the 
lack of strong anti-coup public movements makes the military intervention more likely in 
the country. Ali Karaosmanoglu, Yilmaz Ensaroglu, and Berdal Aral noted that the 
military is not solely responsible for the interventions; rather, the pro-intervention 
civilians also have important role here. Hakan Yilmaz argued that the lack of trust and 
                                                          
178 That arrangement was later annuled by the Turkish Constitutional Court following the application by the 
main opposition party (the Republican People’s Party, CHP). However, the September 2010 constitutional 
amendment, which came into force after the referendum (September 12, 2010) limited the jurisdiction of 
military courts, and enabled civilian courts to try military officers in regard to coup attempts.  
 
179 The EU’s regular reports on Turkey are available online in the website of the EU’s Delegation to 
Turkey: http://www.avrupa.info.tr/AB_ve_Turkiye/Muzakereler,Regular_Reports.html (1998-2010) 
180 Interviews with Lutfi Elvan, Ufuk Uras, Akin Ozcer, Ziya Onis, Ali Resul Usul, Yilmaz Ensaroglu, 
Berdal Aral, and Muhittin Ataman.  
 
181  Interviews with Hakan Yilmaz, Yilmaz Ensaroglu, and Seyfi Tashan. Professors Ersin Kalaycioglu and 
Ali Carkoglu agreed for the existing risk of a further military coup but with a minimal possibility. An 
anonymous diplomat argued that Turkey’s democracy no longer involves any risk of military coup. 
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consensus among the major domestic groups (the military, nationalists, Kurds, and 
conservatives) enhances the risk of a military coup although the international context is 
currently unfavorable for a coup (neither the US nor the EU supports a military coup in 
the country).  
 In regard to the post-2001 civil-military relations reforms, several interviewees 
underscored the important role played by the EU accession process.182 Ufuk Uras 
contended that the EU accession process is critically important to relinquish the military 
guardianship of the post-September 12 (1982) political regime. Murat Mercan, Ziya Onis, 
and Ali Resul Usul argued that the 2001-04 civil relations reforms, which were made to 
fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria, have made possible the Ergenekon investigation 
of coup plots by the civilian courts.183 Ali Karaosmanoglu made a distinction between the 
2001-04 and the 2005-present periods in terms of the EU’s contributions to the civil-
military relations reforms. Karaosmanoglu argued that the EU’s leverage has remained 
very limited in the latter period due to the deadlock in the accession negotiations. 
Moreover, many interviewees argued that Turkish democracy has not yet fulfilled the 
third component of the consolidation, and that further progress is necessary in this 
area.184  
 
 
                                                          
182 Interviews with Saban Disli, Burhan Kuzu, Murat Mercan, Ali Karaosmanoglu, Ege Erkocar, Cengiz 
Aktar, Ziya Onis, Ali Carkoglu, Ali Resul Usul, Berdal Aral and Muhittin Ataman. 
 
183 Ersin Kalaycioglu, an anonymous law professor, and Senem Aydin criticized the Ergenekon 
investigation in respect to fair trial and detention procedures.  
 
184 Interviews with Lutfi Elvan, Ufuk Uras, Burhan Kuzu, Cengiz Aktar, Akin Ozcer,  Ziya Onis, Ali Resul 
Usul, Senem Aydin, Yilmaz Ensaroglu, Berdal Aral, and Muhittin Ataman. 
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4. Legitimacy, anti-system parties, stateness 
 
 The fourth component of democratic consolidation is composed of three parts: (i) 
democracy is considered as the best type of political regime by the majority of people, (ii) 
no politically significant group or political party works for an alternative political regime, 
and (iii) secession is not a serious matter in a multi-ethnic democracy. In consolidated 
democracies, the majority of people consider democracy as the best type of political 
regime; anti-system political parties or separatist groups either are absent or they fail to 
draw strong public support. Overall, the fourth component of the consolidation involves 
both attitudinal and behavioral dimensions. 
 In assessing Turkish democracy in the context of European integration (1999 to 
present), one can note that democracy in the country has enjoyed high public legitimacy, 
and that no anti-system political party exists but the Kurdish question has continued to 
pose a major challenge for the fourth component of consolidation. The following section 
will examine the major issues concerning public legitimacy, anti-system political parties, 
and stateness. In doing so, it will also assess the democratizing impact of European Union 
accession process.  
 
 Public Legitimacy 
 In the post-1950 period of multi-party democracy, the Turkish people have taken 
an active part in the democratic elections as seen in the high levels of turnout rates. The 
following table shows the participation rates from 1950 to 2011. 
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 Table 5.1: Participation in Parliamentary Elections, 1950-2011 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Participation 
Rate (%) 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Participation 
Rate (%) 
 
Year 
 
 
Participation 
Rate (%) 
 
Year 
 
 
Participatio
n Rate (%) 
1950 90.4 1965 71.3 1983 92.3 1999 87.1 
1954 88.6 1969 64.3 1987 93.3 2002 79.1 
1957 76.6 1973 66.8 1991 83.9 2007 84.2 
1961 81.4 1977 72.4 1995 82.3 2011 87.4 
  
Source: Sayari and Esmer 2002: 189, and the website of Turkey’s High Election Board 
(YSK)    (http://www.ysk.gov.tr) 
 
 
 According to a major survey study, conducted with 1492 voting age individuals 
across the country through  face-to-face interviews in May-June 2006,  76.9 percent of 
Turkish people believe that democracy is the best type of political regime (“Democracy 
may involve problems, but it is still much better than any other regime”) (Carkoglu and 
Toprak 2007: 55). In the same study, the respondents provided high levels of support for 
the protection of basic rights and freedoms.185 Moreover, the 2006 survey showed a 
remarkable decline in the level of support for a Shari’ah (Islamic law) based political 
regime among the Turkish people as compared to the mid-to-late 1990s when the country 
witnessed the rise of political Islam. While surveys made in 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999, and 
2002 involved 19.9%, 26.7%, 19.8%, 21%, and 16.4% (respectively) support levels for 
                                                          
185 In what follows,  the responses to some survey questions concerning basic rights and freedoms take 
place: “Radical or marginal ideological groups should be allowed to demonstrate as long as they do not mar 
law and order” (57.1% agree, 19.8% disagree), “People should never be tortured during interrogations by 
police officers regardless of their criminal offence” (73.2% agree, 14.6% disagree), “The freedom of people 
to use mother tongues, which they have learned from their parents, should not be constricted by any means” 
(76.1% agree, 9.4% disagree), “The freedom of people to practice any religion or lifestyle should not be 
limited by any means” (78.6% agree, 8.2% disagree), “The freedom of people to express themselves freely 
should not be limited by any means” (79.9% agree, 7.3% disagree). Ali Carkoglu and Binnaz Toprak 2007, 
Religion, Society, and Politics in a Changing Turkey, a joint project by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) and 
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV). The survey study is available online at the 
website of TESEV: http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DEMP/RSP%20-%20Turkey.pdf (114 pages). 
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such a regime, in 2006 only 8.9 percent of the respondents answered affirmatively the 
question “would you want a Shari’ah-based religious regime to be established in 
Turkey”(Carkoglu and Toprak 2007: 81).  
 Particularly notable, the support for an Islamic political regime in a predominantly 
Muslim society declined when the conservative Justice and Development Party was in 
power as a single-power majority government after November 2002. In addition to the 
2006 survey, many other studies reveal that the Turkish society has moved to a more 
religiously conservative line but this has not corresponded to an increasing yearn for an 
Islamic political regime or any disenchantment from the secular democratic regime. The 
people overwhelmingly support the secular regime but they also demand for a better 
protection of religious freedoms (Zurcher et al 2004: 58, Kalaycioglu 2010: 166-7, 
Carkoglu and Toprak 2007: 13-15, Ozbudun 2009: 36-39).  
 Although the 2006 survey demonstrated a high level of public commitment to 
secular democracy, it also showed that the majority of the Turkish people agree with the 
military’s criticism of the civilian government (“it is natural for the military to 
occasionally voice their opinion against an elected government”; 58.6% agree, 18.4% 
disagree) while about a quarter of the people only prefer a military regime over the 
democratically elected government (“Turkey’s problems can be solved not by elected 
governments but by a military regime”; 26.8% agree, 54.7% disagree). In addition, a 
quarter of the Turkish people disagrees with the statement that “Turkish people can 
safeguard secularism without the support of the military” (53.7% agree, 24.8% disagree) 
(Carkoglu and Toprak 2007: 83). Having considered the civilian control of the army as 
one of the central issues for the consolidation of Turkish democracy, such levels of public 
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support for a military’s engagement in politics could complicate the process of 
democratic consolidation.186  
 The Turkish people perceive the European Union as symbolizing modernization, 
democracy, respect for human rights, and peace.187 Although Turkish people considered 
the country’s EU membership less ‘as a good thing’ in 2010 (42%) than in 2004 (71%), 
which reflects the stalemate in the Turkey-EU accession negotiations, a recent poll (May 
2011) shows that a majority (69% support, 26% oppose) desire accession for Turkey to 
the EU.188 There has been no obvious impact of the EU accession process on the degree 
to which the democratic regime receives public legitimacy, yet the wide convergence of 
Europeanization and democratization processes has generated indirect effects. 
Particularly notable, the European integration process has helped moderation of the 
political Islamist constituents of the governing Justice and Development Party, which has 
shown a strong commitment to EU membership. Overall, the people’s positive 
assessment of the EU in regard to democracy and human rights has made the accession 
process indirectly supportive of the legitimacy of Turkish democracy. 
                                                          
186 A discourse analysis study on the four major political groups (Kemalist, Nationalist, Liberal Left, and 
Islamist) in the country has argued that the liberal left and the Islamist discourses widely reject the notion 
that ‘the army is the guarantor of democracy and secularism”, and that the Kemalist discourse remained 
neutral while the nationalist discourse involved a high level of support for the army’s guardianship role 
(Kanra 2009: 113-30). On the other hand, the 2006 survey showed that people with Kurdish origin take a 
more oppositional stance against a military regime (71%; 18 percent higher than the country average 
(53.7%) (Carkoglu and Toprak 2007: 84-5).  
 
187 Standard Eurobarometer 74, November 2010; Turkey Report. It is available online at the website of the 
EU: http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb74/eb74_en.htm 
 
188 Akgun, Mensur et al 2011, Turkiye’de Dis Politika Algisi (Foreign Policy Perceptions in Turkey), 
TESEV-Open Society Foundation., p.14 (It is available online at: 
http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/11256DisPolitikaAlgiWEB01_06_11.pdf. The poll has 
also revealed that the majority of people do not expect Turkey’s accession in the short-to-middle run 
period. (‘prospective date of Turkey’s accession?’:  in 5 years (16%), in 5-10 years (20%), in 11-20 years 
(8%), after 20 years (5%), never (30%), rejected/do not know (21%). 
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 During the author’s field study, the interviewees discussed several issues in regard 
to public legitimacy of democracy in Turkey. Professor Cengiz Aktar from Bahcesehir 
University noted that societal and intellectual support for the JDP government against the 
military’s interference in the presidential elections (the April 27, 2007 e-memorandum) 
was a key dynamic behind the government’s clear standing against the intervention. The 
July 22, 2007 parliamentary elections results, which involved a substantial increase in the 
JDP’s votes (47%) seems to confirm Aktar’s observation. Several interviewees criticized 
the Turkish people for not having a strong position against the military interventions. As 
discussed earlier, former diplomat Akin Ozcer argued that the absence of strong anti-
coup social movements is one of the major problems Turkish democracy. In a similar 
line, Professor Berdal Aral from Fatih University considered that a considerable size of 
nationalist-secular-urban masses in the country is supportive of the military interventions. 
For Aral, this support poses a serious challenge for democratic consolidation. Moreover, 
Professor Hakan Yilmaz from Bogazici University contended that there is a public 
consensus on the democratic regime in the country but the protection of basic rights and 
freedoms faces serious difficulties due to widespread intolerance in all sections of society 
(the right, the left, the military, and the religious communities, i.e.). Senem Aydin and 
Muhittin Ataman too cited the low level of tolerance as an important democracy 
problem.189 Furthermore, many interviewees criticized the European Union for the 
declining levels of public support for EU membership in the recent years.190 
                                                          
189 In the 2006 survey study, Carkoglu and Toprak found that 57.1 percent of the respondents agreed with 
the statement that “As a society, we should not be obliged to put up with views that are totally against the 
views of the majority” (19.8% disagree) (p.55).  
 
190 For example, interviews with Burhan Kuzu, Ahmet Kenan Tanrikulu, and Ziya Muezzinoglu. 
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 Elite Consensus and Anti-System Parties 
 In the post-1999 period of EU accession process, Turkey has not faced any 
politically significant group or political party working for a non-democratic political 
regime. In a reflection of high level of public legitimacy of the democratic regime, the 
political landscape has been free from extremist parties. Particularly important, the 
ideational transformation of political Islamists following the 1997 military intervention 
has contributed to the democratic consolidation.  Despite the lack of anti-system parties, a 
few significant problems still need to be resolved in regard to elite consensus on the 
democratic regime. The European integration process has played an important role in 
strengthening both secularism and democracy in the country.  
 In contrast to the high level of ideological polarization and political violence of 
the 1970s, which led to a military coup in 1980, Turkish politics was quite peaceful in the 
1990s but the political landscape witnessed the rise of political Islam and Kurdish 
nationalism (Ozbudun 2000: 74, Sayari 2002: 12-14, Kalaycioglu 2010: 174). Both of 
them posed serious challenges for the secular and nationalist foundations of Ataturk’s 
Republic. The Islamist challenge targeted the state-centered, strict interpretation of 
secularism that provided little room for a full enjoyment of religious rights and freedoms, 
particularly in the public space. The Kurdish nationalists had demands ranging from the 
recognition of Kurdish identity to the creation of an independent Kurdish state in the 
South-East (Keyman and Onis 2007: 178).  
 The 1995 parliamentary elections resulted in the establishment of Welfare Party-
True Path Party (Refahyol) coalition government. The political Islamist Welfare Party 
(WP) under the leadership of Necmettin Erbakan followed an ambivalent position 
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towards the secular regime. In a survey conducted in 1995, 61 percent of the Welfare 
Party supporters favored an Islamic political order (Ozbudun 2000: 87-93). The European 
Court of Human Rights upheld the WP’s closure (1998) by the Turkish Constitutional 
Court for violating the principle of secularism in the constitution, although the Court’s 
decision was based on statements made by party officials instead of a party programme 
(Zurcher et al 2004: 59-60). The WP never called for the foundation of an Islamic state 
and followed a very pragmatic line while in power, but much of the WP’s appeal was 
based on religious grounds. Whether the WP could be considered an anti-system party is 
an open question. What is certain is that its appeal to religious grounds and the challenge 
to ‘assertive secularism’ of the Turkish state made its closure by the constitutional court 
easier (due to a low threshold for banning political parties) (Ozbudun 2000: 89-90, 
Zurcher et al 2004: 55, Kuru 2006: 136-42). 
 The February 28, 1997 military intervention, which resulted in the end of the WP 
led coalition government (June 18) and the closure of the party (January 1998) has been 
consequential for the transformation of political Islam towards a stance for pro-EU, 
conservative democratic party politics. The intervention and the closure of the WP 
accelerated divisions among the political Islamists. While the traditionalists continued to 
follow Erbakan’s ‘National View’ with the foundation of the Felicity Party (Saadet 
Partisi, founded in July 2001), the R.Tayyip Erdogan-Abdullah Gul led younger 
generation of reformists established the Justice and Development Party (AK Parti/AKP) 
in August 2001.191 In contrast to the ‘National View’, which involved ambiguous 
                                                          
191 From the closure of the Welfare Party in January 1998 to the foundation of the FP and the JDP, the 
political Islamists took place in the Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi), which was closed down by the Turkish 
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positions concerning secular democracy, free market economy, and Western foreign 
policy orientation, the Erdogan-Gul led JDP has explicitly denied that it is a party of 
Islamists or Muslim democrats; rather, the JDP has claimed for being a ‘conservative 
democratic party’ that attributes a major importance to pluralist democracy, human 
rights, civil society, fundamental rights and freedoms, family, and traditional values 
(Akdogan 2006: 53-65, Cinar 2006: 473-4, Tezcur 2005: 17, Yavuz 2006: 1-4).192  
 The Justice and Development Party has realized an outstanding electoral 
performance in the Turkish politics by winning three consecutive elections (2002, 2007, 
2011) that paved the way for single-power majority governments (see Table 5.2).193 The 
JDP governments have achieved better economic performance as compared to the 
previous era of coalition governments (1991-2002), succeeded to launch the accession 
negotiations with the European Union (2005), and undertaken democratization and 
human rights reforms in line with the EU’s democratic conditionality. According to a 
survey taken in May 2006, the majority of the Turkish people considered the JDP 
government as successful in various areas including the economy (67%), relations with 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Constitutional Court in June 2001. The VP period witnessed the rise of divisions between the traditionalists 
and the reformists. 
 
192 ‘Bize Islamci parti demeyin-Do not call us Islamist Party’, Radikal, September 5, 2002. On the National 
View Movement, see Metiner 2004 and Dagi 2001. The JDP’s party programme (‘Democracy and 
Development’) is available online at the website of the party: 
http://eng.akparti.org.tr/english/partyprogramme.html. Yalcin Akdogan, who is the senior advisor to the 
party chief R.T.Erdogan and the ideologue of the party’s political ideology (‘conservative democracy’) has 
argued that the JDP is different from the former National View Movement based Islamist parties in terms 
of organization, political identity, style, and campaign politics. Akdogan has also argued that the JDP’s 
electoral success should not be considered as a success of political Islam although the JDP leadership 
includes ‘ex-Islamists’ (Akdogan 2006: 53). 
 
193 In the first decade of Turkey’s multi-party democracy, the Democrat Party (DP) too won three 
consecutive elections (1950, 1954, 1957); however, the DP lost its percentage of votes in the 1957 elections 
while the JDP achieved to increase its votes in each consecutive elections  by having 34.3%, 46.5%, 49.9% 
in the 2002, 2007, 2011 elections respectively. 
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the EU (66%), Turkish politics (62%), and the treatment of religious and secular people 
in public offices and society (60% and 55%, respectively). The same survey found that 
people were most satisfied with the JDP’s performance concerning the EU membership, 
improvement of the economy, fight against corruption, solving healthcare issues, and the 
expansion of religious freedoms.  
 According to a recent survey (June 2011), the Turkish people have been quite 
satisfied with the JDP’s performance in power since November 2002; while only 4 
percent of these surveyed were satisfied with the direction the country was following in 
2002, the level of satisfaction increased to 40 percent in 2006, and to 48 percent in 
2011.194 Particularly notable, the 2006 survey provided important evidence for the 
different levels of perceptions among the Turkish people in regard to the JDP’s 
commitment to democracy (53.7% yes, 25.9% no) vis-à-vis the Welfare Party’s (28.6% 
yes, 42.4% no). In addition, 50.8 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement 
that ‘among the existing parties, the JDP is the one that supports fundamental rights and 
liberties the most’ (30.7% disagree, 15.4 undecided) (Carkoglu and Toprak 2007: 92-94). 
In contrast to the ideology-based WP, which acquired support mostly from 
Islamists/religious voters, the JDP has become a catch all party (46.5% in 2007, 49.9% in 
2011) by receiving support not only from religious Turks but also from pro-EU liberal 
democrats and the Kurdish people (Kalaycioglu 2010: 174, Kardas 2008: 180, Onis 2004: 
13-17). Overall, the JDP has followed a different pattern of political identity and 
                                                          
194  ‘On Eve of Elections, a More Upbeat Mood in Turkey’, the Pew Research Center (Washington D.C.), 
June 7, 2011 (http://pewglobal.org/2011/06/07/on-eve-of-elections-a-more-upbeat-mood-in-turkey/). The 
survey also found that religious people are more satisfied with the country’s direction under the JDP vis-à-
vis the secular part of the Turkish society. 
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governmental performance vis-à-vis the Islamist Welfare Party, and it does not have any 
feature of an anti-system party. Therefore, the transformation of political Islam following 
the February 1997 military intervention has made an important contribution to the 
consolidation of democracy in Turkey. 
 
Table 5.2: Turkish Parliamentary Election Results (1995-2011): Percentages of votes 
and number of seats in the Parliament (TBMM) 
 
 
PARTIES* 
 
1995 1999 2002 2007 2011 
Republican People’s Party 
(CHP) 
10.7% 
(49) 
8.7%  
(0) 
19.4% 
(177) 
20.9% 
(112) 
26% 
(135) 
Democratic Left Party (DSP) 14.6% 
(76) 
22.2% 
(136) 
1.2%  
(0) 
- 0.25% 
(0) 
Motherland Party (ANAP) 19.6% 
(132) 
13.2% 
(86) 
5.1%  
(0) 
- - 
True Path Party/Democrat Party 
(DYP-DP) 
19.2% 
(135) 
12%  
(85) 
9.5% 
(0) 
5.4%  
(0) 
0.15% 
(0) 
Nationalist Action Party (MHP) 8.1%  
(0) 
18% 
(129) 
8.3%  
(0) 
14.2% 
(71) 
13%  
(53) 
 Justice and Development Party 
(AKP) 
- - 34.3% 
(365) 
46.5% 
(341) 
49.8% 
(327) 
Virtue Party (FP) - 15.4% 
(111) 
- - - 
Felicity Party (SP) - - 2.5% (0) 2.3% 
(0) 
1.2% 
(0) 
Welfare Party (RP) 21.4% 
(158) 
- - - - 
HADEP/DEHAP/DTP/BDP** 
(Kurdish Nationalist Party) 
4.1% 
(0) 
4.7%  
(0) 
6.1%  
(0) 
- - 
Others 1% (0) 3% (0) 12% (0) 5% (0) 4.5% 
(0) 
Independents 0.5% (0) 0.9% (3) 1% (8) 5.3% 
(26)** 
6.6% 
(35)** 
Total Seats 550 550 550 550 550 
Turnout 82.3% 87.1% 79.1% 84.2% 87.4% 
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Notes:  
 
* The nationwide electoral threshold for political parties is 10 percent. The centre-left 
parties: CHP and DSP; the center-right parties: AKP, ANAP, DYP; the political Islamist 
parties: RP, SP, FP; the Turkish nationalist party: MHP; the Kurdish nationalist parties: 
HADEP/DEHAPDTP/BDP. 
 
** Members of the Kurdish nationalist party took part in the 2007 and 2011 elections as 
independent candidates not to be failed by the 10 percent threshold. 
 
Source: Kalaycioglu 2010: 158, the website of Turkey’s High Election Board (YSK)    
(http://www.ysk.gov.tr), and 
http://www.secimsitesi.com/GenelSecimSonuclari.asp?SY=2007 
 
  
 The lack of an anti-system party in the country should be seen an asset for 
democratic consolidation, yet two related important issues have continued to pose 
challenges to elite consensus on the democratic regime.195 The first issue is the lack of 
consensus on how secularism is defined by the key political actors including the political 
parties, the military, and the judiciary. The question has major repercussions on the 
functioning of democracy in the country as demonstrated by the military’s intervention 
(the April 27 e-memo) in the last presidential election (2007) and the attempt to close the 
JDP by the chief public prosecutor in 2008.196 Both the military and the judicial attempts 
against the JDP showed that the party’s understanding of secularism was in conflict to a 
large extent with the one identified by the secular establishment (the military, and upper 
                                                          
195 The EU’s annual progress reports on Turkey have never considered the Justice and Development Party 
as an anti-system party. In addition, the progress reports have confirmed that the party has had a firm 
commitment to the EU accession process. For example, the 2004 report noted as follow: ‘The three-party 
coalition government which had ruled Turkey since 1999 was, following the early elections in November 
2002, replaced by a one-party government. In the last two years, Turkey has enjoyed greater stability, 
overcoming the consequences of the two serious financial crises of 2000 and 2001. Political and economic 
reforms received new impetus because of the determination of the (JDP) government to meet the 
Copenhagen criteria’ (p.20). 
 
196 Turkey’s Constitutional Court decided not to close the JDP but imposed financial penalties in July 2008. 
In the eleven-member Court, six judges made decision in favor of the closure while five judges rejected the 
charges. Only one vote saved the JDP as seven votes were enough to ban the party.  
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echelons of the bureaucracy and the judiciary) and the main opposition party (the 
Republican People’s Party, CHP). For Ergun Ozbudun, a prominent constitutional law 
professor and an expert on democratic consolidation, a reasonable consensus on the 
definition of secularism is necessary for the consolidation of Turkish democracy 
(Ozbudun 2009: 155-166). Although the country has been free from a ‘secularist-
Islamist’ divide at the public level, as confirmed by the 2006 survey study197, the right 
and the left sides of the political landscape have not yet reached a reasonable consensus. 
The second major issue concerning elite consensus is that the military’s interference in 
politics and the coup plots have not yet faced a solid civilian reaction. In this regard, the 
Republican People’s Party’s (RPP) conventional alliance with the military for the sake of 
protecting the secular regime has made it difficult to realize a democratic pattern of civil-
military relations in the country. The RPP’s underestimation of the threat posed by the 
recent coup plots (the Ergenekon and the Balyoz trials) is a seminal example in this 
regard.198  
 The European integration process has helped the achievement of elite consensus 
in several ways. First of all, the transformation of political Islam in the country started 
                                                          
197  The May 2006 survey study showed that the majority of the Turkish people has been quite tolerant to 
both religious and secular lifestyles, and that there is not a divison between the so-called ‘secularists’ and 
the ‘Islamists’. As suggested earlier, the survey also provided an important evidence for the declining levels 
of public support for an Islamic political regime (21% in 1999, 9% in 2006). The survey asked whether 
‘secularism is under threat in Turkey’; 72.6% said no while 22.6% said yes. In addition, the majority of the 
respondents considered that female civil servants (68%) and university students (76%) should be allowed to 
cover if they wish (Carkoglu and Toprak 2007: 32-33, 76). 
 
198 The former CHP chief Deniz Baykal made a statement that he could be a lawyer for the Ergenekon 
defendants. Suheyl Batum, who is currently a vice president of the CHP, stated that ‘the whole military is 
destroyed; we supposed it as the military but it was just a paper tiger’ in reference to the Ergenekon trial on 
the coup allegations. In the June 2011 parliamentary elections, several MP candidates, who have been in 
jail due to the alleged involvement in the coup plots, get elected in the CHP’s list.  
‘Ergenekon Avukati’, Milliyet,  July 6, 2008 
 (http://www.milliyet.com.tr/Default.aspx?aType=YazarDetay&ArticleID=890324&AuthorID=68), 
‘Batum: Asker meger kagittan kaplanmis’, February 6, 2011 (http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25179379/) 
 208 
 
earlier than the Helsinki decision of Turkey’s EU candidacy (1999); however, the EU 
accession process substantially facilitated the moderation process of the political 
Islamists that culminated in the emergence of pro-EU/conservative democratic political 
party (Tezcur 2005: 17, Onis 2004: 14-17, Tepe 2008: 208). In contrast to cultural 
essentialism and anti-EU positions of the Welfare Party, the JDP realized comprehensive 
political and economic reforms to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria, succeeded in launching 
accession negotiations with the EU. To an important extent, the JDP’s political mission to 
transform the Kemalist paradigm in favor of a more liberal pattern of state-society 
relations, basic rights and freedoms, and the practice of secularism has converged with 
the Copenhagen criteria driven democratization and human rights reforms (Cinar 2006: 
480-82, Dagi 2006: 102). In doing so, the JDP has also been transformed into a more 
moderate political party integrating further with the secular democratic regime. In 
addition, the EU’s requirement for the civilian control of the military has generated an 
important incentive for the JDP’s commitment to the EU accession process (Jenkins 
2006: 186). 
 Second, the European integration process safeguarded secularism in the country 
even though the EU has not offered a concrete model concerning the domestic 
controversies on the practice of secularism (the headscarf issue, i.e.) (Onis 2004: 17; 
2009: 12). Moreover, the expansion of fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of 
religion, during the EU accession process has helped moving the Turkish secularism into 
a more liberal pattern.199  
                                                          
199 In the aftermath of the EU conditionality driven political reforms, public reactions to strict secularist 
policies have declined to a great extent. According to the May 2006 survey, the percentage of respondents 
 209 
 
 Finally, the European integration process has provided a favorable environment 
for the increasing civilian consensus on the democratic control of the armed forces. The 
EU’s conditionality in the realm of the civil-military relations and its explicit support for 
the trials on the coup allegations strengthened the civilians against the military’s 
interference in politics. In addition, the Socialist members of the European Parliament 
have often criticized the Republic People’s Party in favor of the democratic civil-military 
relations. For example, the RPP’s position in the 2007 e-memorandum and its 
underestimation of the coup allegations were condemned by the European Socialists.200  
 When the author asked about the major problems of Turkish democracy in his 
field work, none of the interviewees referred to the existence of an anti-system party in 
the country. Hakan Yilmaz and Ersin Kalaycioglu, Bogazici and Sabanci University 
political scientists, argued that democracy as a political regime has an overwhelming 
public support; however, polarization and the lack of trust among political parties and 
major groups pose serious problems. Professors Kalaycioglu and Ziya Onis noted that 
secularism is still an area of considerable tension in the country. Muhittin Ataman 
criticized the state control over religion while Ali Resul Usul considered that the 
consolidation of Turkish democracy requires overcoming authoritarian understandings 
and practices of secularism. Former diplomat Akin Ozcer and social democratic MP Ufuk 
                                                                                                                                                                             
who indicate that religious people are subject to state repression declined from 43% in 1999 to 17% in 2006 
(Carkoglu and Toprak 2007: 13).  
200 The RPP’s inclusion of the Ergenekon defendants as MP candidates in the 2011 elections was criticized 
by the Vice-President of the Socialist Group in the European Parliament. Swoboda: 'CHP, sivil anayasaya 
destek vermeli', June 17, 2011 (http://www.euractiv.com.tr/ab-ve-turkiye/interview/swoboda-chp-sivil-
anayasaya-destek-vermeli-019084). On the Socialists’criticism of the RPP in regard to the 2007 
presidential elections crisis/the April 27 e-memo, see: ‘Avrupalı Sosyalistler'in CHP'ye tepkisi dinmiyor’, 
Yeni Safak, May 4, 2007 (http://yenisafak.com.tr/Gundem/?t=04.05.2007&i=43758) 
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Uras criticised the RPP for underestimating the coup allegations/the Ergenekon trial. In 
addition, Professor Berdal Aral questioned the RPP’s commitment to democracy due to 
the fact that an important part of the RPP-minded middle class is supportive of military 
coups. In contrast, several interviewees noted that the Ergenekon trial should be subject 
to criticisms as the trial process has many ambiguities, inconsistencies, and violations of 
fair trial.201 Finally, an overwhelming majority of the interviewees argued that the lack of 
intra-party democracy, the party leaders’ dominance in shaping the MP lists, and the 
political parties law are serious democracy problems in the country.202 
 
 Stateness 
 Turkey’s decades-long armed conflict with the Kurdish separatist organization 
(PKK, Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan-Kurdish Workers’ Party) in particular, and the 
Kurdish question in general have posed a serious challenge for the consolidation of 
democracy in the country. In contrast to the 1984-1999 period in which 35-40 thousand 
people lost their life in the war between the PKK and the Turkish state, the amount of 
violence has declined significantly in the aftermath of the capture of the PKK leader 
Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999. In addition, the post-1999 period has witnessed the 
success of the Kurdish ethnic party in the municipal and parliamentary elections.203 The 
                                                          
201 Interviews with Senem Aydin, Ersin Kalaycioglu, Huseyin Pazarci, and the anonymous law professor 
from Yeditepe University. The author did not ask the Ergenekon issue specifically; rather, these 
interviewees discussed it while they were responding to the twelve questions in the interview document 
(Appendix 1). 
 
202  Interviews with Ziya Muezzinoglu, Senem Aydin, Yilmaz Ensaroglu, Huseyin Pazarci, Seyfi Tashan, 
Ali Resul Usul, and anonymous law professor from Yeditepe University.  
 
203 See Table 5.2 for the performance of the Kurdish ethnic parties in the 1999, 2002, 2007, and 2011 
parliamentary elections. In the 2009 local elections, the Kurdish ethnic party (DTP) won the governance of 
ninety-six municipalities along with the metropolitan city of Diyarbakir. In the 2004 municipal elections, 
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Copenhagen political criteria-related democratization and human rights reforms in the 
past decade have involved several improvements concerning the cultural and language 
rights of the Kurdish people. Although these reforms have been very helpful, the 
consolidation of democracy in Turkey requires taking further steps in order to handle the 
Kurdish question. 
 The genesis of the Kurdish question goes back to the late Ottoman and the early 
Republican periods. During the one-party rule (1923-50), the Turkish state forcefully 
repressed the Kurdish rebellions, and did not recognise the Kurdish identity. The 
nationalist ideology of the Republican regime envisioned an organic and homogenous 
society by providing no room for the expression of non-Turkish ethnic identities 
(Keyman and Onis 2007: 294, Karakas 2009: 49-53). The decades-long question 
experienced an important transformation with the establishment of the Marxist-Leninist 
Kurdish separatist PKK in the early 1970s. The PKK’s attempt to form an independent 
Kurdish state paved the way for a violent armed conflict with the Turkish state, 
particularly in the period of 1984-99. The conflict resulted in the death of about 25-40 
thousand Kurdish guerillas, five thousand Turkish soldiers, and 5-10 thousand civilians 
(Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 46-48).  
 From 1923 until the late 1990s, the Kurdish problem in the country was taken 
predominantly as a security problem, and the military-driven state policies denied the 
Kurdish identity. For example, the use of Kurdish language was prohibited from 1983 to 
1991, and the Kurdish population has only recently enjoyed cultural rights such as 
radio/TV broadcasting in their native languages. The internationalization of the Kurdish 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the Kurdish candidates took part in the elections on the list of a social democratic party (SHP), and 
achieved to rule several municipalities including the major Southeastern city, Diyarbakir.  
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issue after the Gulf War (1990-91), the mounting levels of PKK insurgency in the early 
1990s, and the increasing U.S. and European criticisms of Turkey concerning violations 
of humans rights stemming from the armed conflict with the PKK made the Kurdish 
question a central problem for Turkey’s democracy in the 1990s (Kalaycioglu 2010: 161, 
Turan 2007: 337-8, Ahmad 2008: 200-4).  
 The capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan in February 1999, the Helsinki 
decision of Turkey’s candidacy for EU membership in December 1999, the fast-tract 
democratization and human rights reforms to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria 
(2001-2004), and the increasing power of the civilian authority vis-à-vis the military 
throughout the 2000s have made the resolution of the Kurdish question more likely in the 
past decade. In contrast to the security identification of the question in which the military 
played a central role in the previous two decades, the 2000s witnessed several positive 
developments in this area: (i) the declining level of violence between the PKK and the 
Turkish state following Ocalan’s capture, (ii) the expansion of fundamental rights and 
liberties as well as cultural rights for the Kurdish population during the EU accession 
process, (iii) the Turkish government’s initiative (‘democratic opening’, launched in fall 
2009) to find a political solution to the Kurdish question204, (iv) the presence of a Kurdish 
ethnic party in the parliament following the 2007 and the 2011 elections, and (v) the 
                                                          
204 On the ‘democratic opening’ see: Milli Birlik ve Kardeslik Projesi: Demokratik Acilim-The National 
Unity and Brotherhood Project: The Democratic Opening, Public Relations Office of the Justice and 
Development Party. 
(http://www.akparti.org.tr/media/halklailiskiler/M%C4%B0LL%C4%B0%20B%C4%B0RL%C4%B0K%2
0ve%20KARDE%C5%9EL%C4%B0Kyeni.pdf)  
 
 213 
 
ongoing negotiations between the PKK authorities (including the imprisoned Ocalan) and 
the Turkish state205.  
 While the recognition of Kurdish identity and the attempt to find a political 
solution were almost a taboo until the turn of the century, now both the people and the 
political elite, including the military, have become more willing to end the decades-long 
armed conflict through a political solution206. In addition, the PKK’s focus has shifted 
from establishing a Kurdish state to the following targets: the constitutional recognition 
of Kurdish identity, the expansion of social, cultural, and political rights of the Kurdish 
people, and the formation of an autonomous Kurdish entity in the South-east207 (Karakas 
2009: 17-50, Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 4-12). 
 The European integration process has helped Turkey to resolve the Kurdish 
question in several areas, but has not played a decisive role. It resulted in the expansion 
of fundamental rights and liberties, declining levels of torture and other human rights 
                                                          
205 On the seven-part series of negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish state, see Candar 2011: 40-
56. 
 
206 According to a poll taken by SETA-Pollmark in August 2009 (10,577 respondents in 601 urban and 
rural areas took part), the people considers the Kurdish question a political problem in contrast to the 
security oriented conceptions of the 1980s and 1990s. 71.1% respondents considered that ‘the policies 
implemented in the last 25 years against terrorism’ not successful, while only 20.8 percent found them 
successful (75% versus 14.8% for Kurds, 70.4% versus 21.9% for Turks). On the other hand, both the 
Turkish and Kurdish people regarded the parliament, the government, the president, and the political parties 
as the major actors to settle the Kurdish question. However, the Kurdish people did not consider the 
Turkish military a key actor in this process while the Turkish people allocated a major role to the military. 
For the question that “in your opinion, which of the below will be the most effective in the process of 
settlement of the Kurdish question”, the top three actors for Turks are the military (43.8%), the parliament 
(39.4%), and the government (38.4%) while Kurds considered the parliament (50.7%), the government 
(45.4%), and the presidency (28.3%). Public Perception of the Kurdish Question in Turkey, p.7-8 (It is 
available online at: 
http://www.setadc.org/pdfs/Public_Perception_of_the_Kurdish_Question_in_Turkey.pdf) 
 
207  On the changing targets of the PKK, see the interview with Murat Karayilan (the acting commander): 
“Karayilan: PKK artik eski PKK degil”, Milliyet, May 5, 2009. (http://siyaset.milliyet.com.tr/karayilan--
pkk-artik-eski-pkk-degil/hasan-cemal/siyaset/siyasetyazardetay/06.05.2009/1091211/default.htm)  
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violations, and the abolition of the death penalty (the imprisoned PKK leader was 
sentenced for). Particularly important, the explicit Copenhagen conditionality paved the 
way for increasing cultural rights for the Kurdish people.208 In addition, the EU accession 
process has played an important role in expanding the scope of public debate on formerly 
taboo issues including the Kurdish question. The two constitutional amendments and the 
eight EU harmonization law packages in the period of 2001-2004 were most 
consequential as these legislative changes were made to fulfill the Copenhagen criteria in 
order to start the EU accession negotiations.  
 The stalemate in the Turkey-EU relations (after 2005) has also weakened the 
leverage of the European integration process on Turkey’s efforts to handle the Kurdish 
question. The JDP government’s Kurdish initiative, launched in 2009, was primarily 
driven by domestic dynamics although the European Union encouraged the government 
for this effort. The EU called the Kurdish ethnic party (DTP/BDP) to distance itself from 
the PKK while recognizing the latter as a terrorist organization.209 In addition, the EU 
encouraged the Turkish government and political parties to reach a political solution for 
the Kurdish question. Furthermore, the EU, through the Commission’s annual progress 
reports, has monitored Turkey’s performance in the legislative changes and the level of 
implementation in regard to cultural rights of the people with Kurdish origin.  
                                                          
208 In 1999, the State Security Courts opened an investigation for the former Minister of Foreign Affairs 
since he argued that the Kurdish broadcasting should be possible (Karakas 2009: 19). Later (in 2008), the 
Kurdish broadcasting in radios/TVs was legalised due to the EU conditionality to such extent that the 
Turkish state channel started to make 24 hours broadcasting in several non-Turkish languages including 
Kurdish. In addition, the Kurdish broadcasting was legalised in private channels. 
209 The European Parliament’s annual reports on Turkey, 2007-2011. For example see the 2007 report, page 
5. It is available online at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-
//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A6-2008-0168+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN 
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 In spite of these positive effects, the EU’s leverage on Turkey to make further 
reforms concerning the Kurdish question remained very limited in the years after 2005 
vis-à-vis the 2001-2004 period. For example, the EU has asked for the elimination of 
restrictions concerning Kurdish education and the use of Kurdish language in political 
life (2007 to 2011 regular reports) as well as the ratification of the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National minorities-FCPNM (2001 to 2011 
regular reports). In spite of the EU’s demands, Turkey has not yet made any progress in 
these areas. In the absence of a credible EU commitment to Turkey’s prospect of 
membership, the EU has lacked the capacity to drive Turkey to follow a fast-track pattern 
of reforms in this area. Certainly, domestic political crises in the country in 2007 and 
2008 along with the sporadic occurrence of PKK violence also complicated the resolution 
of the Kurdish question. 
 The interviews with Turkish politicians and academicians provided several 
insights as regards the impact of European integration process for the Kurdish question. 
Professor Ziya Onis suggested that Turkey could handle the question more easily if the 
Turkey-EU relations stay alive. He also argued that the deadlock in the Turkey-EU 
relations after 2005 has played an important role for the low level of success in the 
government’s Kurdish initiative. In a similar line, Professor Ali Karaosmanoglu argued 
that the Kurdish initiative has been undertaken without any considerable impact from the 
EU. Ege Erkocak from the Secretariat of European Affairs confirmed the EU’s positive 
role in the 2001-04 reforms. He also argued that the EU accession process has helped the 
expansion of public debate on the formerly taboo issues. Particularly interesting, he 
provided an anecdote that a bureaucratic commission, which he involved, spent about 
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eight and a half hours to decide on the title of an EU directed law concerning the right of 
broadcasting in non-Turkish languages (in 2002). Keeping in mind that the use of the 
‘Kurdish question’ has only recently been widely used in the country, Erkocak’s anecdote 
suggests that the EU accession process has been entangled with very sensitive issues in 
the political landscape.  
 For Professor Cengiz Aktar, the European integration process has helped Turkey 
to reflect upon the strict nationalist policies pursued in the past century dating back to the 
1908 CUP coup in the Ottoman period. Moreover, several interviewees discussed about 
the limits and negative effects of the EU accession process. The JDP Member of 
Parliament Murat Mercan suggested that a uniform model from the EU member states 
does not exist to guide Turkey’s efforts to handle the Kurdish question as he noted the 
variance across the Spanish, Nordic and French models. Yilmaz Ensaroglu, who is a 
human rights expert in a think tank, pointed out the different conceptions of minorities 
between Turkey and the EU. Particularly interesting, he argued that Turkey’s religious 
and ethnic minorities (the Alevi sect of Islam and the Kurds) have not been happy with 
the EU’s treatment of themselves as minorities since they considered that treatment as 
inferiority. Professor Ali Resul Usul contended that the rise of ethnic issues in the EU 
accession process could generate both positive and negative consequences. Usul was 
concerned that the division of ‘demos’ with the EU directed ethnic debates could 
complicate the democratic consolidation. With an increasing negative note, Huseyin 
Pazarci (the Member of Parliament) and Seyfi Tashan (the president of a think tank) 
criticized the EU as they considered that the EU’s involvement in the Kurdish question 
results in political instability in the country. 
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 Table 5.3 provides a summary of the domestic and European dynamics of 
Turkey’s democratic consolidation by component. 
 
 
Table 5.3: European versus Domestic Dynamics of the Consolidation 
 
 
Components 
of Democratic 
Consolidation 
 
 
Major Events- 
Key Developments 
 
Domestic Dynamics 
 
European Dynamics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Free, fair, 
and 
competitive 
elections 
 
 
 
-Holding parliamentary, 
presidential, and local 
elections without any 
considerable problem 
since 1950 with the 
exception of semi-
competitive 1983 
elections. 
 
  
 
 
-High level of public 
and elite consensus 
about the legitimacy of 
the democratic 
elections in the country. 
 
-The EU suggests that 
10% electoral threshold 
is too high while the 
ECHR ruled (2007) that 
it is up to the countries.  
 
 
-The EU’s democratic 
conditionality (the 
Copenhagen political 
criteria) anchored the 
maintenance of 
democratic elections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Protection 
of basic 
rights and 
liberties, 
human and 
minority 
rights 
 
 
-The 1982 constitution 
prioritized the state over 
the full enjoyment of 
fundamental rights and 
liberties. 
 
-The 2001, 2004, and 
2010 constitutional 
amendments expanded 
the scope of 
fundamental rights and 
liberties. 
 
 
 
 
 
- The state of 
emergency in the 
South-east (1987-2002) 
resulted in further 
restrictions of already 
limited scope of 
fundamenral rights and 
liberties. 
 
- The JDP single-power 
majority government 
(2002-2007) enhanced 
the momentum of EU 
related reforms vis-à-
vis the 1999-2002 
coalition government. 
 
- The 1999 Helsinki 
decision of Turkey’s EU 
candidacy and the 
Copenhagen 
conditionality rules 
paved the way for the 
unprecedented political 
reforms in 2001-04. 
 
-The EU set the 
ratification of 
international covenants 
on human and minority 
rights as a part of the EU 
acquis. 
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-The 2004 constitutional 
amendment to Article 90 
made international 
human rights agreements 
Turkey ratified superior 
to domestic laws. 
 
 
 
 
 
- Death penalty 
abolished (August 2002) 
to align with the EU 
acquis. 
 
- The Commission 
reports (1998-present) 
monitor Turkey’s 
performance in this area. 
 
- The stalemate in the 
Turkey-EU relations 
(2005 to present) has 
lessened the EU’s 
leverage. 
 
-The Council of Europe 
membership and the 
adoption of the ECHR 
(1949, 1954). Since 
1987, the Turkish 
citizens have been 
allowed to apply to the 
ECtHR.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.High 
prospects of 
regime 
survival and 
civilian 
control of 
the military 
 
    
- The military has long 
served as a ‘guardian’of 
the Republic; the 1960 
and 1980 military coup 
d’etats; the 1997 and 
2007 military 
memorandums. 
 
-The currently 1982 
constitution extended 
further the institutional 
and political autonomy 
of the military. 
 
- The April 2007 e-
memorandum by the 
General Staff in regard 
to the presidential 
elections 
 
 
 
 
- Public reaction to the 
April 2007 e-
memorandum; the 
governing JDP received 
the historic 47% of the 
votes in the July 2007 
elections. 
 
-The 2010 
constitutional 
amendment made 
possible the trial of 
coup plots by the 
civilian courts. 
 
- The EU monitors 
Turkey (1998-present) in 
regard to the civil-
military relations. 
 
- The National Security 
Council reforms (2001-
2004) undertaken to 
fulfill the Copenhagen 
political criteria.  
  
- The stalemate in the 
Turkey-EU relations 
(2005 to present) has 
lessened the EU’s 
leverage. 
 
-The EU supports the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz 
trials of coups plots by 
the civilian courts. 
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-The 2003-2004 and 
2009 coup plots are 
currently under 
investigation by the 
civilian courts (the 
Ergenekon and Balyoz 
trials) 
 
 
-Turkey’s membership 
in the NATO (1952); 
ambiguous effects on the 
civil-military relations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1 
Legitimacy 
 
 
-High levels of turnout 
in the parliamentary 
elections (1950 to 
present). 
 
 
 
-The level of public 
support for an Islamic 
political regime 
declined from 27% in 
1996 to 9% in 2006. 
 
-77% of the people 
consider democracy the 
best political regime 
(the 2006 poll). 
 
-A considerable part of 
the people (27%) 
consider that a military 
regime can be more 
effective in solving the 
country’s problems 
than elected 
governments; the 
majority of the people 
also agree (56.8% yes, 
18.4% no) that the 
military occasionally 
can criticize the civilian 
government (the 2006 
poll). 
 
 
-The people perceive the 
EU symbolizing 
modernization, 
democracy, respect for 
human rights and peace.  
 
-The public considers 
the EU membership less 
‘as a good thing’ in 2010 
(42%) than in 2004 
(71%). 
 
-The majority of the 
people aspire the EU 
membership (69% yes, 
26% no in May 2011 
poll) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 Anti-
System 
Parties/Elite 
Consensus 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- Ideational change in 
Turkey’s political 
Islamists following the 
1997 military 
intervention; from an 
ideological/religious 
party towards a 
conservative 
democratic catch-all 
party. 
 
 
- In contrast to the EU 
skeptical Welfare Party, 
the JDP has had a high 
commitment to the EU 
membership goal. 
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-Lack of elite 
consensus on the 
practice of secularism; 
secularism is still a 
source of a major 
political contention. 
 
-Lack of a strong 
civilian consensus 
against the military 
interventions; the main 
opposition party (CHP) 
follows an ambiguous 
position towards the 
military’s 
interventions/coup 
plots. 
 
 
- The JDP’s drive to 
liberalize the Kemalist 
political regime has 
converged to a great 
extent the EU accession 
related political reforms. 
 
-The European 
integration process 
anchors the secular 
regime but also 
transforms it by 
enhancing the scope of 
freedom of religion. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3.Stateness 
 
 
 
 
 
-In contrast to the 
military-security driven 
paradigm of the 1980s 
and the 1990s, a 
political solution to the 
Kurdish question has 
been more likely in the 
past decade. 
 
- The capture of PKK’s 
leader (A.Ocalan) in 
1999 eased the PKK-
Turkey armed conflict, 
and made the political 
solution of the Kurdish 
question more likely. 
 
-The ongoing 
negotiations between 
the PKK and the 
Turkish state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- The EU monitors 
Turkey (1998-present) in 
regard to minority rights. 
 
-The Copenhagen 
political criteria related 
reforms (2002-04) have 
enhanced cultural rights 
of the Kurdish people 
(tv/radio broadcasting, 
i.e.) 
 
-The EU accession 
process has helped the 
expansion of public 
debate on sensitive 
issues including the 
Kurdish question. 
 
-The EU’s conditionality 
requires the adoption of 
international 
conventions on minority 
rights as a part of the 
acquis. 
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-The Kurdish ethnic 
party (DTP/BDP) takes 
part in the the 
parliament since the 
July 2007 elections; it 
also governs several 
municipalities 
including the South-
Eastern metropolitian 
city of Diyarbakir. 
 
-The JDP government 
has launched the 
Kurdish initiative but it 
has not realized any 
considerable progress. 
 
-The Kurdish people and 
the ethnic party provide 
a high level of support 
for the EU membership. 
 
- The stalemate in the 
Turkey-EU relations 
(2005 to present) has 
lessened the EU’s 
leverage. 
 
-The Council of 
Europe/ECtHR helps in 
regard to minority rights. 
 
 
  
 
 Conclusion 
 The six-decade long but interrupted Turkish democracy has only recently found 
an opportunity to be consolidated. The current trial process on several military coup plots 
by the civilian courts, first time in history, represents a symbolic milestone in the 
changing nature of civil-military relations in the country. The Kurdish question as one of 
the central challenges for the consolidation has also been widely considered as a political 
problem recently in contrast to the earlier military-security paradigm that left little room 
for the recognition of Kurdish identity. Moreover, Turkey has achieved to make a major 
progress in regard to the protection of fundamental rights and liberties in the past decade. 
Nevertheless, Turkey has to take further steps to realize democratic consolidation as 
defined in this study. In this regard, two areas are of fundamental importance: the 
democratic control of the armed forces and the resolution of the Kurdish question. 
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 The European integration process, which was launched through the December 
1999 Helsinki European Council decision of Turkey’s candidacy, has made several 
contributions to the consolidation of Turkish democracy. The EU’s democratizing impact 
was most decisive in the period of 2001-2004, in which Turkey realized democratization 
and human rights reforms at an unprecedented scale in order to fulfill the Copenhagen 
political criteria and launch the accession negotiations. The two constitutional 
amendments and the eight EU harmonization law packages involved several changes 
concerning various components of the consolidation. The legal changes along with 
improvement in the level of implementation resulted in major progress, particularly on 
the second and third components: the protection of fundamental rights and liberties 
including human and minority rights, and the civilian control of the military.  
 The stalemate in the Turkey-EU relations, the partial suspension of the accession 
negotiations, and the declining prospect for EU membership have reduced the EU’s 
democratizing leverage in the period 2005-present. Although the EU has continued to 
monitor Turkey concerning the Copenhagen political criteria, and urged for making 
further progress in the deficient areas through the annual progress reports, the EU has lost 
its leverage to great extent in this period. Unless the Turkey-EU relations got a new 
momentum through a credible prospect for membership, the EU is not expected to play a 
decisive role for the consolidation of Turkish democracy in the years to come. The course 
of democratic consolidation could take a longer time in the absence of a dynamic pattern 
of Turkey-EU relations. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
COMPARATIVE CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 The central research question in this dissertation is: when, under what conditions, 
and to what extent did European integration, particularly the European Union’s 
requirement for democratic conditionality, contribute  to democratic consolidation in 
Spain, Poland, and Turkey? On the basis of a four-part definition of democratic 
consolidation, the case study chapters analyzed the democratizing impact of European 
integration on each component. That impact was also examined in the context of 
domestic and non-EU international dynamics. While the chapters briefly discussed the 
period of democratic transition, the major focus was on the process of democratic 
consolidation by assessing the EU’s democratizing effects in three specific time frames: 
1977-1986 for Spain, 1994-2004 for Poland, and 1999-present for Turkey. 
 This chapter will first overview the three case studies and generate comparative 
observations. Then, it will revisit the two hypotheses, which were set at the beginning of 
the study. Next, domestic and non-EU international dynamics of democratic 
consolidation in the three countries will be evaluated vis-à-vis the EU’s democratizing 
role. Finally, the chapter will end with a discussion on implications of the dissertation for 
future research. 
 
 Summary of Findings and Cross-National Observations 
 In the post-Franco period of political transformation, the European integration 
process was an integral part of the process of democratic consolidation in Spain. 
European political parties and transnational party networks provided organizational, 
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material and moral support to both the Spanish left and the Spanish right. The Council of 
Europe set the holding of free, fair and competitive elections as a precondition for the 
membership. The European Community explicitly stated that ‘respect for and 
maintenance of representative democracy and human rights’ are essential elements of the 
EC membership (the Copenhagen Declaration, April 1978). Following the enactment of 
the 1978 constitution, the European Commission provided its favorable opinion for the 
beginning of accession negotiations as it considered that Spain fulfilled the political 
conditionality. King Juan Carlos and Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez (1982-96) 
underlined many times the critical link between the processes of European integration 
and democratic consolidation. For the majority of the Spanish people, and particularly for 
the Spanish left, the EC membership symbolized the end of political isolation from 
European democracies, which was one of the key features of the Franco period (1939-
75). The European integration process, which received an overwhelming support from 
the Spanish people and political elite, was very helpful for the acceleration of the 
consolidation process. Nevertheless, three major qualifications should be made in 
assessing the EC’s democratizing role: (i) domestic dynamics of the consolidation were 
of primary importance, (ii) the EC did not yet have a rigid mechanism insisting on 
democratic conditionality210, and (iii) the February 23, 1981 coup attempt showed that the 
EC was not in a position to prevent a serious risk of breakdown of democracy. 
 While the European Community followed a cautious line in the wake of the post-
Communist democratic transition (1989-91), the EC attained an increasing leverage on 
Poland’s political and economic reforms in the aftermath of the June 1993 Copenhagen 
                                                          
210 In contrast, the 1993 Copenhagen political criteria involved specific rules on human rights, minority 
rights, and civil-military relations. 
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European Council summit. By linking Poland’s prospect for membership to fulfillment of 
the Copenhagen criteria, the European integration process played accelerating and 
reinforcing roles in the process of democratic consolidation. However, the EU’s 
democratizing role varied across different components of the consolidation. The EC’s 
democratic conditionality anchored the maintenance of democratic elections, contributed 
to the protection of minority rights and the ratification of international human rights 
conventions, played a direct role in the abolition of death penalty, and indirectly 
contributed to public legitimacy of Poland’s democracy. In addition, the European 
integration became an integral part in the broad consensus between Solidarity and the 
communist successor political parties concerning the major political and economic 
reforms. The EU’s role on civil-military relations remained limited as compared to the 
one that NATO accession talks (September-November 1997) had for Poland’s reforms in 
the army. As a result, civilian control of the army was not a problem area during the EU 
accession talks (1998-2002). Moreover, one should acknowledge that Poland’s domestic 
dynamics (the enactment of 1997 constitution and the broad consensus between the right 
and the left, i.e.) played significant roles for the second and third component of 
consolidation. 
 From the 1963 Turkey-EU Associate Agreement to the 1999 Helsinki decision of 
Turkey’s official candidacy for membership, the European Union did not make a 
considerable impact on Turkey’s democracy for two major reasons: (i) the lack of 
credible prospect for EU membership, and (ii) political instability in Turkey’s political 
landscape that involved the 1971, 1980, and 1997 military interventions. In contrast, the 
1999-2004 period witnessed a substantial EU leverage on Turkey’s political reforms 
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through the Copenhagen political criteria, set as a prerequisite to launch the accession 
negotiations. Two constitutional amendments and eight EU harmonization law packages 
adopted during this period resulted in significant progress in the democratic 
consolidation, particularly with regard to protection of fundamental rights and liberties, 
human rights, minority rights, and civilian control of the military. Later, partial 
suspension of the accession negotiations, which lessened Turkey’s prospect for 
membership, weakened the EU’s democratizing impact. As a result, the 1999-2004 
period represented a particular era in about half a century of Turkey-EU relations in terms 
of the EU’s leverage on the promotion of Turkey’s democracy. 
 When studying the impact of the European integration process on democratic 
consolidation in the three countries, several comparative observations can be made. First 
of all, Spain and Poland shared three major similarities that have been largely absent in 
the Turkish case: (i) the existence of a credible prospect for membership throughout the  
EU accession process (Turkey did have that prospect only for the period of 1999-2004), 
(ii) the European integration process converged with the major era of political 
transformation (post-Franco and post-Communist periods of regime change), and (iii) the 
NATO accession process was more helpful than the EU accession process in regard to 
civilian control of the military. The first two similarities were favorable dynamics for the 
increasing leverage of the EU accession process in Spain and Poland while Turkey has 
lacked such advantages. In addition, NATO membership (since 1952) did not save 
Turkey from the frequent military interventions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997) while the 
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EU’s Copenhagen conditionality was a driving force behind significant reforms in the 
civil-military relations made in the years 2001-04.211  
 The changing nature of EU’s democratic conditionality over time was visible in 
the latter cases of Poland and Turkey while Spain did not face meticulous conditionality 
rules as set through the Copenhagen political criteria (1993). Although Spain’s 
membership too was linked to the maintenance of democratic regime and respect for 
human rights (the 1978 Copenhagen Declaration), the EU’s democratic conditionality did 
not involve specific rules concerning minority rights and civil-military relations at that 
time.  
 In Poland and Turkey, the EU developed a more rigorous form of democratic 
conditionality attached by the European Commission’s annual progress reports. As a 
result, the two countries encountered specific EU requests concerning the ratification of 
international human rights conventions, respect for minority rights, and democratic 
control of the armed forces.  
 The democratic consolidation processes in Spain and Turkey share two major 
similarities. In both countries, the stateness question and civilian control of the army have 
been the central challenges to consolidation. The Basque separatism in Spain and the 
Kurdish separatism in Turkey also posed serious challenges. In addition, military’s 
involvement in politics and coup plots were among the major troubles for democratic 
consolidation in Spain and Turkey.  
                                                          
211 One can argue that Turkey’s NATO membership has generated some democratic effects such as the 
spread of democratic norms of civil-military relations among the military officers. For example, Professor 
Ali Karaosmanoglu contended that Turkey could have witnessed more coup d’états if the country has not 
been a NATO member (the author’s interview in Ankara-December 18, 2009). Yet, these democratic 
effects remained very limited as demonstrated by the 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 military interventions. 
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 Revisiting Hypotheses and the Research Question  
 Hypothesis 1: The European integration process, particularly the EU’s 
democratic conditionality, favors democratic consolidation in the candidate country but 
its magnitude is conditioned by domestic factors. 
 
 The first hypothesis has found a general support in the analysis of the three case 
studies. The European integration process, particularly the EU’s democratic 
conditionality contributed to Spain and Poland’s democratic consolidation as defined in 
this dissertation. Likewise, the ongoing process of Turkey’s integration with the EU has 
generated democratizing effects for the four components of consolidation. Table 6.1 
provides an overview of the democratizing impact of the European integration process on 
different components of democratic consolidation in Spain, Poland, and Turkey.  
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Table 6.1: The European Integration Process and Four Components of Democratic 
Consolidation: Spain, Poland, and Turkey in a Comparative Perspective 
 
   
I. Free, fair  
and competitive 
elections 
 
 
II. Protection of 
fundamental 
rights, human, 
and minority 
rights 
 
 
III. Prospect of 
regime survival 
/ civilian control 
of the army 
 
IV. Public 
legitimacy, elite 
consensus, 
stateness 
 
 
 
 
Spain 
(1977-86) 
 
 
 
anchoring, 
reinforcing 
 
 
 
 
reinforcing, no 
explicit 
conditionality for 
minority rights 
 
reinforcing, no 
explicit 
conditionality in 
this area 
  
reinforcing, 
strong public 
and elite support 
for 
Europeanization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Poland 
(1994-2004) 
 
 
 
anchoring, 
reinforcing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
helpful, explicit 
conditionality for 
the ratification of 
international 
human rights 
conventions and 
for the promotion 
of minority rights 
(Roma people, 
i.e.) 
 
  
no direct role as 
the key civil-
military relations 
reforms made 
before the 
beginning of 
accession 
negotiations 
 
indirect 
contributions 
 
reinforcing 
strong public 
and elite support 
for ‘Return to 
Europe’ 
 
 
 
Turkey 
(1999-present) 
 
 
 
anchoring, 
reinforcing 
 
 
 
 
 
 
decisive for the 
2001-04 reforms 
as regards 
fundamental 
rights and 
liberties, human 
rights, ethnic and 
religious 
minority rights 
 
limited 
contributions in 
the post-2005 
period 
 
 
decisive for the 
2001-04 reforms 
as regards civil-
military relations 
 
limited 
contributions in 
the post-2005 
period 
 
indirect 
contributions 
 
converged with 
ideational 
transformation 
of the political 
Islamists (the 
JDP rule, 2002-
present) 
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 As discussed in the case study chapters, the EU’s democratizing impact is not 
uniform across different components of the consolidation and over time. As a result, 
cross sectional and temporal variations arose during the EU accession process. In this 
regard, domestic factors in the EU candidate countries are notable as they shaped the 
EU’s democratizing leverage. In all three countries, cross-party consensus and strong 
public support for EU membership enhanced the EU’s democratizing leverage.  
 Change of government during the EU accession process did not result in any shift 
in the EU’s democratizing impact in Spain and Poland. Both the UCD (1977-82) and 
PSOE (1982-86) governments in Spain were supportive of the accession. Similarly, both 
Solidarity (1997-2001) and post-Communist (1993-1997, 2001-2004) coalition 
governments worked for the cause of EU membership. In Spain, political instability and 
the rise of Basque violence in 1979, 1980, and early 1981 converged with the low profile 
of Spain-EU relations. As a result, it cannot be a coincidence that the February 23, 1981 
coup attempt took place in this period.  
 In Turkey, change of government in November 2002, from the three-party-
coalition government (included a nationalist-EU skeptic party) to the single-power-
majority government, resulted in the acceleration of EU promoted political reforms; 
hence, the change of government extended the EU’s democratizing leverage.212 The 
JDP’s desire to liberalize strict nationalist and secularist grounds of the Kemalist 
                                                          
212 From the 1999 Helsinki European Council decision of Turkey’s official candidate status for EU 
membership to the fall 2001, the three-party coalition government was slow in responding to the EU-
Turkey Accession Partnership document, which set short-term and middle-run reforms to fulfill the 
Copenhagen political criteria. The Nationalist Action Party (MHP) and several Members of Parliament in 
the Democratic Left Party (DSP) provided a noticeable resistance to the EU’s demands concerning the 
abolition of death penalty, cultural and broadcasting rights for the Kurdish people. For example, the MHP 
applied to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of several articles in the third EU harmonization law 
packages (adopted in August 2002) (Erdem 2007: 11-23). 
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establishment largely converged with the EU promoted political reforms. Later, domestic 
political crises in the country (the presidential elections, the military’s memorandum, and 
the closure case of the governing party- JDP) in the years 2007 and 2008 worsened the 
already stagnated relations with the EU since 2005. The governing party did not change, 
but leverage substantially declined in these years.    
 
 Hypothesis 2:  The degree to which the candidate country has prospect for 
membership affects the democratizing leverage of the European Union. 
 
 In assessing the democratic effects of the EU accession process for democratic 
consolidation in the candidate country, a major dynamic is the EU’s credible 
commitment. If the candidate country has a low prospect for membership, it is unlikely 
that the EU has a high level of democratizing leverage. The three case studies in this 
dissertation provided clear evidence for this hypothesis. In Spain, the February 23, 1981 
coup attempt took place when the Spain-EU relations followed a low profile.213 In 
Poland, the 1993 June Copenhagen European Council meeting was a turning point in 
terms of the EU’s democratizing leverage as the meeting paved the way for the beginning 
of Poland’s accession process. With a clear prospect for membership, conditioned upon 
fulfilling the Copenhagen criteria, the EU accession process had pronounced 
democratizing effects with regard to the four components of consolidation (see Table 
6.1). Unlike the previous period of 1989-1993, which lacked a clear prospect for 
                                                          
213 In 1979 and 1980, Spain suffered from three major problems: the increasing levels of Basque violence, 
economic problems, and the governmental crisis, which resulted in the end of Suarez’s power. Meanwhile, 
France was uneasy for Spain’s accession to the EU, particularly with a concern that Spain’s entry would 
harm French farmers. As a result, the EU-Spain relations followed a low profile in the wake of the 
February 23 coup attempt. 
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membership, the EU executed a greater impact over political reforms in Poland during 
the accession process (1994-2004).  
 In Turkey, the 1999-2004 period represents an exceptional era of EU’s 
democratizing leverage as compared to both the pre-1999 and the post-2005 period of 
Turkey-EU relations. When the December 1999 Helsinki European Council summit 
recognized Turkey as a candidate country, the EU accession process became a key 
dynamic behind Turkey’s efforts to fulfill the Copenhagen political criteria in order to 
launch the accession negotiations. Eight EU harmonization law packages and two 
constitutional amendments adopted in this period resulted in major progress concerning 
consolidation, particularly in its second and third components (see Table 6.1). After 2005, 
the declining prospect for EU membership (accession negotiations were partially 
suspended) substantially lessened the EU’s democratizing leverage. Although the EU has 
continued to monitor Turkey’s democracy and made recommendations for further 
reforms, the post-2005 period shows that the EU has lost most of its democratizing 
leverage in the country. Unless Turkey has a clear prospect for membership (by setting an 
accession date, i.e.), it is unlikely that the EU will have a considerable impact on 
Turkey’s democracy in the years to come. 
 
 Domestic Dynamics of Democratic Consolidation 
 An important part of the research inquiry in this study is the assessment of 
domestic and non-EU international dynamics of democratic consolidation vis-a-vis the 
EU’s democratizing impact in the three countries. In Spain, two major domestic factors 
played a role. First, the earlier enactment of democratic constitution (1978) not only 
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protected fundamental rights and liberties but also substantially helped the solution of the 
regional question through formation of autonomous communities. Second, there was 
broad consensus among the King, the post-Franco right and the socialist-communist left 
in favor of the democratic regime, which prevented it from several coup plots. Compared 
to the EU’s democratizing role in the accession process, these domestic dynamics were of 
primary importance. The European integration process became an interdependent part of 
the post-Franco period of democratization when the Spanish people and political elite 
provided a wholehearted support for EU membership. The EU accession process played 
reinforcing and anchoring roles for the re-born Spanish democracy, and accelerated its 
course of consolidation.  
 Poland followed a very similar line with Spain: domestic dynamics of democratic 
consolidation were of primary importance while the EU accession process accelerated the 
consolidation. The 1997 constitution guaranteed the protection of fundamental rights and 
liberties including human and minority rights. In addition, the constitution strengthened 
the 1996 Ministry of Defense Act in particular and civilian control of the military in 
general. Moreover, Solidarity and the communist successor parties maintained a high 
consensus on the major political, economic, and foreign policy goals. As in Spain, the 
European integration process was of secondary importance as compared to domestic 
factors; however, it became an interdependent element of post-Communist transformation 
because of its high symbolic significance (‘Return to Europe’). The EU accession process 
reinforced and accelerated the course of democratic consolidation.    
 In contrast to Spain and Poland, the EU accession process was a primary dynamic 
of democratic consolidation in Turkey for the years 1999-2004. This period witnessed an 
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extraordinary pace of political reforms, which were made to fulfill the Copenhagen 
political criteria. Particularly notable, the EU’s democratic conditionality favored pro-
reform forces in the country against the status quo coalition (hardliner military officers, 
ultra-nationalists i.e.) who resisted reforms concerning civilian control of the military and 
expansion of rights for Kurdish and non-Muslim people. Without the EU accession 
process, including a credible prospect for membership, the civilian governments in this 
period could have not undertaken these reforms, central to making progress in the second 
and third component of democratic consolidation. For the years 2002-2004, which 
involved the highest pace of reforms, two domestic factors played important roles: (i) 
ideological moderation of political Islamists after the 1997 military intervention that 
culminated in the JDP rule (2002-present), and (ii) pro-democratic profile of the Chief of 
Staff prevented the coup plots and facilitated the making of civil-military relations 
reforms.  
 When the Turkey-EU relations went into a serious deadlock after 2005, the EU 
accession process ceased to be a driving force, and Turkey’s domestic dynamics became 
more important in the course of democratic consolidation. In this period, strong public 
basis of the JDP government made it possible to stand against the April 27, 2007 e-
memorandum and other cases of resistance by hardliner generals. In the post-2005 period, 
the government’s initiative for the Kurdish question, although remaining very limited, did 
happen without any considerable EU impact. In addition to the impasse in Turkey-EU 
relations, domestic political crises in the years 2006-2008 (the April 2007 e-memo and 
the closure case of the governing JDP i.e.) also negatively influenced undertaking further 
democratic reforms in the country. As a result, combination of unfavorable domestic and 
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European milieu in these years left a little room for making progress in the course of 
democratic consolidation.   
 
 Non-EU International Dynamics of Democratic Consolidation 
 Non-EU international dynamics of democratic consolidation in the three countries 
performed varying levels of impact vis-à-vis the one played by the EU accession process. 
The NATO accession process (1994-97) clearly helped civil-military relations reforms in 
Poland. By the time of the EU accession negotiations (1998-2002), Poland had already 
fulfilled the Copenhagen political criteria, which also required civilian control of the 
army. In Spain, joining the NATO (1981) facilitated civilian control of the army, 
particularly by helping re-orientation of the military officers’ attention from domestic 
politics to external security issues. At that time, the area of civil-military relations was 
not an explicit element of the EU’s democratic conditionality. In contrast to Spain and 
Poland, the EU accession process was clearly more favorable than NATO membership 
concerning civil-military relations reforms in Turkey. To satisfy the Copenhagen political 
criteria, Turkey undertook significant reforms in this area in the years 2001-04.  
 The Council of Europe (CE) membership and the ratification of the European 
Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) promoted the protection of fundamental rights and 
liberties, including human and minority rights in three countries. In Spain, the CE 
conditioned the membership upon holding of democratic elections and respect for human 
rights policies. In Poland, the CE and the ECHR were helpful particularly in the first 
years after the democratic transitions while remaining secondary to the Copenhagen 
conditionality during the EU accession process (1994-2004). In Turkey, the CE 
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membership and the ratification of ECHR failed to prevent serious violations of human 
rights in the 1990s while the EU’s democratic conditionality paved the way for 
undertaking substantial reforms during the accession process, especially in the years 
2001-04. 
 Table 6.2 summarizes the role of domestic and non-EU international dynamics of 
democratic consolidation in Spain, Poland, and Turkey. In addition, the table includes 
domestic factors that shaped the EU’s democratizing effects (Hypothesis 1) along with 
the levels of prospect for EU membership (Hypothesis 2) in the three countries. 
 
Table 6.2: Overview of domestic and non-EU international dynamics of democratic 
consolidation in Spain, Poland, and Turkey 
 
 
 
 
Prospect 
for EU 
Member
ship 
 
 
Domestic factors that 
shaped the EU’s 
democratizing effects 
 
Domestic dynamics 
of the consolidation 
 
Non-EU 
international 
dynamics of the 
consolidation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Spain 
(1977-86) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
High public and elite 
support for European 
integration 
 
UCD (1977-82) and 
PSOE (1982-86) 
governments were pro-EU 
 
Earlier enactment of the 
democratic constitution 
(1978), which 
guaranteed fundamental 
rights and included the 
autonomous 
communities formula 
 
The King,  post-Franco 
right and the socialist-
communist left allied 
against the coup plots 
 
High level of public and 
elite support for 
democratization 
 
The Council of Europe 
membership was 
conditioned upon 
holding of the 
democratic elections 
and respect for human 
rights 
 
European political 
parties and party 
networks encouraged 
and guided the 
Spanish political 
parties 
 
NATO membership 
more than EC 
membership helped 
civil-military relations 
reforms 
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Poland 
(1994-
2004) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High public and elite 
support for European 
integration 
 
Solidarity (1997-2001) 
and post-Communist 
(1993-1997, 2001-2005) 
governments were pro-EU 
 
The 1997 constitution 
guaranteed fundamental 
rights, human and 
minority rights; 
strengthened civilian 
control of the army 
 
Solidarity and post-
Communist parties had 
broad consensus on the 
major political and 
economic reforms 
 
The Council of Europe 
Membership and 
ECHR were helpful 
for the promotion of 
fundamental rights, 
human and minority 
rights 
 
NATO accession 
process made direct 
contributions to the 
acceleration of civil-
military relations 
reforms 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Turkey 
(1999-
present) 
 
 
 
 
High, 
1999-
2004 
 
 
Low, 
2005-
present 
 
 
 
 
 
 
High public and elite 
support for European 
integration 
 
Majority of  people and 
political elite in Turkey 
still support the 
integration but enthusiasm 
and expectations 
substantially declined 214 
 
The JDP single power 
majority government 
accelerated the EU related 
reforms (2002-2004) as 
compared to the 1999-
2002 coalition 
government, which 
included a Turkish 
nationalist party. 
 
 
 
 
CGS Hilmi Ozkok 
(2002-06) was a 
favorable figure for the 
2002-04 civil-military 
relations reforms and 
the failure of coup plots 
 
Strong public basis of 
the the JDP government 
(2002-present) have 
made easier civil-
military relations 
reforms and civilian 
trial of the coup plots. 
 
Ideational change of the 
political Islamists after 
the 1997 military 
intervention has been 
very helpful. 
 
77% of the people 
views democracy the 
best political regime. 
 
 
 
The ECHR have been 
helpful for the 
promotion of human 
and minority rights but 
not decisive as much 
as the EU’s 
Copenhagen 
conditionality 
 
NATO membership 
(since 1952) has failed 
to prevent the frequent 
military coups while 
the military intervals 
remained short with 
considerations 
concerning the US and 
EU criticisms. 
 
 
  
 
 
                                                          
214 According to a poll conducted in May 2011, 69 percent of the Turkish people support the EU 
membership while 26 percent oppose (Akgun et al 2011).  Although the stalemate in Turkey-EU relations 
after 2005 did not result in a major decrease in public support, the people has considered Turkey’s EU 
membership less as a good thing in 2011 as compared to 2004 (73% in 2004, 63% in 2005, 54% in 2006, 
40% in 2007, 42% in 2008, 48% in 2009, 38% in 2010, and 48% in 2011). Source: “Transatlantic Trends: 
Key Findings 2011” , The German Marshall Fund of the United States, p.37. Available online at: 
http://www.gmfus.org/publications_/TT/TT2011_final_web.pdf 
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 Implications for Future Research 
 The dissertation attempted to develop a thorough understanding of the 
democratizing impact of European integration for democratic consolidation in Spain, 
Poland, and Turkey. In doing so, the study focused on the EU’s democratic conditionality 
during the accession process, and dissected the phenomenon of consolidation into four 
components. By following a similar structure in each case study chapter, it identified the 
power and limits of EU’s democratizing leverage. In the end, the dissertation found an 
overall support for the two hypotheses put forward in the beginning: the European 
integration process favors democratic consolidation but its magnitude is shaped by (i) 
prospect for EU membership, and (ii) domestic factors in the candidate country. When 
the EU provides a credible prospect for membership and works with favorable domestic 
dynamics in the candidate country, the European integration makes significant 
contributions to different components of democratic consolidation. Otherwise, the EU’s 
democratizing effects remain very limited if the candidate country lacks a credible 
prospect for membership, and if there is an unfavorable domestic setting.  
 The study does not conclude that domestic dynamics of democratic consolidation 
are more or less important than international factors in general. Rather, one has to explore 
the relative significance of domestic and international dynamics across different 
components of the consolidation and over time. An important challenge here is the 
assessment of linkages between domestic and international dynamics of consolidation. 
For that reason, undertaking further comparative case studies could be very helpful to 
explore these linkages.  
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 The dissertation might also have theoretical repercussions for the rationalist and 
sociological/normative approaches in the existing literature on European integration. 
When examining public and elite support for the EU membership in the three countries, 
both approaches could be considered useful. Not only material incentives (EU funds and 
infrastructure development i.e.) but also symbolic and reputational factors (‘Return to 
Europe’ in Poland, overcoming the isolationist Franco legacy in Spain i.e.) played 
important roles for high levels of public and elite support for the European integration. 
 The thesis can be applied into the current and potential EU candidate countries to 
assess the democratizing impact of EU accession process.215 For example, one can expect 
a higher degree of EU’s democracy promotion in the current candidate countries vis-à-vis 
the potential candidate countries as the former have a more credible prospect for EU 
membership. In addition, the EU is expected to execute more leverage in the countries 
that have favorable domestic setting for the EU promoted reforms. The way democratic 
consolidation is defined and dissected into four components could also be applied to 
analyses of these countries in order to see how the European integration process 
contributes/will contribute to different aspects of democratization.  
 Future studies may also focus on one component of democratic consolidation 
(protection of fundamental rights, including human and minority rights i.e.), and then 
analyze in detail how the EU accession process contributes to this area in the current 
and/or potential candidate countries. Moreover, the exploration of domestic factors in the 
EU candidate countries is another area for future studies. It is possible to examine a 
                                                          
215 In addition to Turkey, Croatia, Iceland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and Montenegro 
are the current candidate countries. The EU recognizes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, and 
Kosovo as the potential candidate countries (http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-
countries/index_en.htm). 
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single domestic factor across current and/or potential candidate countries to see how that 
factor enhances or limits the EU’s democratizing leverage. Such factors could include 
ideology of political parties, ethnic nationalism, public and elite support for EU 
membership. 
 Finally, the dissertation involves policy implications for the European Union. As 
the ongoing deadlock in the Turkey-EU relations demonstrates, the EU fails to generate 
considerable democratizing effects in candidate countries if it does not provide credible 
prospect for membership. Therefore, the EU should offer a clear green light for accession 
if it desires to promote democracy effectively in current and potential candidate 
countries. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Field Research Interview Questions 
 
(1) Do you think the EU accession process has helped democratization in your country?  
 
(2) What are/were the major democratizing effects of European integration for 
democracy in your country?  
 
(3) What is/was your own position in regard to the EU membership process? Pro-EU or 
Euro-skeptical?  
 
(4) What is your political orientation in the context of right-left spectrum of politics? 
(Christian Democrat, Social Democrat, Liberal, Conservative, Nationalist etc.)  
 
(5) Which political party do you support in your country?  
 
(6) In what areas, do you think, the EU accession process has helped democracy in your 
country? (political stability, basic rights and freedoms, human rights, minority rights, 
civilian-military relations, economic development etc.)  
 
(7) Do you think democracy in your country has been consolidated in the sense that it is 
free from major democratic problems, and that it does not involve a substantial risk to 
revert to an authoritarian regime?  
 
(8) How do you rate the quality of democracy in your country? (0 to 10 scale; 10 is the 
highest score)  
 
(9) In your view, what are/were the major problems of democracy in your country during 
the EU accession process?  
 
(10) In your view, to what extent political parties differed/differ from each other in regard 
to the EU accession process?  
 
(11) Do you think European integration is a good thing for your country? Why or Why 
not?  
 
(12) In your view, what does European integration symbolize for you? (modernization, 
democratization, political stability, economic development etc.)  
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Appendix 2: The List of Interviewees in Spain 
 
Anonymous Official, Partido Popular, Interview answers received through e-mail on July 
30, 2009 
 
Antonio Carlos Pereira, Professor of Law at Universidad Santiago de Compostela, 
Interview answers received through e-mail on February 12, 2010 
 
Antonio Gonzalez Terol, Director General for European Affairs and Cooperation for the 
Community of Madrid, Interview made on June 24, 2009 
 
Antonio Gutierrez Molina, Partido Popular member of Parliament for Melilla (1996 to 
present), Second Secretary of the Foreign Affairs Committee, Interview made on June 24, 
2009 
 
Charles Powell, Director of Fundacion Transicion Espanola, Professor of Political 
Science at San  
Pablo-CEU University, Interview made on June 29, 2009 
 
Enrique Curiel, former Member of Parliament for PCE (1986-89) and PSOE (1993-96), 
Senator for PSOE (2004-08), Professor of Political Science at Universidad Complutense 
de Madrid, Interview made on June 12, 2009 
 
Ignocio Molina, Senior Analyst at Real Instituto Elcano & Associate Professor of 
Political Science at Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Interview made on June 23, 2009 
 
Jorge Verstrynge, former Secretary General of Popular Alliance (AP) (1979-86), former 
Member of Parliament for Sevilla (AP,1982-86) and for Madrid (PSOE,1986-89), 
Professor of Political Science at Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Interview made on 
June 16, 2009 
 
Jose Manuel Fernandez, current Mayor of the town of Bustarviejo (Madrid), former 
Secretary General of of the United Left’s Parliamentary Group (1986-1995), Interview 
made on July 9, 2009 
 
Josefina Cuesta, Professor of History at Universidad Salamanca, Online communication 
on July 14, 2008 
 
William Chislett, Senior Analyst at Real Instituto Elcano, Time Journalist during the 
Spanish Transition (1975-78), Interview made on July 28, 2009 
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Appendix 3: The List of Interviewees in Poland 
 
 
Ageta Dziewlska, Director of European Studies, Centre for Europe, Warsaw University, 
Interview form filled out in October 2009 
 
Anonymous Official, Office of the Committee for European Integration (UKIE, 
Warsaw), Interview made on October 15, 2009 
 
Anonymous Official, Polish Information and Foreign Investment Agency (Warsaw), 
Interview form filled out on October 16, 2009 
 
Cezary Zoledowski, Director of the Institute of Social Policy, Warsaw University, 
Interview made on September 20, 2009 
 
Dominika Karwoth-Zielinska, Professor of Political Science, Cracow University of 
Economics, Interview answers received through e-mail on November 1, 2009 
 
Ewa Lyskowska, Professor, Faculty of Economic and Social Problems, Warsaw School 
of Economics, Interview form filled out in September 2009 
 
Franciszek Golembski, Professor of European Studies, Faculty of Journalism and 
Political Science, Warsaw University, Interview made on September 15, 2009 
 
Josef Oleksy, Former Prime Minister of Poland (1995-96) and President of the Polish 
Parliament (1993-97, 2001-05), Interview made in Warsaw on October 24, 2009 
 
Justyna Wiatrowska, High School History Teacher, Meridian International School 
(Warsaw), Interview form filled out on October 27, 2009 
 
Katarzyna Zakrzeska, Officer in the Bureau of Andrzej Halicki (Deputy and the Chair of 
Foreign Affairs Committee in the Polish Parliament), Interview answers received through 
e-mail on October 21, 2009 
 
Klaus Bachmann, Professor of Political Science and a Member of the Governing Board 
of the Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw), Interview answers received through e-mail on 
October 29, 2009 
 
Kazimierz Starzyk, Professor of Economics, Warsaw School of Economics, Interview 
made on October 12, 2009 
 
Krzysztof Bobinski, Journalist and Director of the Unia and Polska Foundation 
(Warsaw), Interview made on September 23, 2009 
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Leszek Jesien, Director of European Studies at the Polish Institute of International Affairs 
(Warsaw), served in Poland’s negotiation team for the EU accession, Interview made on 
September 17, 2009 
 
Maciej Duszczyk, Professor of Political Science and Deputy Director of the Institute of 
Political Science, Warsaw University, served in Poland’s negotiation team for the EU 
accession, Interview made on October 13, 2009 
 
Malgorzata Mizerska-Wrotkowska, Professor of European Studies, Institute of 
International Relations, Warsaw University, Interview made on October 16, 2009 
 
Marcin Korolec, Undersecretary of State, Ministry of Economy (Warsaw), Interview 
made on September 29, 2009 
 
Marek Ostrowski, Jouralist, Foreign Affairs editor of the Polityka Magazine (Warsaw), 
Interview made on October 26, 2009 
 
Marek Wejtko, Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Economy, Interview 
made on September 29, 2009 
 
Mieczyslaw Szostak, Lecturer, Faculty of World Economy, Warsaw School of 
Economist, Interview form filled out in September 2009 
 
Pawel Poncyljusz, Member of the Parliament from the Party of Law and Justice (PiS), 
Interview form filled out on October 6, 2009 
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Appendix 4: The List of Interviewees in Turkey 
 
 
Anonymous Law Professor, Yeditepe University (Istanbul), Interview made on January 
7, 2010. 
 
Anonymous Diplomat, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Interview made on 
December 9, 2009. 
 
Ahmet Kenan Tanrikulu, the Member of Parliament, the Nationalist Action Party (MHP), 
Interview made on December 15, 2009. 
 
Akin Ozcer, the Retired Turkish Diplomat, Interview made on January 10, 2010. 
 
Ali Carkoglu, Professor of Political Science, Sabanci University (Istanbul), Interview 
made on December 23, 2009. 
 
Ali Karaosmanoglu, Professor of International Relations, Bilkent University (Ankara), 
Interview made on December 18, 2009. 
 
Ali Resul Usul, Professor of Political Science, Bahcesehir University (Istanbul), 
Interview made on December 28, 2009. 
 
Atilla Eralp, Professor of International Relations, The Middle East Technical University 
(ODTU, Ankara), Interview made on December 17, 2009. 
 
Berdal Aral, Professor of International Relations, Fatih University (Istanbul), Interview 
answers received through e-mail on January 20, 2010. 
 
Burhan Kuzu, the Member of Parliament, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
Interview made on November 23, 2009. 
 
Cengiz Aktar, Professor of European Studies, Bahcesehir University (Istanbul), Interview 
made on December 31, 2009. 
 
Ege Erkocak, EU Expert, Directorate of Political Affairs, the Secretariat General of EU 
Affairs, Interview made on November 18, 2009. 
 
Ersin Kalaycioglu, Professor of Political Science, Sabanci University (Istanbul), 
Interview made on December 24, 2009. 
 
Hakan Yilmaz, Professor of Political Science, Bogazici University (Istanbul), Interview 
made on January 14, 2010. 
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Huseyin Pazarci, the Member of Parliament, the Democratic Left Party (DSP), Interview 
made on November 18, 2009. 
 
Lutfi Elvan, the Member of Parliament, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
Interview made on November 12, 2009. 
 
Muhittin Ataman, Professor of International Relations, Abant Izzet Baysal University 
(Bolu), Interview answers received through e-mail on December 24, 2009. 
 
Murat Mercan, the Member of Parliament, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
Interview made on December 7, 2009. 
 
Mustafa Kaya, Vice Chairman of the Istanbul Provincial Presidency, the Felicity Party 
(Saadet), Interview made on January 6, 2010.  
 
Ridvan Karluk, Professor of Economics and the EU Expert, Anadolu University 
(Eskisehir), Interview answers received through e-mail on December 16, 2009. 
 
Saban Disli, the Member of Parliament, the Justice and Development Party (AKP), 
Interview made on November 17, 2009. 
 
Senem Aydin Duzgit, Professor of International Relations, Istanbul Bilgi University, 
Interview made on January 11, 2010. 
 
Seyfi Tashan, Director of the Foreign Policy Institute (Ankara), Interview made on 
December 16, 2009. 
 
Ufuk Uras, the Member of Parliament (Independent), the former chairman of the 
Freedom and Democracy Party, Interview made on November 13, 2009. 
 
Yilmaz Ensaroglu, Law and Human Rights Director of the SETA (Ankara-based think 
tank), Interview made on December 10, 2009. 
 
Ziya Muezzinoglu, the Former Minister of Finance, the Chairman of the Turkey-Europe 
Foundation (TAV, Istanbul), Interview made on December 28, 2009. 
 
Ziya Onis, Professor of International Relations, Koc University (Istanbul), Interview 
made on January 5, 2010. 
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